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hail
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This thesis is a general examination of the Soviet and East
European crisis which followed the death of Joseph Stalin in March,
1953.

Stalin's character, position, and power were such that the

methods he employed in the government of the vast multi-national and
multi-state empire bequeathed to his successors could not be made to
function in his absence without reform and redefinition.

The post-Stalin

leadership realized that in order to consolidate its position at the head
of the empire a careful program of "de-Stalinization" was mandatory.
The

p~osecution

of that program from the announcement of collective

2

leadership in April, 1953, to the 1957 Moscow celebration of the
fortieth anniversary of the

Bolsh~vik

Revolution and the upheavals

associated ·with the period comprise the four year long Soviet and
East European crisis of de-Stalinization.
There can be little doubt that the crisis was genuine.

The

violent convulsions of 1953 and 1956 belie an imperial system only
marginally, however finally, under control.

Though the stability of

the bloc was re-enforced through a single-minded and determined
application of force and ideology many other complex factors were
involved.

M?jor reforms in all aspects of intra-bloc relations were

carried out.

The system moved from one governed by diktat enforced

by military power to one governed by policy management grounded upon

a Soviet military and economic predominance.

This study is primarily

concerned with the broad conditions and decisions made in the Soviet
and East·European system between March,

1~53,

and November, 1957.

The

·general, topical treatment seeks to identify the major pressures and
currents in the flow of events,· rather than to isolate any one factor
and subject it to exhaustive analysis.
Because the treatment is general, the sources consulted were
general except where the realistic demands of exposition necessitated
more detailed research.

Thus the more relevant of Stalin's and

Khrushchev's speeches and various other documents have been treated
directly, while "secondary" sources have provided the bulk of the
research material.
The image 'of the Soviet and. East European system which emerges
from this study is one of fundamental, long-range continuity glossed

r
3

over and frequently hidden by more transient ·change.

This is not to

say that major changes did not occur, but that they did so within the

context of and were assisted by a more profound stability.

Though it

had been redefined, reformed, and its rhetoric recast, Stalinism,
defined as the systematic codification and application of Leninism,
remained in force.
This is, therefore, a study of the dynamics and continuities of
Stalinism.
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INTRODUCTION
ON THE PROBLEMS OF SCOPE,
METHOD, AND PURPOSE
Since the early nineteenth century, industrialization has become a
question of geopolitical life and death.

Economic development is the

central imperative of modern national existence.

At issue is not whether

a state will industrialize but the method to be used.

The vital appeal

of Communism is its formal commitment to industrial development.
However, as the industrial development of a given Communist state
progresses, a point is usually reached at which Communist ideology, the
force which broke through the previous constraints and was able to impel
and compel economic development, becomes itself a constraint upon further
development.

At this point exclusively political and ideological require-

ments can no longer produce. economic growth, and the classic economic
100dels of Marxism-Leninism lose their fundamental relationship to economic
reality and policy.

Industrial growth stagnates as indicated and symbol-

ized by dramatically rising capital-output ratios.

Political solutions

prove impotent for purposes other than the immediate retention of power.
In most instances, the bases of economic policy shift from purely
political to economic considerations:

The Party's ultimate political

t00nopoly is maintained; it is the dictatorship of the proletariat and
the concretion of its ideology.

2

It was not until the early 1960s that East European economic reforms attempted· to reach beyond the political confines of Stalinism.
In the late· 1940s, the system which Stalin had developed during the

previous decade was transferred to Eastern Europe where it served as
the foundation of East European "socialist reconstruction" and as a
central element of Communist political power.

Since the middle 1950s,

however, the various Party leaderships have realized that reforms have
been necessary.

To the extent· that the proposed reforms jeopardized

the Parties' political monopoly, they were disallowed; to the extent
that they enhanced the Parties' position, they were adopted.
The events which forced that realization upon the East European
and Soviet Parties can be termed the crisis of de-Stalinization.

The

process of de-Stalinization began shortly after Stalin's death in
March, 1953, and continued in one form or another until approximately
1964.

The crisis of de-Stalinization, on the other hand, also began

in mid-1953 but lasted only until late 1957.

The focus of the present

analysis is this four-year crisis and the efforts of the various postStalin leaderships to perform the redefinitions of the Soviet and
East European system necessitated by Stalin's death.

Within that

context, the primary purpose here is to examine those factors which
...

enabled the Soviet Union to weather the crisis and re-establish itself
at the head of the bloc late in 1957.

This is, therefore, a study of

the continuities of Soviet power in Eastern Europe up to the end of 1957.
That the crisis of de-Stalinization was real there can be little
doubt.

The convulsions of 1953 and 1956 exemplify a system only

marginally, though finally, in control.

The resolutions of the conflicts

3

which led to those events demonstrated that Soviet military power alone
could not enforce a favorable solution to the underlying crisis.

A

"Carthagenian" solution, the Soviets realized, would have produced
further destruction and at a counterproductive cost.

The military

answer could be used only in the most extreme Hungarian case.

Even

there, the enforced retention of a Communist government was accompanied
over the years by economic and political reforms.

In Poland, Gomulka

was clearly threatened with Soviet force but promised armed resistance
to direct Soviet military intervention.

The "Polish solution." involved

the threat of force but also economic and political reforms both within
Poland and in Poland's relations with the Soviet Union.

Though the

stability of the bloc was restored through the direct application of
force in Hungary, and therefore the implied threat of its use elsewhere,
and limited economic and political reforms, many other factors were also
involved:

the functional absence of concrete Western aid; the ability

of most East European Parties to maintain political control; the
interests of those Parties.served by the centralist position of the
Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); the
security provided by close relations with the Soviets against the threat
of future German aggression, a threat which was very real in the minds
of many East Europeans; and the Communist commitment to industrialization.
It is these factors, military, political, and most importantly, economic,

which ·in their interaction comprise the dynamics of Stalinism:

the basis

for the continuity of Soviet power in Eastern Europe.
The image of the Soviet and East European system which emerges
from this study is one of long-range continuity partially obscured by

1-·

I
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mol;'e superficial changes. · This is not to say that important changes
did not occur, but that they took place within the context of a more
fundamenta~

stability.

For example, the bilateral treaty network,

which formed the legal basis of the Soviet and East European collective
security system, was replaced in 1955 by the Warsaw Pact.

This was a

shift from a bilateral to a multi-lateral form, but the substance of
the Soviet and East European collective security system remained.
This situation was roughly paralleled in other areas.

As

of 1957, the

fundamental elements of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe were intact.
The Stalinist economic system, despite some relaxations in agriculture,
the political monopoly of the bloc's Communist parties, the primacy of
the CPSU, the economic primacy of the Soviet Union, the coilllllitment to
world Communist revolution, and the essential coIInllitment to industrialization--all remained in place.

Though it had been redefined,

operationally reformed, and its rhetoric recast, Stalinism, as defined
as the systematic codification and application of Leninism, continued
in operation.
Therefore, this study is concerned with the broad conditions and
major decisions made in the Soviet and East European system between the
last stages of the Second World War and the 1957 Moscow celebration of
the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.· The treatment is
general and topical.

It seeks to identify pressures and currents rather

than isolate one given factor and subject it to exhaustive analysis.
Because the scope is general, the sources used are also general.

No

attempt has been made to research beyond general works except where
the realistic

require~nts

of balance and clarity necessitated.

5

To an extent,

every piece of analysis, every research project,

is both a success and a failure.

Its achievements are mitigated by

the limitations of the researcher, the scope of the enquiry, and the

methods of analysis employed.

Guarded by qualifications, its tentative

conclusions stand as open questions rather than as final answers.
1.
I

work is no exception and does not pretend to be.
chance of success.

Therein lies its

This

CHAPTER I
THE FOUNDATION OF THE SOVIET BLOC
"Those last years with
Stalin were hard times. 11

--

Khrushchevl

THE AFrERMATH

It was announced on March 6, 1953.

"The heart of Lenin's comrade-

in-arms, the standard bearer of his genius and his cause, the wise leader
and teacher of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, has ceased to
beat. n2

The "brilliant continuator, 11 the "indefatigable builder of

Conmunism, 11 the "Great Stalin" was dead.
trembled.

The nation wept and the Party

The epoch was finished.

It has been speculated that the situation the new Soviet leadership
faced appeared to them as both bizarre and threatening.

On

the one hand,

it was possible that the struggle between the Party's factions for power

would threaten the achievements of the Stalin era. 3

On

the other hand.,

Stalin's absence would aliow needed innovations in the methods used in the
pursuit of Soviet goals.4

Reform had become vital.

In April, 1953,

the East Germans requested economic assistance and a reconsideration of
the Stalinist capital-development program.5
in serious danger.

The East German regime was

Albania immediately after Stalin's death dropped

its 1951-1955 economic plan.6
The Soviet leadership (Georgi M. Malenkov, Stalin's designated

7

successor and the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Lavrentii
P. Beria, the chief of the Soviet security forces and First Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Viacheslav M. Molotov, a Bolshevik
since 1906 and diplomat in charge of foreign policy from 1939 to 1949
and again following Stalin's death; Nikolai A. Bulganin, a long-time
Bolshevik and government functionary who was Minister of Defense from
1947 to 1949 and again from 19·53 to 1955; and

Niki~a

S. Khrushchev,

Stalin's deputy in the Ukraine during the purges of the 1930s and
following the war and head of the Moscow ·Party organization from
1949 to 1953 when he became First Secretary of the CPSU) soon realized ·
that Stalin's immediate methods would not work without Stalin.

There-

fore, a rapid and prudent course of de-Stalinization was essential. 7
The first explicit m::>ve in that direction was taken in the f onn of an
April, 1953, Pravda article, entitled
Principle of Party Leadership."

11

Collectivity is the Highest

The article argued that all important

·decisions are the fruit of collective decisions.
process,

mut~al

and self-criticism are important to prevent error and

are based upon "collectivity."
not be lost.

In the collective

However, individual responsibility must

Collective leadership is necessary for the initiative

of Party organizations and the self-reliance of their members.

The

article concluded with the assertion that collective leadership is a
necessity in the building of Communism. 8
The first faction to pose a threat to the Soviet collective
leadership was headed by Beria.

He was the first to move.

Stalin.' s death, Beria had begun build·ing up his position.

Long before
Indeed,

Beria' s strength even before Stalin's death was such that Khrushchev

l

I
I

8

felt Stalin feared Beria.
necessary
power.9

follo~ing

Khrushchev also knew that it would be

Stalin's death to ensure that Beria did not hold

From his position as the second man in the hierarchy within

the collective leadership, Beria made a two-pronged bid for power.
He consolidated his hold on the secret police and made a play for
public popularity.

His power bid failed.

It was subsequently

announced on July 10, 1953, that Beria had been "unmasked."

He and

several of his associates were tried the following December and immediately shot.10
Thus ended the era of Stalin.

It was "an era of tyranny which

in its cruelty and personal concentration of power stands without pre-

cedent in modern history. 11 11
FOREIGN

POL~CY

OBJECTIVES

The empire the leadership inherited from Stalin and which they
had helped to build was based upon Soviet geopolitical realities, Stalin's
· application of Leninism to the Soviet Union, and the extension by force
of that system into new territories as a consequence of the Second World
War.

The Soviet Union emerged from.that war as what would come to be

· known as a super power, a position secured by the Soviet development of
an atomic bomb in 1949.
The Second World War shattered the European balance of power and
left the Soviet Union in occupation of the traditional Central and

East European "buffer zone."

Little stood be·tween the Soviet military

machine and Europe's Atlantic coast.12

Germany had been divided; Japan

had been reduced to its main islands; Italy had been shorn of its

r ..

l
9

\

1·

colonial possessions; and in general other Western colonial possessions
were in the process of being relinquished.

In contrast, the Soviet

Union had directly annexed some 250,000 square miles of territory,
established satellite or client states in Europe and Asia, and stood
ready to fill any political or military vacuum which might develop in
the immediate postwar turmoil.13
Specifically, the annexed territories were the Tannu-Tuva Republic
which had been a part of Mongolia, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile
Islands in the Far East, the Carpatho-Ukraine taken from Czechoslovakia,
various areas from Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Eastern Poland,
Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the northern half of East Prussia.14
The long term East European satellite states have proven to be:
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

Poland,
In terms

of population, the Lithuanian, Moldavian, Latvian, Estonian, and other
minorities which were not a part of.the Soviet Union at the time of the
1939 census comprised in 1959 some 14,144,000 out of a total Soviet.
population of 208,827,000 or 6.9 percent.15
. However, Soviet losses as a result of the war were also vast.
Some 20,000,000 persons
been shattered.16

~ad

been killed and the industrial plant had

However, by 1950 the Soviet Union had largely recon-

structed its economic losses.17

Thus, contrary to their expectations,

Stalin and those around him found that the state which they controlled
possessed an overwhelming strength

vis-~-vis

the rest·of Europe.

The

non-Communist political forces in Eastern Europe were weak; Western
Europe and the United States were demobilizing rapidly·, leaving a
power vacuum.18 In those happy circumstances the Soviet Union intended

I

,I

\
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1.

to "enjoy all the pr~rogatives" of its new position.19

l

Soviet postwar foreign policy objectives can be grouped as geopolitical and intrabloc.20

Geopolitically, the maximum Soviet goal has

been considered by many scholars to be the "revolutionary conquest of
the world" and the active, as opposed to passive, defense of the Soviet·
Union, the "heartland of Conn:nunism. rr21

The World War II Teheran, Yalta,

and Potsdam agreements supported the Soviet claim to the creation of
governments in Eastern Europe which were "democratic and friendly" to
the Soviet Union.22
~

At Yalta, the Soviet Union sought its post-war

security through the complete dominance of Eastern Europe and a preponderant influence in the rest of Europe itself.23

The Potsdam agree-

ments in their turn emerged as a confirmation of the Yalta agreements
both through explicit agreement and Western inaction.24
Stalin's "election speech" given on February 9, 1946, established
. as an element of Connnunist ideology that one of the major results of
the Second World War was the proof that the Soviet system was more
enduring than and inherently superior to any non-Soviet social system.25
Further, in his speech to the 19th Party Congress given on October 17,
1952, Stalin asserted that the interests of the Soviet Union were
"inseparable from world p~ace. n26

Given the ideology of Marxism-

Leninism, there can be little doubt that "world peace" was possible
in the long run only after the "historically inevitable" destruction

of all non-Soviet social systems.
This view of Soviet foreign policy objectives is also supported
by published Soviet sources.

In History of Soviet. Foreign Policy 1945-

1970, a standard Soviet text, A. Alexandrov writes in regard to Soviet

11

and East European foreign policy coordination:
United action by the socialist countries in foreign
policy.is a vital factor in preserving peace and
ensuring the progressive development of all mankind.27
Alexandrov continues:
Socialist international relations spell out not only
peace and genuine equality but also fraternal mutual
assistance between the free and sovereign peoples of
the socialist community, and they soon gave rise to
the idea of socialist integration. These relations
are the prototype of the relations that will be
established in future between all the peoples and
countries of the world.28
In a less ideological

direction~

it can be argued that at the

very least the Soviets were and are determined to expand their sphere
of influence to whatever extent possible·without running a serious risk
of global war.29
The simplest and most banal explanation is not necessarily
wrong; the Soviet Union was bent upon expanding her sphere
of power and influence but without incurring the risk of war.30
The Soviets viewed the postwar situation in Eastern Europe as both an
opportunity in the

"revolution~ry

conquest of the world" and as a

chance to finally achieve Soviet territorial security in line
the active defense of the "heartland of Communism."

with

Therefore, the

"Soviet leaders demanded a safe and secure protective belt of countries
tmquestionably loyal to themselves to cover their vulnerable Western
frontier. 11 31
Regardless of the specifics of emphasis. Soviet forei~ policy
in the postwar period was expansioniSt.

The vast territories added

directly to the Soviet Union and those brought under Soviet hegemony
were not acquired accidentally.

12
By 1948, the

S~viet

the East European bloc.
The Soviet Bloc:

Union had

co~leted

the basic formation of

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his classic work,

Unity and Conflict, has cited the following Soviet

objectives in Eastern Europe:

to deny the area to Germany or any

other power; to ensure that the individual East European countries
would not be controlled by domestic elements hostile to the Soviet
Union; to use Eastern Europe as a buffer against Germany or any other
power; to ensure that the individual East European countries would not
be controlled by domestic elements hostile to the Soviet Union; to use
Eastern Europe as a buffer against Germany or any other power; to use
the area as a capital source; to use the area to aid Soviet economic
recovery; to use Eastern Europe as a revolutionary springboard in a
revolution which must "go forward," and to use Eastern Eruope as an
element in the integration of the "socialist bloc" into an independent
geopolitical unit.32
In the postwar period, therefore, the Soviet Union had two main
objectives:

to expand wherever' ahd to whatever extent_ possible and to

consolidate and integrate into a single political and economic sys tern
the territorial, political, and economic gains which had been or were
to be made.

THE EXPANSION INTO EASTERN EUROPE
From the standpoint of continuity with the postwar period, the
extension of the Stalinist system into Eastern Europe began in the
early stages of the war when the Soviets organized National Liberation
Committees for each of the East European countries.33

As a result of

13
the rise of European Fascism in the 1930s, many European Communists had
fled to the Soviet Union where most of them fell victim to the purges
of the 1930~.34

However, it was from their surviving ranks that the

National Liberation Committees were staffed.35

The main postwar purpose

of these committees was to serve as the core of each of the pro-Soviet
governments, with the exception of Yugoslavia, created between 1945 and
1948.36
Though the pattern varied substantially throughout Eastern Europe,
the Polish case is a good example.

The process began in earnest with

the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact on August 23, 1939, and the additional secret protocol on September 29, 1939.

By this agreement, Poland

was "divided" along the Vistula.River into German and Soviet spheres of
influence.

After Poland was overwhelmed in September, 1939, the line

demarking the Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence was redrawn in conformance wi'th the 1793 second partition of Poland.

Between late 1939

and June, 1941, the Soviets seemingly had no plans for the creation of
a satellite government in .the Soviet zone of conquered Poland.

They

followed instead a policy designed to exterminate all Polish political
consciousness.

Indeed, the Polish territories were directly incorporated

into the appropriate Soviet republics.37
After the German invasion of the Soviet Union on Jtme 22, 1941,
the situation altered slightly.

On the one hand, Stalin sought a

, rapprochement~with the London-based Polish government in exile (see
Appendix A for the text of the mutual assistance pact concluded between
the

tw~

powers); while, on the other hand, Stalin set down the fotmda-

14

tions for the future take-over of Poland by Soviet-sponsored Polish
Conununists.38

On March 1, 1943, the Union cf Polish Patriots was

formally established in Moscow as the "true" representative body of
Poland.

This was the end result of much careful ground work.

By

the middle of 1943, the Soviet Union had formed the two instruments of
its future policy in Poland:

the Union of Polish Patriots and the

Polish Workers' Party, a political front organization.39
Following the defeat of German .forces in.eastern Poland, on
July 21, 1944, in Lublin, Poland,

~he

Union of Polish Patriots was

merged with Polish Communist and other groups in the formation of
the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

On July 26, 1944, the

Polish Conmdttee of National Liberation signed an agreement with the
Soviets to administer Polish territory occupied by the Soviets in
! '

the course of the war.

Finally, on December 31, 1944, the Lublin

Conimittee declared itself to be the.provisional government of Poland
and was recognized as such by the Soviets on January 5, 1945, the
Soviets having broken diplpmatic relations with the Polish government
in

e~le

in April, 1943.

(See Appendix B for the text of the pact

concluded. between the Soviet Union and its Lublin government.)

One

of the results of these maneuvers was that the Polish Workers'· Party,
the Communist Party of Poland at that time, was deeply divided between
those brought from Moscow, the "Muscovites," and those who had fought
it out in Poland, the "natives. rr41

This situation was replicated

throughout the satellite countries and was to prove dangerous for
the Soviets as well as the Party factions involved.

i·

!

15.
With its Western allies, the diplomatic maneuvering involved in
the extension of Soviet hegemony began in 1941 and lasted until 1945·.
The Soviet Union had legitimized its territorial acquisitions and its
sponsored East European border changes such as the westward movement of
Poland.

The Soviets promised that .the new East European governments

would be established through free elections which would be "responsive
to the will of the people. 11 42
Also, an important pattern was established in Czechoslovakia.
As

a result of Soviet and Czechoslovak moves, which began with the

Soviet offer of aid in September, 1938, the two governments signed a
treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration on
December 12, 1943.43
Czechoslovak treaty.)
in

~he

(See Appendix C for a text of the SovietThe Czechoslovak treaty set the pattern followed

creation of the bilateral treaty system which formed the legal,

that is, formal

basis for the Soviet and East European system.44

Hugh Seton-Watson, a British So~ietologist, has identified three
phases in the Communist seizure of power in Eastern Europe.

The first

stage was that of genuine coalition government which allowed non-

..

Communis t opposition parties freedom of action.

In the second stage,

bogus coalition governments were formed and the non-Communist parties
lost their ability to criticize Communist policies.
abolished or absorbed all non-Communist parties.

The third.phase

The East European

states passed through these stages at varying rates, some entirely
skipping the first or severely trunkating it.
the Communist East European bloc had emerged.45

By the end of 1948,
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THE BASES OF CONTROL
The fundamental system of control thus established by Stalin and
the Soviet Union was built upon five simple and direct fundamentals:
ideology, "socialist international relations," the economic and political primacy of the Soviet Union, the nsocialist reconstruction" of
!.

Eastern Europe, and the presence of the Soviet Army.

!-

doxy in the postwar period was based upon four ideological assumptions.

Communist ortho-

The first was that Communism must by virtue of scientific and historical
necessity supersede Capitalism as the dominant method of social and
economic organization.

The second assumption was that the historical

processes generating Capitalism's collapse required, purposeful promotion
/

through disciplined organization, direct action, and, of course, class
conflict.

The third assumption was that social change must be accelera-

ted through rapid socialization and industrialization.

This process

would also directly aid the destruction of Capitalism by broadening the
socialist ecom>mic base. ·The .last assumption was that because of the
internal and external threat to the Communist revolution, political
power must be exclusively held by the local Communist parties and that
these Parties must maintain unity between themselves through the processes of centralized leadership, uniformity of ideology, and an underlying uniformity of action.46
Socialist international relations within the bloc were categorically not confined to relations between governments.

The new inter-

national relations in Eastern Europe were to operate on all levels of
national life.

These relations are described by Alexandrov as follows:

TI
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In the old world the concept 'international relations'

is the equivale~t of the concept 'interstate relations.'
It only embraces the system of relations between governments and .their agencies. In the case of socialist
international relations, they cannot be reduced solely
to relations between states; they embrace all aspects of

the life of the peoples.

The working people themselves

--workers, 'peas an ts, and working intellectuals of all
the socialist countries--take a direct and active part in
strengthening the socialist community and, consequently,
in implementing the principles of socialist interstate
relations. In promoting co-operation in the socialist
community, a key role is played by fraternal relations
among the Connnunist and Workers' parties, which adhere
to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and by friendly
relations between.mass public organizations.47
Socialist international relations do not exist merely on the governmental
level.

They exist on each of the definable levels of a state's socio-

economic structure and on a "level to level" basis.

The most important

of course are government to government and Party to Party relations.
The Soviet Union was presented ideologically in Eastern Europe as
being economically and politically of primary importance.

As the first

socialist state and the ultimate source of the socialist revolution,
that which strengthened the Soviet Union strengthened the international
Communist

mo~ement.

If a· temporary problem arose due to economic rela-

tions which favored the Soviet' UniQn, the damage and difficulties were
outweighed by the

increas~d

strength of the Soviet Union, world Communism

as a whole, and, therefore, of the particular East European state experiencing the damage. or difficulty.

What made the Soviet Union strong,

in the final analysis, according to this circular argument, made the
individual East European countries strong.48
Following Marxist thinking, the "socialist reconstruction" of
the East European countries would create, in Brzezinski's words, a
"solid, spirited, and single-minded phalanx which would stand together
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under any circumst~ces."49

The reconstruction was to.work as follows:

. The parties, by becoming Stalintzed, by purging themselves. and destroying such sources of deviationism as
the Social Democrats, would tend to be more oriented

toward the USSR. ·Terror used against the population

l

at large would destroy any sources of potential opposition to the regime and introduce such fear that
compliance with the policies and purposes of the _system
would be assured. Collectivization would carry the
class struggle into the countryside and weed out the
normally conservative orientation of the peasants,
driving them into collective institutions where they
could be subjected to organized political and economic
control. Economic transformation through nationalization and, more significantly, through industrialization,
would create the objective basis for socialism while
ripping apart the social fabric to such an extent that
the Connnunist Party--Stalinist and dependent on the
Soviet Union--would be the only source of social cohesion,
the only organization to which the youth, in p~rticular,
could turn for guidance.SO
Purges would strengthen and centralize the local Communist parties,
terror would silence all possible opposition, collectivization would
enable economic and political control of the peasants, socialization
and-industrialization would deliver the national economies into the ·
Parties' control and would

sha~ter

the existing social patterns to such

an extent that only the local Conununist party organizations would
remain functioning.
Throughout the process, the Soviet Army stood ready to guide
events in the desired direction.

It was that presence which made the

expansion of the Soviet system possible.51

For example, the Soviet

Union concluded an agreement with the Lublin Connnittee whereby the
Committee was assigned the authority to administer Polish territory
occupied by the Soviet Army.52

Further, examples of direct Soviet

intervention in the postwar period in ·support of the emerging Communist
govemments included the arrest of Bela Kovacs, the. leader of the
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Hungarian Smallholde~s' Party, on February 25, 1947.53

Mikolajczyk,

the former prime minister of the Polish government in exile, who had
been grudgingly included in the postwar Polish Government, fled Poland

in fear 0£ his life in November, 1947.54 Indeed, the Soviet Army was
directly or indirectly the critical factor in the process of establishing Soviet control; local statesmen
Soviet power.55

fal~ered

under the pressure of

In short,

Stalin's successes came where the Soviet Army was in a
position to lay a firm foundation for Communist domination,
and his failures occurred in areas where the case for
~~nnnunism had to be put by persuasion, propaganda, and
example.56
As subsequent events were to demonstrate, the Soviet Army was to remain
a central element in bloc affairs.
Upon this foundation the Soviet Union constructed a dynamic, interlocking system of control comprised of two definable subsystems:
extrasovereignty relations and intersovereignty relations.
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CHAPTER II

EXTRASOVEREIGNTY CONTROLS

"You need not doubt that I shall do my
best to jus.tify your trust. 11 - - Stalinl
THE SEMIAUTOMA.TIC CONTROLS

For the purposes of this present analysis, the relations between
!

1·

any two states or within a group of states fall into two general
categories:

extrasovereignty relations and intersovereignty relations.

Extrasovereignty relations are those relations which take place beyond
the confines of formal diplomatic channels or which are not directly
covered by state to state treaties.

Intersovereignty relations are

those relations which take place through formal diplomatic channels.
The relations between the government of the Soviet Union and, for example,
the government of Czechoslovakia would be an example of intersovereignty
relations; while the relations between the respective Communist parties
would be examples of extrasovereignty relations.

For Eastern Europe

as a whole during the period concerned "relations" between the Soviet
Union and the CPSU and the individual East European governments and
Communist parties were such that those relations constituted methods
and channels of frequently blatant control.
The extrasovereignty controls of the Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe fell into three main categorfes:

semiautomatic control systems,
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directed control systems, and institutional replication.
A semiautomatic control system can be considered to be any method
of control·which functions with a minimal amount of supervision on the

part of the controlling agent.

I

I·

This process is roughly analagous to

the concept of "management by exception" in accounting or business
administration in which only the exceptional conditions are acted upon
by higher authority once the general operational objectives and proce-

.. :

dures have been set into motion •
The first of the semiautomatic systems was the reconstruction of
the local Communist parties which conducted local governmental administration

in the image of the CPSU.3

This involved the obligatory

glorification of Stalin, the CPSU, and the .USSR.

The CPSU along with

Stalin were promoted via a massive propaganda program as, and to an
extent actually considered to be, incapable of any error.

The cam-

paign's general aims were to eliminate "negative conceptions of Soviet
life11 and to "instill a positive emotional commitment to the USSR."
In a sense the process worked too well.

Between 1949 and 1953 many

of the most radical decisions were not made by Stalin, but by local
Communist leaders on the basis of their anticipation of Stalin's
reaction or wishes.

This 'zealousness was an attempt by the "little

Stalins" to do what Stalin might have done.

This process and Soviet

policies in general led inexorably to the second semiautomatic system.
The radical political and economic programs (harrassment of
opposition political parties, extreme labor norms, forced farm collectiviz~tion,

and various types of press and cultural censorships, for

example) imposed by the local Parties u.pon their countries critically

I
l.
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increased their domestic unpopularity and at the same time their dependence upon Stalin and the Soviet Union.
Because of his unwillingness to allow Stalin a free hand in
Yugoslavia, Tito, the leader of·Yugoslav Connnunism, was expelled from
the Cominform on June 28, 1948.4

The paranoid Stalinist reaction to

"Titoism," the cause of Tito's expulsion, sent a wave of Party purges
through Eastern.Europe.
up.

The tempo of Sovietization was also stepped

"Separate ways to socialism became a crime."5

The end result was

the creation of Parties and local leaders totally, and some would say,
blindly loyal to Stalin.
The third semiautomatic system arose from the territorial shifts
resulting from the Second World War.

The territorial gains assigned to

Poland were, among other things, a "way to guarantee her staying within
the.Soviet sphere."6

Generally, the population and border shifts

throughout Eastern Europe, though approved by the West, established
the Soviet Union as the guarantor of the postwar frontiers.

This

further increased the dependence of the individual East European states
upon the Soviet Union and upon Stalin.7
The fourth system was the maintenance of a constant atmosphere of
crisis.

A crisis atmosphere is a virtual necessity to the Soviet poli-

tical system:

the monopoly of political power held by the Party:

"party-police" system of control. 8
create the

d~sired

popular fear:

the

Three elements were combined to
the danger of "capitalist aggreS!sion,"

the "cold war," and the threat of a revanchist Germany.

Unity and dis-

cipline were touted as necessary in the face of the "outside" threat.9
The fifth semiautomatic system was and is more profound.

By
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1949 or 1950, the results of the "socialist reconstruction" had served
to preclude any

anti~Communist

resistance.

The Church, generally a

last focus· of opposition, was reduced to a "sanctuary" for alternative
values.

In this period, it could not be a source 0£ active opposition.

Further, until 1951 or 1952, the Communist emphasis upon the future,
a future which contrasted sharply with the stark brutality of the
immediate past and the equally stark present, had broad popular appeal.
The uncertainty of the immediate postwar era pred a craving for
certainty.

Only the Communist movement offered or was permitted to offer

both a future and certainty.

"Thus even the unbelieving were brought

face to face with the dilemma of the one alternative--to oppose
Communism was to be against everything and for nothing. rilO
The "dilemma of the one.alternative" is, however, also the most
effective and long range of the informal mechanism used to maintain
Communism in power.

Certainty in th,e

fa~e

of grim chaos is powerful.

But more powerful, as Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav critic of Communism,
has repeatedly pointed
beh~nd

ot~t,

is: the unwillingness of a people to lag

economically in a world where to lag

extinction.11

means. social and political

Thus the present was made bearable by the image of a

brighter, industrialized future.

The Communists controlled that image.
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·THE DIRECTED CONTROLS
The second category of extrasovereignty controls was that of

directed control systems.

A directed control system can be ·considered

to be any method or system of control in which the higher agency takes
a direct and continuing interest in the affairs of the managed agency.

.

In this method the higher agency plays an immediate and continuing

~

..
~

role in the decisions formally taken by the lower agency either by
the direct imposition of policy or through functioning as the necessary
approver of policy.

The directed control systems used were:

consulta-

tion between the Soviets and the individual East European countries,
which took the form.of direct communication between the Soviet leadership and that of a specific country; supervision by the Soviet ambassadors of the domestic events in a given bloc country; maintenance of
close contact between the various Party organs through the frequent
exchange of experts and visitation by Soviet Party "experts";
penetration of vital East European governmental functions by Soviet
agents; and, because diplomatic, economic, and political relations were
largely bilateral or were functionally so, all communication and coordination was channeled through the Soviet Union.
In the period concerned, the most important, formal, international Party organization was the Communist Information Bureau
(Cominform).

It was distinct due to its multilateral nature at a

time when the burden of Soviet and East European relations was
carried through bilateral mechanisms.
Cominform marked the beginning of
Stalinism.12

The establishment of the

enf~rced

tmiformity in East European

The organization was founded in September, 1947, in
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Poland with its

headq~arters

to be located in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

The organization's journal was titled For A Lasting Peace, For A
People's Democracy, the title having been proposed by Stalin.

The

founding meeting declared that '.'two camps, 11 one imperialist and one
socialist, had formed and that East-West collaboration was a thing of
the past.13

The Cominform helped to re-enforce the Soviet Union at

the head of world Communism.
Russian standards as to what was proper in the arts,
literature, and science were to be applied in other
C.Ommunis t parties as well. This was something new,
even.by the standards of pre-1939 Communist uniformity.14
The Cominform's purposes were: to politically integrate the CPSU, the
East European, and some Western Communist parties; to convey the accepted ideological dogma; guide its application; and monitor its progress,
\lllder the watchful eyes of the CPSU and Stalin.

In short, the Cominform

was to put a stop to "initiative in the ranks. 11 15
nie most reasonable conjecture must be that the Cominform
was to serve to cover up the increasingly centralized
direction of foreign Communism now assumed by the Soviet
Union and especially as a means through which she could rap
the knuckles of a dissident member Party--the rebuke or
4iscipline coming ostensibly not from the Kremlin but
from the collective body.16
The Cominform's first tactical objective was opposition to the
Marshall Plan,17 the second was the purge of Tito.

After the failure

of the campaign against Tito, the Cominform was allowed to linger on in
Bucharest where its headquarters had been moved following the StalinTito break.18

The organization was finally disbanded in April, 1956,

as part of the' Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia.19
In smmnary, the extrasovereignty relations, both semi.automatic
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and directed, focused upon two primary objectives:

the control of the

local East European Parties by the CPSU and the control of the East
European governments by their associated Communist parties.

Subsequent

events were to show that these issues would cause Soviet tanks to roll
on more than one occasion ..

INSTITlITIONAL REPLICATION
The third type o.f informal control was the replication of Soviet
institutions in Eastern Europe.

Stalinism in the new "people's demo-

cracies," was built not only upon the "enforced claim to infallibility"
of Stalin and the CPSU and the military presence of the Soviet Union,
but also upon the replication of Soviet experience and Soviet institutions. 20

The guiding principle of this process was that countries with

similar or identical institutions would develop similar outlooks upon
important questions ·and would therefore be more easily led.

After 1948,

the Soviet Union became the universal model to be copied in all imper. tant policy questions.21
. Stalin's 1952 article restated and reinforced Marxist dogma
regarding the relationship b.etween the......~co~omic
and cultural superstructures of a society.

b,?~~

and the political

Stalin wrote, ". • • the

relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of
the productive forces. 11 22

Industrialization within the context of

state ownership was to create the institutional and political similarities needed to hold the Soviet bloc together.
:

Institutional reproduction

I

became a vital necessity.

Therefore, the socialist reconstruction of

Eastern Europe was to proceed by radical and rapid industrialization,

as it had in the USSR in the 1930s.

The effect would be social chaos,
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a revolutionary situation in which the Connnunist party would be the
only source of social cohesion, and the "only source of direction"
would be "the leadership's will. n23

Brzezinski has critiqued this· aspect

of Stalinist dogma:
A belief in environmental influence tends to exaggerate
the importance of a community pf views between the
various leaders and the identity of institutions and
socioeconomic systems. Similarity of material conditions
becomes one of the vital guarantees of unity of action,
and such a similarity can best be established through
the duplication elsewhere of the institutions of the
dominant power.24
This Soviet policy was to prove ill-advised as well as dangerous.
Institutional reproduction operated i~ three important areas out·side of the Party, which itself relied upon the Cominform and
centralism to enforce uniformity.

These areas were:

de~o.cra~ic

the new constitu-

tions of the East European states, the collectivization of agriculture,
and the organizations and methods of economic planning.
Beginning in 1947, the new atmosphere of political uniformity led
to a series of East European constitutional reforms.

In line with

Connnunist ideology, the new constitutions were created as both a reflection of then current social and political realities and as instruments
to be used in the construction of East European "socialism. n25

Between

late 1947 and 1952, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland adopted constitutions closely patterned after the 1936 Soviet
"Stalin" constitution.

The constitutions of Hungary and Poland even

included praise for the Soviet Union, an unusual practice for a national
constitution.
These constitutions were set up as instruments in the "socialist
reconstructj_on" of Eaf;tem Europe.

For example, the Polish document
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defined' any act "injurious to socialist property" as the equivalent of
sabotage or diversion.

Czechoslovak legal thought at the time went

further and equated such acts with treason.
In their constitutions most of the East European states declared
themselves to be "people's democracies."

However, the East German

constitution followe,d a slightly different train of thought regarding
its political situation.

In its 1949 constitution, it declared itself

to be a "democratic republic."

Supposedly the East Germans had not

reached the historical stage in the building of socialism ref.lected in
the term "people's democracy."
The central point regarding East European constitutional revision
in this period is that alliance with the Soviet Union became no longer
a matter of policy but "an 'organic' quality of the People's Democracy,
maturing and strengthening as the People's Democracy transformed itself."
Soviet attitudes toward agriculture and industrial planning were
also

repro~uced

in Eastern Europe.

The

in Eastern Europe had four main goals:

~ollectivization

of agriculture

to assure state control of the

food supply; to generate a labor surplus through farm mechanization;
to allow the extraction of capital needed for industrialization through
the manipulation of agricultural prices, and to prevent the peasantry
from exercising political influence.
ly in Eastern Europe.
far from good.

Collectivization proceeded uneven-

In terms of farm production, the results were

By 1953 only two states, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, had

reached or passed bread grain production levels set in the period from
1934 to 1938.

(See Appendix D.)26 In agriculture the im?act of

Stalinism was disastrous.

The "class struggle" was extended into
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agriculture with the idea that the worse the agricultural situation
became, the sooner socialization would occur.

"Established methods

of good farming ~uffered accordingly."27
There was, however, some degree of relaxation of Stalinist
agricultural policies following Stalin's death.

The percentage of

farm land in the "socialist sector" dropped in Czechoslovakia from
48 percent to 44 percent in 1954, in Hungary from 37 percent to 32 percent, and in Bulgaria from 62 percent to 60 percent.

However, in

Poland the "socialist sector" increased from 17 percent to 19 percent
in 1954 and in Rumania from 21

per~ent

to 26 percent.

The greatest

increase was in East Germany where the amourit of collectivized land
increased from 8 percent in 1953 to 30 percent in 1954.
E.)

(See Appendix

A bloc regime's ability to "overcome internal resistance" to farm

collectivization can be considered an indicator of that regime's
strength.28

In 1950, various actions taken by the Soviet Union and the East
European states, in accord with the Soviet and East European political
agreements of 1943 to

19~7,

resulted in the East European adoption of

mandatory economic planning mechanisms.
planning mechanisms were rejected.

Semiautomatic or semi-market

The Soviet "material balances"

method of economic planning was uniformly adopted by Comecon members.29
The institutionalization of the nonmarket economic model by the East
European. countries was not voluntary.
It was imposed on them particularly as a consequence
of the outbreak of the Korean War, when individual
socialist countries, under Soviet pressure, revised
their long-tenn plans and reshaped them for a speedy
militarization of their economies.30

!.
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One of the more important results of the adoption of the "material
balances" mechanism was that the initial economic plans of the group
favored individual domestic sources of materials over foreign ones.

Bloc

trade, both within the bloc and outside of it, was motivated, therefore,
by the single need to open economic bottle necks.31

A situation resulted

which militated against trade and economic efficiency long after Stalin's
death.32
In summary, the post-Stalin leadership came into an extensive,
flexible, and highly useful system of extrasovereignty controls, controls
which ·operated outside the bounds of formal diplomatic agreements and
which were in fact superior to them.

These informal controls served as

the foundation for the structure of formal alliances by which the Soviet
Union established its power and influence in Eastern Europe.

At those

times when the formal alliance structure has shown signs of weakening
or breaking down altogether, the Soviets have been able to fall back upon.
the informal methods of control and/or outright military intervention to
restore order, to set the formalities back in· their proper, from the
Soviet point of view, position
for the East European leaders.

and to interpret the alliances' meaning

!.

CHAPTER III
INTERSOVEREIGNTY CONTROLS
"I jokingly said to Comrade Bierut,
'Why don't you pay for our trip and
our consultations by giving us half
the electric power which we will
restore in Warsaw?'" -- Khrushchev!
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The intersovereignty control mechanisms used by the Soviet Union
fell into two broad subsystems.

The first was economic integration

involving bilateral trade treaties, the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon or CEMA), and Soviet and East European joint stock
companies.

The second subsystem consisted of a network of treaties

of "Friendship and Mutual Assistance" concluded between the Soviet
Union and the East European states and between ·the individual East
European states themselves between 1943 and 1952.

This collective

security subsystem entailed military alliances and formal and subsidictry informal programs of military and police integration.
Before the Second World War, Eastern Europe's main trading relationships were with Gen:.nany, However, the established Soviet hegemony
prevented any renewal of the prewar trading patterns.2

For Bulgaria,

Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, their 1937 trade with the
Soviet Union and other East European bloc countries, as a percentage
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generation. Even the emphasis on rapid industrialization,
albeit destructive in some of its social consequences, was
not without its appeal. Communism seemed to offer a key to
the understanding of a complex and often brutally unpleasant
past and a straight causeway to a socially controllable
future. The era of uncertainty bred many who craved such
certainty. The Communists seemed to enjoy a monopoly on the
tomorrow to which those who opposed them were no longer able
to provide any alternative. Thus even the unbelieving were
brought face to face with the dilemma of the one alternative
--to oppose Communism was to be against everything and for
nothing."
11see Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1957),
pp. 11-14; and Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), pp. 102-103.
12Brzezinski, p. 62.
13u1am, pp. 460-461.
14rbid.
15 Nicholas Halasz, In the Shadow of Russia: Eastern Europe in
the Postwar World (New York: Ronald Press, 1959), pp. 251-252.
· 16u1am, p. 461.
17The.celebrated Marshall Plan was a United States postwar aid
program, the central purpose of which was the economic reconstruction
of Europe. See below Chapter III.
18u1am, p. 449.
19Brzezinski, p. 183.

See below Chapter VII.

20rbid., p. 301.
21Ibid. , p. 71.
22J. V. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in U.S.S.R. ," in
Bruce Fr&1klin, ed., The Essential Stalin (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday
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and John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 349.
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2The following analysis of semiautomatic and directed control
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7Poland was not the only case, only the most celebrated. The
Rumanian and Hungarian and the Rumanian and Bulgarian frontiers are
guaranteed by the Soviet Union. The case of the Polish and Czech frontier as well as the Czech and Hungarian frontier offer two other examples.
The position of the Soviet Union as the arbiter of political frontiers,
which was especially the case in the period in question, has given a
great boost to its power and influence. Most of the states in Eastern
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not the Soviet Union, then who will guarantee them?
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" • • • Probably until about 1951-1952, the Communist emphasis on
the future, contrasted with a reality still bearing the marks of the
German occupation, appealed to many, particularly among the younger
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of their own total foreign trade, ranged from a low of 7 percent for ·Poland
to a high of 18 percent for Rumania.

By 1951 these trade percentages

ranged from a high of 92 percent for Bulgaria
Poland.

~o

a low of 58 percent for

(See Appendix F.)3

Following the Second World War, the traditional Soviet emphasis upon
heavy industry was reaffirmed and applied in Eastern Europe.

In his elec-

tion speech of 19464 and in his oft-cited article of 1952, Economic
Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Stalin argued, and thereby reaffirmed
Soviet economic development and defense policies, that heavy industrial
development was necessary for defense and economic growth and that a
shift to consumer goods production would have the effect of destroying
• • • the possibility of the continuous expansion of our
national economy, because the national economy cannot be
continuously expanded without giving primacy to the
production of the means of production.5
The long-standing dogma, coupled with the Soviet policy to rehabilitate
economically at a rate comparable with that of Western Europe, led to.the
application of methods which imperiled Soviet policy in Eastern Europe~6
As an example, a manager's failure to fulfill his assigned economic plan

quota could lead to criminal charges of negligence and economic crimes
. against the state.

Offenders could be imprisoned or shot.

The results

of this policy upon the managerial group can be easily imagined.7
Between 1945 and 1956, about 20 billion dollars were extracted from
Eastern

Eur~pe

in line with Soviet objectives to use Eastern Europe as a

capital and material source.

500 million dollars of that total were

extracted between 1946 and 1956 from Poland through the manipulation of
the prices paid by the Soviet Union for Polish coal.

This is the most
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familiar example of Soviet price manipulation, but it is not an atypical
example.8
This 20 billion dollar figure can be placed in perspective if it
is recalled that the dollar value of the entire wartime destruction of

Poland has been assigned a value of 18 billion dollars.

Britain's

foreign debt at the close of the war totaled 12 billion dollars.

Also,

the total amount expended during the course of the Marshall Plan (1947
to 1951) was 13.5 billion dollars.9

For the economic period concerned,

20 billion dollars was an immense sum.
Building upon the foundation of the 1943 Soviet and Czechoslovak
treaty, the economic integration of the East European states and the
Soviet Union began in 1947.

Through 1947 and into 1948, a series

~f

trade treaties granting reciprocal "most favored nation" status was
concluded between the Soviet Union and: Rumania (February 20, 1947),
Hungary (July 15, 1947), Czechoslovakia (December 11, 1947), and Bulgaria
(April 1, 1948).

A similar treaty concerning "reciprocal goods deli-

veries" valued at one billion dollars was signed by 1:he Soviet Union and
Poland on January 26, 1948.

Also, beginning in 1950 and continuing

into 1952, a series of long-term trade agreements, which generally focused
upon the period from 1951 through 1955, was negotiated between the Soviet
Union and the East European countries.lo

In addition, between 1950 and

1951 a network of long-term trade agreements was concluded between Albania,
Bulgaria,

Cz~choslovakia,

the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and

Ruinania. . (See Appendix G.) 11
The most durable instrument of Soviet and East European economic
integration has proven to be the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
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or Comecon •. Comecon was founded at a Moscow conference held by Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union on
January 5-8, 1949.

The founding members were joined the following

February by Albania, the German Democratic Republic in September, 1950,
and by Mongolia in June, 1962.12

Comecon's founding marked the end of

the use of strictly bilateral economic mechanisms in the Soviet bloc •.
Though the dangers of economic isolation and defections after
1948 prpmpted the formation of Comecon, 13 the main purpose of the organization was to provide a necessary alternative to the Marshall Plan for
Eastern Europe.14

In the stated Soviet view, the Marshall Plan was a

violation of the participating countries' national sovereignty and
meant their economic and political subordination to the "interests of
the U. S. monopolies."15 This objection was stated in Comecon's founding
communique and was also motivated by a Soviet desire to prevent the·
formation or pressures for the formation of regional coalitions in
Eastern Europe.16. However, the Soviet emphasis upon national sovereignty
was at sharp variance with East European realities.

At no time were the

individual East European governments, with the exception of Yugoslavia,
nore subject to Soviet command.17
Comecon is particularly significant because it is the first formal,
multilateral organization of the governments of the Soviet Union and
the East European states. 1 8

Comecon, the economic counterpart of the

Cominform, was founded as a multilateral, economic control mechanism,
just as the

~ominform

was founded as a multilateral, Party control

mechanism.
Comecon's· founding communique was published on January 22, 1949,
and served as its only policy statement for 8 years and as its
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constitution for 11 years.

The January connnunique (see Appe_ndix H)

stated that as a result of the "considerable success" in the "development of economic relations" between the Soviet Union and the bloc
countries, the "great rise in the turnover in trade," the "implementation of economic cooperation" between the new people's democracies and
the Soviet Union, and in the face of a trade boycott led by the United
States and Great Britain, Comecon was founded by the nations convened
with three main objectives.

These were:

"to accelerate the restoration

and development of their national economies," to exchange economic
experience, and to extend technical aid and material assistance with
particular emphasis upon raw materials, foodstuffs, machines, and other
equipment.19
_7'

The long-term significance of Comecon's founding communique lay in
the Soviet determination to divide Europe economically as well as
politically.20

This method was in line with stated Stalinist perceptions

of postwar economic and political realities.21

These views, which formed

the official line, were given concrete, systematic expression by Stalin
in his article, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.

Stalin wrote:

The disintegration of the single, all-embracing world
market must be regarded as the most important econoinic
sequel of the Second World War and of its economic
consequences.
The economic consequences of the existence of two opposite
camps was that the single all-embracing world market
disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world
markets, also confronting one another.22
The "two camps:

two markets" dogma was an outgrowth of the need to

generate an atmosphere of crisis as one method to ensure discipline
and to legitimize the economic and political primacy-of the Soviet Union.
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Under the force of this political and economic dogma, economic contact
with the West was considered dangerous, and Western attempts to expand

trade with Eastern Europe were treated as "cunning" attacks upon the
sovereignty of the East European countries.23
The question of East-West trade is important.

One of the central

arguments for Comecon's foundation was that it was necessary to enable
the East European states and the Soviet Union to counter a Western
trade boycott which had been motivated by the East European refusal to
"submit • • • to the dictatorship of the Marshall Plan. n24
European refusal was not altogether voluntary.

That East

Czechoslovakia had

announced its intention to participate in the Plan, but as a result
of direct Soviet pressure, the Czechoslovaks withdrew.

Their forced

withdrawal brought home to the Czechoslovak government the point that
their country was indeed within the Soviet sphere.ZS

It must also be

recalled that in 1947, Czechoslovakia was perhaps the last functioning
democracy in Eastern Europe; the era of bogus coalition government had
set in.
The Comecon charge of Western trade boycott is unfounded.

However,

two elements, beyond Soviet trade policy itself, did restrict trade in
the 1948-1953 period.

The industrialization of Eastern Europe severely

altered the traditional trading patterns of the area and adversely
affected the composition and amotult of traditional agricultural products
available

in Eastern

Europe for export.

The second element was a

Western restriction upon the sale of military and militarily related
goods to

East~~

Europe and the Soviet Union.

This restriction func-

tioned in terms of the nature of the items traded

but did not address
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the volume of trade.

These restrictions were begun, for example, in

March, 1948, by the United States.26
The volume of trade between the Soviet bloc and Western Europe
and the United States, as measured in then current unadjusted dollars,
ranged from a low of 908 million in 1947 to a high of 1.3 billion in
1948.

The figures for 1949 and 1950 are 1.2 billion and 1.0 billion,

respectively.

Trade outside the bloc as a percentage of total

forei~

trade for the bloc countries ranged from a low of 11 percent for
Bulgaria to a high of 33 percent for Poland in 1952.
I and J.)27

(See Appendices

Subsequently, critical supply bottlenecks in Eastern

Europe between 1953 and 1956 forced a reopening of trade with the West. 28
Within the Stalinist context of the period, economic

restor~tion

and development was to be accomplished through the operation of the
"law of preferential growth of the output of producers' goods."

Emphasis

was placed upon the autarkic construction of capital goods industries.29
The concentration of each country- o~ the development of heavy industry
required vast raw material resources which only the Soviet Union could
supply.

As the pattern developed, the Soviet Union exported raw materi-

als to and imported finished goods from Eastern Europe.30

Consequently,"

the intrabloc competition for favor with Stalin and the CPSU was further
accelerated.

The allocation of Soviet raw materials further bound the

East European governments and Commtmist parties to the Soviet Union
and to Stal:ln.31
Kaser, a British expert on Soviet economics, has identified three
phases in the development of Comecon prior to 1956 when the organization
began to take on a more definite structure:
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1)

1949-195li During this period "an initial round of
consultation brought long-term agreements on mutual
trade, the introduction of triangular deals which
began to break the restrictiveness of bilateralism,
and permanent arrangements for technical assistance. n32

2)

1951-1953: This was a period of Soviet insistence,
without regard to the costs or consequences, upon
heavy industry and upon munitions manufacture.
During this per~od, Comecon did not play any substant.ial role.

3)

1953-1956: This was a period of experimentation
during which the mixed companies in several states
were dismantled, Soviet extraction of Polish coal
ceased, the emphasis upon heavy industry was
relaxed, and other reforms were implemented.

The period immediately in question (1949-1953) was one of little activity
for Comecon as such.

In fact, various sources entirely skip the whole

1950-1959 period, while others begin only with Comecon activities after
1955.33

However, from January, 1949, through November, 1950, there

were six sessions of the Comecon council:

the constituent conference;

the acceptance of Albanian membership; an organizational meeting; a
sessio~

concerned with scientific and technical cooperation and the

consideration of long-term economic plan coordination; the approval
of membership of the German Democratic Republic; and a conference on
inter-regional trade. 34

The acceptance of the Albanian and East German -.

memberships were apparently done by correspondence.
sessions were held in Moscow and one in Sofia.

Three of the

From September, 1950,

to March, 1954, there were no sessions of the Comecon Council.35
Comecon served as an umbrella under which Soviet economic
exploitation of Eastern Europe proceeded.
From its inception until Stalin's death, there appears
to have been· little intensive economic cooperation and
technical help, apart from Russia's search for know-how
and skills for its own industry among East European
workers. Little attempt appears to have been made to
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increase inter-menber trade, but effort was devoted to
series typification and standardization of products
to Soviet types and norms.36
This process provided the Soviet Union with valuable economic and
political leverage.

The system went even further in this period.

In

1950, Comecon introduced the ruble as the intrabloc trading currency.
The Soviets thereby gained ultimate power over currency exchange rates
within the bloc.

This and the consistent lowering of the prices of

goods sold to the Soviet Union were the two principal achievements of
Comecon in this period. 37

Ulam is more blunt.

"Until 1953, Comecon

was simply a new piece of machinery for milking the satellites. u38
As was the Co~inform, the Comecon was also used in Stalin's con-

flict with Yugoslavia.

Beginning in 1949, Comecon was the central.

mechanism in the Soviet economic boycott of Yugoslavia,39 playing the
economic counterpart of the political boycott led by the Cominform.
· The third major mechanism of Soviet and East European economic
integration was the network of Soviet and East European joint stock
companies established largely upon the basis of war reparations paid
to the Soviet Union.

Some of these companies were the Meszhart, for

navigation on the Danube; Maszanlet, .a Htm.garian-Soviet company conecerned with civil aviation; Sovrompetrol, a Soviet-Rumanian oil
exploration and development company; and Gorubso, a Soviet-Bulgarian
company concerned ~ith mining.40

The wartime alignment of the indivi-

dual East European cotm.tries caused a marked difference in their postwar relations with the Soviet Union.

The former ailies, Czochoslovakia,

Poland, and Yugoslavia, were able to.conduct large-scale nationalization
programs, receive reparations payments, and in general enjoyed more
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flexible relations with the Soviet Union.

The former enemy states,

Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, had to pay reparations, were much more
tightly bound to the Soviet Union, and in general had to adopt a slower
pace of economic nationalization.41

The fact that in 1945 the Soviet

Union became the main holder of former "German" assets in the former
East European axis states was a prime conditioner of the economic
integration of these countries.42

For Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria,

reparations payments had been established as part of the armistice
agreements which they signed with the Soviet Union.

For Germ.any,

reparations had been established in principle by the Yalta and Potsdam
agreements.

The Soviet Union was allowed to receive reparations in part

by taking over various German and Italian assets in the former East
European enemy states.43
German economic penetration of Eastern Europe had resulted in a
substantial German control of the banking, industrial, and commerical
structures of its prewar allies.
Polan~,

Following the war, Czechoslovakia,

and Yugoslavia recovered those economic assets seized by Germany

during the war.

However, the Soviet Union received the Germ.an assets,

many of which had formerly belonged to Britain or France, in Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania, despite the fact that many of those assets had
been seized by Germany and had in turn been declared by the Soviets
themselves as German ''war loot."

Thus the Soviet Union came into the

possession of the fundamental structure of Gennan East European economic
penetration.44
The reparations agreements also established that:

Hungary was to

pay a total of 300 million dollars in reparations, 200 million to the
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Soviet Union, 50 million to Czechoslovakia, and 50 million to
Yugoslavia; Rumania was to pay 300 million to the Soviet Union; and
Bulgaria was to pay a total of 75 million, 25 million to Yugoslavia
and 50 million to Greece.

By 1948, the period in which these vast sums

were to have been paid was extended from 6 to 8 years.

The composition

of the goods to be used in payment was changed, and the oustanding
balances were halved.45
Reparations

pay~ents

to the Soviet Union comprised 26.4 percent

of the Hungarian national budget in 1946-1947 and 17.8 percent in
1947-1948.

The respective figures for Rumania were 37.5 percent and

46.6 percent.

However, these rates were reduced in 1948.46

Nicolas

Spulber has made the following observation:
Having imposed drastic conditions at the beginning, the
Russians could continuously play the role of 'lenient
friend' by reducing the bill at the most critical
moments.47
Therefore, reparations payments were also a political weapon.
After the Soviet dismantling programs proved quite counterproductive,48 the Soviets invested some of their reparations receipts in
Eastern Europe in the form of wholly-owned Soviet companies.

These com-

panies concentrated in the financial and distribution areas.

The

Sovi~t

and East European joint companies, in which the Soviets invested the
balance of their

pl~nt

and equipment reparations receipts, operated mainly

in the areas of mining and manufacturing.49
special conditions of operation.

These companies enjoyed many

In general, they were exempt from

taxation, were guaranteed profits from the moment of

foundat~on,

had

various privileges in the use of foreign exchange, received the use of
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special facilities, and were granted "extraterritorial" status.

In

addition, the joint companies were able to promote their interests across
state boundaries.

The real power in these companies was held by the

general manager, as distinct from the company president, who, interestingly enough, was always a Soviet national.SO

To a large extent,

therefore, the joint companies developed as an international network
in which Moscow acted as the hub and which frequently operated against
the economic interests of the specific country in which a given company
happened to be located.51

As

a result, for the East

Europe~s,

the

joint companies were a further burden hampering their postwar economic
recovery.52

The Soviets, however, found these companies extremely

profitable. 53

COLLECTIVE SECURITY
The second major area of intersovereignty control was the Soviet
and East European collective security system.
upon

~he

This system was built

foundations laid during the establishment of Soviet hegemony in

Eastern Europe.

As early as April 1945, Stalin is quoted as saying that

"whoever occupies a territory" will impose "his own social system" upon
it.54

Thus the Soviet East European bloc received a primarily Soviet

military foundation.

The Soviet troop level in Eastern Europe in 1947

and 1948 was around.500,000 men, organized in some 30 divisions.SS

As

each of the Bast European countries passed through the various stages
of "socialist reconstruction," the Soviet military and secret police
were present to "discourage" resistance~56
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Between December, 1943, and 1949, a series of treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was concluded between the
Soviet Union and the various countries of Eastern Europe.
K for the text of a representative treaty.)

(See Appendix

From 1947 through 1949 an

additional series of bilateral treaties of a similar nature was concluded
between the individual East European countries.57

The bilateral treaties

between the Soviet Union and the East European states stressed the
.latter's sovereignty, equality, and independence.

Nothing in these

formal agreements sanctioned the domestic interference of the Soviet
Union.58

This would prove to be a weakness of the system under later

conditions.
Brzezinski has characterized these treaties as cloaks "for a
relationship of political subservience, with the juridical fiction of
equality serving both to mask this relationship and to perpetuate it. 11 59
Ulam has stated, regarding the process of negotiations in the Stalin era:
The past pattern of negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and
the satellites was not that involved; representatives of
the latter had agreements thrust under their noses and
were told to sign.60
The process was simple and direct; the. treaties were meaningless except
as interpreted by the Soviet Union.
This network of friendship and mutual assistance treaties formed
the legal basis for the bloc's collective security system.

Alexandrov

has expressed the Soviet view of these treaties as vital to the promotion of "fraternal friendship between the peoples of the socialist
countries and ensuring their security and economic and political independence."

In. l.ine with the Soviet assertion that German imperialism

showed "ominous signs" ·of "resurgence" and that the United States and

i.
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other "imperialist powers" were making "preparations for a war against
the USSR and the People's Democracies"; the treaties provided for
"joint action" to eliminate the threat of aggression by Germany or any
combination of states involving Germany.

If one of the signatories

of these bilateral treaties was attacked by such a combination, the
other was bound to respond with military and other assistance.

In the

Soviet line, "These treaties were thus directed entirely against the
possibility of further aggression by German ·imperialism. u61

The Soviet-

Hungarian treaty (signed on February 18, 1948), for example, provided
that the signatories would "undertake jointly all the measures in their
power to avert any threat of a repetition of aggression" by any German
and/pr imperialist combination.

Further, the signatories pledged:

not

to join any "alliances or coalitions or take any action or steps directed
against the other party," to consult each other on all important international issues, and to act "in a spirit of friendship and cooperation"
in cultural and economic relations which were to be founded upon the
basis of "mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs."

After its formation in

October, 1949, the German Democratic Republic was brought into the
system of "fraternal relations with the socialist states. 11 62
The German-Imperialist threat was used, at least officially, as
the emotional cornerstone of the Soviet and East European collective
security system.

That system provided for close military and diplomatic

cooperation between the "countries of people's democracy" and the Soviet
Union.

Through the Communist political power monopoly and a Soviet-

enforced "democratic centralism," the Soviets defined the operative
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terms and conditions of the treaties.

"Consultation, 11 and

11

all the

measures in their power," and "friendship and cooperation" were exactly
what the CPSU and Stalin said they

were~

A central element of this collective security system was the integration of Soviet and East European secret police agencies and, similarly,
the pre-Warsaw Pact integration of Soviet and East European military
establishments.

These integrations proceeded on both the formal and

informal levels

and had devastating results.

Radaslav Selucky, an

economist who was a member of the "Prague Spring," has identified two
essential characteristics which differentiate Stalinism from Leninism.
The critical features of Leninism are the dictatorship of the proletariat
and democratic centralism.

In practice, the result is the acfual dic-

tatorship of the Connnunist party apparat (its bureaucra.cy) within the
context of Party and governmental centralization.

However, Stalinism

is characterized by the dictatorship of a single individual, in the place
of the Party apparat, and the imposition of the state security organs
over _the Party apparat.

The result is political terror.

"The suppress-

ive role of the organs of power lacks any sense or system; it is terror
existing beyond any legal norms as well as beyond any laws of logic. n63
One result of the East European Communist party purges was that
the East European secret police organizations became independent of the
local Party apparat and subject only to the Soviet authorities.64

In

Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, the Soviet Union's representatives

co~trolled

the intelligence services, recruited agents for the

·soviet Union, and had access to local secret information.65

The Soviet

penetration of the secret police organizations had two primary goals:
to ensure their absolute loyalty to the Soviet Union and to prevent

j.
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the local Party from gaining control of them.

In this manner potential

opposition to the policies of the Soviet Union was denied the power
inherent in access to the state security organs.6 6

In Czechoslovakia,

for example, the Soviet secret police network from 1949 onward was a
separate power within the state, responsible only to the Soviet Union.67
The East European secret police agencies became states within states,
controlled from the Soviet Union and feared by both the general populations and the Communist party memberships.68
After 1949, the East European armies were revitalized and remodeled
on the Soviet pattern.69

Between 1945 and 1949, the local armed forces

were placed in the background, and their officer corps purged of members
who were likely to be

anti-Commu~st.

The Yugoslav army was

unaff~cted

because of the international tensions over Trieste and because the government and Party had firm control of the army.

The junior men who

.were promoted to fill the posts made vacant by the purges could be
trusted by the Soviets because the new officers' new status was the
result of Soviet policy. ·rn addition to arms standardization and other
measures, a system of political control and training was instituted
following the Soviet practice.~O
In short, the Soviets had created in Eastern Europe a "separate
yet subordinate arm of the USSR army."71

Yet, in the period 1949

through 1953 and later, the burden of Soviet military activity, as a
function of •the East European bloc, was executed largely by Soviet
forces. ~2
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CHAPTER IV

THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF STALINISM
"Concerning S_talin' s merits, an
entirely sufficient number of books,
pamphlets and studies had already been
written in his lifetime." -- Khrushchev.l
In assessing the strengths and the weaknesses of the system the
new Soviet leadership inherited, it is important to recognize that many
of Stalinism's strengths became weaknesses after Stalin's death.
converse is also true.

Many of the weaknesses of the Stalinist

The
sy~tem

became strengths, recognized or not, when the new leadership emerged.
The criteria by which an element of the system is evaluated are also
influenced by the conditions of the specific period in question and
whether overall system survival or the ability of the Soviet leadership
to exert detailed control is concerned.
of

ind~lStrialization

system.

For example, the radical pace

in the Stalin era was a principal strength of the

It helped to· ensure Soviet control of the bloc.

Yet without

Stalin, and because of many additional factors, the pace of industrial!zation became a weakness.

Stalinism is a sharp, two-edged sword of

intrabloc relations.

STRENGTHS
The Stalinist system had three central strengths which were
carried over into the post-Stalin era and beyond:

the informal, extra-

!

;·
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sovereignty component; the willingness and ability of the Soviets to
intervene militarily both within the context of a collective security
system and outside of it; and the genuine Soviet connnitment to industrialization.

Stalinism relied heavily upon informal and indirect

devices to hold the bloc together.

Stalin himself was the most impor-

tant informal instrument of control.2

When Stalin died this linchp;i.n

of the system was removed.

Stalin, the object of adulation and the

source of rigor, was gone.

More importantly, the uniformity and conti-

I

nuity of unquestioned leadership were broken.

The Communists who took

control in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s were totally loyal, despite
a growing domesticism, to the CPSU, to· Stalin, and to the USSR.

11

For

years they had been physically supported by Soviet funds and emotionally
nourished by Soviet myths. u3

The pathos of apostates such as Milovan

Djilas is testimony to the profundity of their commitment.
however, that many were simple opportunists.

It is true,

But, whether through

idealism or·opportunism, by 1950 the internal factional struggles and
.-...--

purges had eliminated from power those whom the Soviets did not trust
or who were not considered experienced Stalinists.4

This informal

element continued to be a strength of the system after Stalin's death.
The second strength of the system was the pervasive fact of Soviet
power.

This power derived from the Soviet position in international

affairs and from Soviet willingness to use military force to maintain
its interests..

Therefore, any domestic tendencies or "efforts to

loosen Soviet control" on the part of 'the various East European leaderships were absolutely constrained by -the threat of "a violent Soviet
reaction·. u5

As the events of 1953, 1956, and 1968 were to prove,. the
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"military imperative" has remained a durable instrument.
Regardless of military power, the leading role of the CPSU, or
simple idealism, the most vital element of Stalinist control, indeed of
Communism as a global, ideological movement, is its commitment to indus- ·
trialization.

This promise was used by Lenin, by Stalin, and by all

·subsequent leaderships of the Connnunis t movement, both Soviet and nonSoviet, to justify the sacrifices, to gloss over the failures and the
horrors, and to legitimize Connnunist control.

In his "secret speech","

Khrushchev made a special effort to draw a clear distinction between
true industrialization and the "cult of the individual," between gen:uine
economic growth and ~talinism.6

The dream, the promise, and the achieve-

ment of industrial power are the lifeblood of Connnunism.

It is a

commitment, both exploited and fostered, which finally matures and
becomes stronger than Connnunism itself.
Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav critic of Connnunism and a one-time
close associate of Tito, is eloquent in his description of the desperate
appeal of Communism:
The countries which were not yet industrialized • • • found
themselves in a dilemma; they had either to become industrialized, or to discontinue active participation on the
stage of history, turning into captives of the developed
countries and their monopolies, thus doomed to degeneracy
No society or n~tion allows production to lag to such an
extent that its existence is threatened. To lagcmeans to
die. People never die willingly; they are ready to undergo
any sacri:fice to overcome the difficulties which stand in
the way of their econom~c production and their existence.7
It is not the absolute level of production which is important.

What is

important is the international economic and industrial position of a
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nation.

It is this situation, true of all planned and unplanned econo-

mies, which allows the Stalinist system to operate.
Herein lies the diabolical genius of Stalin:

he

realized that Communists, in spite- of their troubled
human consciences, would go along with his falsehoods
and crimes because these were accepted as expedients
and sacrifices that had to be made on the Communist
party's journey to its true end.8
.
WEAKNESSES
As

a system

fo~

the management of the East European bloc, Stalinism

had several critical weaknesses.

These fall into four broad categories:

1) the dependence of the system upon Stalin; 2) the over-dependence of
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe upon the Soviet military; 3) the inherent nationalism of the East European states which Stalinism could
only suppress; and 4) the rigidity of the Stalinist economic model.

The

central role which Stalin played in the Soviet and East European system
has already been touched upon.
was alive.

His image was a real strength while he

Stalin was the object of massive glorification campaigns.

His image was a central factor in the stability of the East European
regimes.

But, with Stalin's death that central figure was gone.

Conti~

nuity was ·broken; there was no "center" for democratic centralism.

The

importance of the role played by the Stalin myth in Eastern Europe, and
the importance of the roles _played by those whom Stalin had placed in
power was to be learned by the new leadership in 1956 when de-Stalinization turned its belated attention to Stalin the man and some of the less
praiseworthy of his fraternal achievements.
As a result of Stalinist economic and political policies, the

Connnu..'list political monopoly had been established.

But the processes
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had generated suffering and bitterness, and the promised results were
still far from being realized by the East European populations.
"socialist reconstruction" had worked both ways.

The

The rule of the

Communist party had been established, but the generated hostility had
made the majority of East
support.

~uropean

regimes dependent upon direct Soviet

It is doubtful that in 1952 any of the East European regimes

could have maintained themselves in power without Stalin's active
support.9

While Stalin was alive, this situation acted in his favor;

with his death, it became an intolerably dangerous situation for the
new Soviet collective leadership.
The third weakness of the Stalinist system was the tension generated as a result of the conflicts between the economic and political
primacy of the Soviet Union and the irreducible, domestic interests of
the East European nations.

National "ways to socialism," domesticism,

and nationalism had been expressed as early as 1948.10

That expression

had focused ·upon "national ways to socialism" within a context of economic bilateralism and autarky and was permitted in the period before the
Stalin-Tito split.

That rupture resulted in the suppression of all

types of domesticism.

The period from 1948 to 1957 was a period, over

all, of conformity to the Soviet mode1.ll

However, if for no other

reasons, nationalistic pressures were kept alive and occasionally brought
into sharp focus by ·the process of economic integration.

As Kaser has

observed:
When the members of an economic union are sovereign nations,
their separate interests will make explicit the conflict
of advantage which decision-makers within any one centralist
state may p~s over.12
The processes of economic integration will make explicit a nation's
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economic advantages and interests.

Nationalism is reinforced by this

process.
The fourth major weakness of the Stalinist system was the rigidity
of the Stalinist economic model.

Eastern Europe was made into a carbon

copy of the Soviet Union in terms of economic institutions and central
economic goals.13

'!he process went further.

Most of the industrial

development and reconstruction was done in conformance with Soviet
economic and engineering standards and requirements.

Much of the new

East European capital construction was geared to the use of Soviet raw
materials both in terms of technology and resource availability.14
However, the economic model itself is of central importance.

That

model was the Soviet nonmarket model, applied rigidly and absolutely.
The political system created by Stalin • • • equated the
nonmarket model with socialism itself. hiy deviation
from that model was considered heresy, treason against
socialism, revisionism, and an attempt to restore
capitalism. 15
The Soviet economic structure was transferred to the new East European
econom~c

planners in its totality.

With regard to the rigidity of that

structure, Kaser has written, "Soviet planning decisions were made on
rules rather than judgements, and rationalized • • • as demonstrating
conformity with Marxist laws • • • • "16

Economic planning decisions

were not made with regard to economic considerations, but with regard
to Marxist dogma.
Unlike

a,

market mechanism, a material balances economic management

and pl&1ning system does not, in and of itself, gravitate toward an
optimal structure of industrial output.17

Rigidity in the production

of consumer and capital goods is one result.
I

1·
~

In support of this point
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Kaser has explained one of its basic cause·s as follows:
For a national 'material balance' the fact that production
is the starting-line tends to induce a certain automatism in
allocation: users are put down for the same shares year
after year because assessment of the relative utility of
each use is not the responsibility of the producer.IS ·
The pattern of production once set is slow to change, each planning period
being little more than a gross update of the last period's allocation. and
production schedules.
~

The virtually uncompromising drive toward heavy industrial development in the Stalin era had four basic roots:

Stalinist ideology, the

political need for an atmosphere of perpetual crisis generated by nsocialist reconstruction," the quite genuine need to industrialize to shorten
the economic lag between the Soviet bloc and the West, and the automatism
of the planning process.

Once set as a priority and as a criteria for

resource and production allocation, heavy industry proved virtually
impossible to renounce.
Fundamentally, • • • the Soviet policy favoring the
creation of fuel and metal industries in the countries
was an autarky inherent in the planning system.19
The priority of heavy industry and national economic autarky placed tremendeus strains upon the East European economies.
These strains took various forms in several areas.
of interest is resource allocation.

The first area

The industrial targets set left

little scope for dom~stic resource shifts or changes in trade agreements.20
Once a plan was set, there was little that could be done to change it.
The second area of strain was the ineffi_ciency introduced into the
system by the pricing mechanisms used.
physical production targets.

Planning was done in terms of
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The consistency of these goals was effected, as it
had been since 1930, by a complex of 'material balances'
but because the units of each were physical (tons,
meters, boxes, bales), there was no aggregation, and

hence no procedure to reach an optimum, that is, a set
of plans which would maximize output and minimize input.
More importantly, • • • the prices of the goods balanced
in physical terms were all but irrelevant for the pro. duction enterprise.21
But, the problem of allocation and prices was even more extensive.
Aggravating the difficulty of assessing the comparative
costs in physical units is the parallel operation of
price measurements. Enterprises and countries calculate their transactions in money: the one uses the
domestic-price relationships, the other prices in the
capitalist world market. Neither set of prices reflects
the physical-input coefficients used by the planners-national or international--and the concerns of the
monetary planners (the enterprise accountants, the
Ministry of Finance, or the foreign settlement department of the national bank) will differ from those
running the physical programmes.22
Thus, efficiency in resource and production allocation are excluded
from the system.
The third area of strain is foreign trade.

Under the Stalinist

economic model, foreign trade had the exclusive function of relieving
supply bottlenecks in national economic plans.23

The East European

economies were, and are, much more dependent upon foreign trade than is
the Soviet economy.
model.

Foreign trade is very poorly handled by the Soviet

This aspect is one of the "conditioners" of the East European

reaction· to.the Soviet mode1.24
Stalinism, as a system for the political and economic control of
the East European bloc, has several ptrengths and weaknesses.
strengths of classic Stalinism resided in its ability

~o

The basic

enforce the

political monopoly of the various East European Conrrnunist regimes, its
consequent ability to control those regimes both politically and

.

-
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economically, and in Marxism-Leninism's fundamental commitment to
industrialization and economic growth.

The basic weaknesses were the

inability of "democratic centralism" to overcome nationalism and the
fundamental inability of the Stalinist economic model to provide economic efficiency, balanced industrialization, and the spectrum of
economic growth which'were the well-springs of its support.

THE IMPERATIVES OF CHANGE
The specific weaknesses of the system did not in themselves
necessitate change.

The weaknesses cited have remained in one form

or another well into the current period.

The strengths of the Stalin-

ist system, many of them inherent strengths of Communism itself, eµabled
the new leadership to revise the system while remaining in ultimate
control.

However, Selucky has identified six factors in Stalinism as

it operated in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which made change
imperative.

The first of these elements was the backlog of economic

reforms which had been impossible to implement while Stalin had been
alive.25

Brzezinski and Kaser support this view.

Stalinism was

"noticeably untouched by innovation and experimentation. 11 26

Economic

reforms were either stifled or reversed until after Stalin's death.27
Under the then prevailing circumstances, it is understandable that
this was the situation.

Selucky has written:

While tlie dictator with the authority of an inf al lib le
leader was still alive, any attempt at changing the
state of affairs that had been petrified by Stalin
was tantanvunt to attempted suicide.28
The second element was the inexplicable, ·irrational terror which

j·

~

!.
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was growing in the latter period of Stalin's life.

It could not be

explained upon the basis of Stalin's personal power requirements.
It could, as far as Selucky is concerned, only be apparently explained
upon the basis of Stalin's character.29
charitable.
another

Brzezinski i~, ~n a way, more

In 1952 and 1953, Stalin was building the found.adons ·ro·r

ser~es

of 1930s style purges in order to revitalize the system.

In other words, increasingly suspicious that somehow
his system was becoming brittle and static, Stalin
was preparing to deal with it in the only way he
knew how.30
But, as Selucky has noted, the purges were contrary to the interests of
the Pa!tY apparatus, particularly those who lived in constant danger
under the direct authority and control of the secret police.
The third element was that the system was contrary to the interests
of the technocracy, i.e., the technological and managerial elite.

Any-

thing which caused the disruption of the frequently unrealistic
economic plans could bring charges of sabotage and counter-revolutionary
activity against them.

"The managers of Soviet enterprises lived almost

lite.rally with one foot in prison throughout the period. n31
The fourth element was that the system ran counter to the interests
of the military.

"Ideological limitations delayed the development of

cybernetics, physics, and other scientific fields connected with the
build-up of Soviet.nuclear and rocket power."32

As far as the military

was concerned, it must have appeared as a question of advance technology
now or "pay in blood" later.
the fifth element was the intolerably low standard of living
which the Stalinist system created.

Within the framework of Stalinism,.
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an improvement in the standard of living could not be expected.

In

terms of agriculture, Stalinism had created such economic canditions
"that any coincidence of unfavorable weather conditions could have
resulted in famine. n33

In this respect Stalinism was operating at

sharp variance with Soviet ideology.

Schwartz has observed that the

Soviet system is finally dependent upon a steady increase in the
material standard of living.34
The sixth element was the over-centralization and militarization
of the Soviet economy and the resulting economic losses.
were the result of several factors:

These losses

the deep imbalance of the economy,

rigid management, a "nonsensical pricing system," national and regional
autarky in terms of economic development, and direct, inexpert "interventions" in the operation of various branches of the economy.
Stalinism was a block upon the interests of the Party, the technocracy, the military, and the general populace.
negative aspects of Stalinism were well known.

The critically
As

Selucky has observed,

It was, therefore, no accident that almost immediately
after Stalin's 'death (after June, 1953, upon the liquidation of Lavrenti Beria as a potential perpetuator
of Stalinism), a movement started for their gradual
elimination.35
Stalinism, as a total system and in its classic and extreme form, could
not endure.

It could not survive the death of its creator.

between the members of the New Class and their interests.

It stood
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CHAPTER V

THE NEW COURSE
"As anyone· who knew Malenkov will tell
you, after Stalin's death he was completely without initiative and completely
unpredictable." -- Khrushchevl

THE OBJECTIVES

In June, i953, workers first in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, and then
in East Berlin, rioted.
economic.2

The immediate sources of the flare-ups were

Of the two, th~ East German demonstrations are the more

significant.

The East German regime, highly dependent upon Soviet

support, was in a dangerous situation in 1953.

As early as Aprii,

the East German leadership pleaded with the Soviets to allow an economic relaxation .in the form of a reconsideration of the extant capital
development policy.

Finally, on June 9, 1953, the East German Polit-

buro made a public statement which admitted that "aberrations" had
occurred in the past and announced an economic relaxation designed to
relieve the most pressing economic hardships.

The program involved

a reduction of taxes and delivery quotas, the granting of government
loans to

p~ivate

businesses, and an increase in various material allo-

cations. 3 However, the situation was beyond the control of the East
German regime.

On June 16, 1953, a demonstration against an increase

in compulsory work norms in the construction industry spread throughout the German Democratic Republic.

The Soviets decided to intervene.

1

1

l
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By J'lllle 18,

as

a result of Soviet military action, order and the

Ulbricht government had been restored.4
The East German riots are important because they demonstrated
the ultimate and direct dependence of the East German government upon
Soviet military power5 and, by implication, that the "socialist camp"
was held together by little other than the Soviet ability to militarily

I.

intervene as necessary.

However, the riots left the Soviets with little

choice but to ·recognize that change in the bloc was vital.6
the Soviet army could not1be everywhere at all times.

After all,

Therefore, the

central goal of the new Soviet collective leadership with regard to
Eastern Europe was

~imply

to maintain Soviet power in the area.

Because

the main pressures which threatened the unity of the bloc were expressed
in terms of economics,7 the Malenkov period was primarily concerned with
the economic legacy of Stalinism.8
The Soviet need to focus their attention upon conditions within
the bloc and the stark realities of nuclear war made a relaxation of
th~ ~old

War necessary.

first atomic bomb.

In August, 1949, the Soviets exploded their

This development was followed in September, 1953,9

by the first Soviet hydrogen detonation.10
capability was quickly coming of age.

The Soviet thermonuclear

First-hand knowledge of the

destructive potent1al of nuclear weapons had a profotmd influence upon
the new leadership:
tionary option.11

Global war was no longer an international, revoluThe threat embodied in nuclear war made a policy

of "peaceful coexistence" an absolute necessity.12
Because of these
primary objectives:

c~rcumstances,

the "New Course" had three

to avoid a nuclear war with the West; to maintain

1

I
1·
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and further consolidate Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and other
areas; and to reform the Soviet and East European system so that it
would function more efficiently, but to reform it in such a manner
that the substance of Soviet power would not be relinquished.

These

goals existed within the context of historic Soviet foreign and economic policies.

Their object was not the renunciation of· the goals of

Stalinism and of Marxism-Leninism, but the preservation of the total
Soviet system.
THE POLICIES AND SCOPE
The "New Course," usually associated with Malenkov, who had
apparently been designated as Stalin's successor at the 19th Party
Congress in 1952, was based upon two policies:

an improvement in the

general standard of living in the bloc as a whole and a degree of
relaxation in Soviet foreign policy.

Politically, Malenkov's policies

were characterized by a continuation of Stalinism balanced by a limited
economic relaxation.

It was an attempt to "pursue a new course in econo-

mies without basically altering the framework of essentially Stalinist
politics. 11 13
The "New Course" was intended to apply to both the Soviet Union
and to the people's democracies.14

Just as they had followed Stalin,

the East Europeans were now expected to follow the "New Course."
Absorbed. in its own succession struggle,. Moscow's
perception of Soviet-East European relationships
continued much in the Stalinist mold.15
The East European regimes were to duplicate the "New Course" just as
they had duplicated classic Stalinism.16

77

The

11

New Course" involved concessions both real and rhetorical.

That concessions were made by Stalin's successors, men politically
matured in the traditions of Stalinism, indicates how urgent they considered the post-Stalin situation and how dangerous they believed a
continuation of the more odious aspects of the "old ways" to be.17
In essence the "New Course" was a period of re-examination and intense
power struggle.

The struggle itself forced a debate on many aspects

of Soviet policy.18

The most crucial of these debates was between the

Khrushchev and Malenkov factions regarding industrialization.19
Those debates and the

act~ons

necessitated by the East European

situati9n resulted in a number of policy changes.

The pattern was set

by the solution worked out for the East German affair.

It contain.ed

no political concessions, but economic concessions were made to relieve
the political tensions.20

The following concessions were made in the

__)

German Democratic Republic:

there was an admission that the pace of

industrialization had been too rapid; the allocation of investment
was altered by a reduction in the investment made in heavy industry;
work norms were lowered; wage taxes and prices were reduced; more
consumer goods were made available; travel was made less expensive;
pensions were increased; a partial amnesty was granted to minor
offenders; on January 1, 1954, repa!ations payments to the Soviet
Union were terminated; and the control of various East German enterprises was returned to East Germany.21

It is important to note that

though the pace of industrialization was admitted to have been too
fast, heavy industrialization itself was not repudiated.

The issue

was one which turned on the rate of industrialization on the one hand
and the living standard on the other.

1

I
1 ·

I
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In Hungary,
ly sharp.

th~

results

of

Stalinist policies had been dangerous-

The first five-year plan had called for a 380 percent

1

increase in the production of capital goods.

In June, 1953,

~meeting

was held in Moscow between the Hungarian leadership, headed by Matyas
Rakosi, a member of the Hungarian National Liberation Committee and
Stalinist hardliner, and a Soviet delegation.

The Soviets castigated

the Hungarians for economic excesses and insisted on an immediate
economic reform to prevent a catastrophe.

The Hungarian leadership,

the Soviets charged, had driven the country too far.22

Rakosi was

forced to resign as premier, though he remained the First Secretary
of the Hungarian Connnunist party.

Imre Nagy, a Hungarian moderate who

supported the "New Course," was appointed in Rakosi' s place as premier
in a strictly formal implementation of the principle of collective
leadership.
Nagy initiated the "New Course" with an address to the Hungarian
Parliament.

While the main focus of his speech was economic, the

who_le system was essentially criticized.
included the following elements:

The Hungarian "New Course"

the institution of collective leader-

ship, both Nagy and Rakosi holding positions of authority; a partial
amnesty along the East Gennan line was declared; prices were reduced;
wages increased; compulsory obligations reduced for the labor force;
some agricultural.deliveries were canceled; peasant taxes were reduced
by 15 percent; withdrawal from collective farms was sanctioned; greater
religious tolerance was introduced; the internment camps were abolished;
the judiciary and the secret police were institutionally
and the investment rate in heavy industry was reduced.

s~parated;

l

I
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Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia were the next states to
adopt the "New Course."

The Czechoslovak reform had five elements:

taxes were reduced; wages were increased; delivery quotas were reduced; a limited permission to withdraw from collective farms was
granted; and the rate of industrial growth was reduced.
the last state to adopt the "New Course."
cessions were:

Poland was

The Polish economic ·con-

a reduction .in taxes, delivery quotas, and of accumu-

lation in national income; and an increase in the availability of
consumer goods.
Dmytryshyn has summarized the uniform elements of the "New Course":
Each satellite regime adopted the principle of 'collective
leadership,' and promised (alongside continued industrialization) to improve the standard of living; to abandon the
policy of economic autarky; to increase wages and to decrease
prices; to give increased attention to agriculture; to slow
the tempo of collectivization; to encourage initiative in
small production and trade; to curb the activity of the
police; and to release those who had been imprisoned
tmjustly.
Though the first bilateral steps toward truly joint economic
planning were taken during the "New Course," the most striking economic
reform was the dismantling of the network of Soviet companies and Soviet
and East European joint stock companies which operated in Eastern
Europe.24

Most of these companies, located in Hungary, Rumania, and

Bulgaria, were dismantled by a series of bilateral agreements in the
autumn of 1954 with the remaining companies disbanded in 1955 or 1956.
'!he more important of the companies to the Soviets were the last to be
transferred to local state o'Wnership.

Those states were to pay for

the Soviet's equity in yearly installments.

Due to the terms of the

transfer of ownership, Spulber has asserted that those payments could
be termed a "second round of reparations."

The companies had been

L
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extremely profitable for the Soviets. .Only Soviet awareness of the
pent-up East European resentment to the companies caused the Soviets
to transfe~ ownership to the local states.25
The policies of the "New Course" were a mixture of Stalinism and
a relaxation of both internaitonal tension26 and the methods by which
the Soviets

~intained

their hegemony in Eastern Europe.

What is

important to note is that neither the maximum goal of Soviet foreign
policy, nor the leading role of the CPSU, nor the diplomatic and
economic primacy of the Soviet Union, nor the fundamental commitment
to the development of heavy industry were abandoned.
The "New Course" lasted from June 26, 1953, the date of Beria's
arrest, until February 8, 1955, the date of Malenkov' s "resignation"
from his post as chairman of the Council of Ministers.

It existed as·

an attempt through economic, political, and foreign policies to redefine Stalinism in such a way that the Marxist-Leninist system and
the

"sociali~t

camp" would function and endure.

The "New Course"

was not revolutionary; in the final analysis, it was a matter of
degrees.

The general standard of living did improve, but it did not

receive absolute priority over heavy industry.

The power of the secret.

police was reduced, but the basic organizational structures, with some
reforms, remained in operation.

Foreign tension was relaxed, but?.: the

Cold War was hardly·a thing of the past.

AN ASSESSMENT

Because the "New Course" existed within the context of Stalinism,
it retained the principal. strengths and weaknesses of Stalinism..

It
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both lessened the tensions acting to disintegrate the "socialist camp"
and, in many ways, critically increased them.

In terms· of the Soviet

East European bloc itself, the strengths of the "New Course" were:
foreign trade increased;27 the standard of living increased; as a
result of the East European replication of "collective leadership,"
I

l·

many new, sometimes more popular figures were brought into the various
East European leaderships, for example, Imre Nagy in Hungary; there
was an increased recognition of peculiar domestic factors in the
application of Soviet policies to the East European states;28 the
total flexibility of the system was increased; and none of the substance
of Soviet power had been renounced.
However, the "New Course" was a period of power struggle characterized by a continual crisis of authority.

In such a period, and

particularly in the Soviet system, the operational capabilities of a
government are reduced.29

Marxism-Leninism is a governmental system

which tends to focus power in the hands of a single individual. 30
The "New Course" was that period in which the system, in the form of
the choices and the actions of individual
that

pow~r

~en,

in the person of Nikita Khrushchev.

began to concentrate
It is from this con-

1

l

dition of "leaderlessness" that the main weaknesses of the "New Course"

1·
I

l

II

derive.

These were:

Soviet policy in Eastern Europe as a whole lacked

coherence; 31 in Poland and Hungary the "New Course" was "insufficient

I

to resolve the dilelillllas bequeathed by Stalinism without a clear and .

I

sustained Soviet involvement"; 32 under the policies of the "New Course,"

I

controls were relaxed to permit slight variations from the Soviet norm,
yet there were no clearly defined limits to those variations;33

I
•

i
I

l.
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ideological fissures were opened by the "New Course"; the Soviet leadership itself was deeply divided about the wisdom of the "New Course";

and finally, many of the "little Stalins," such as Rakosi, were still
active.
THE SOURCES OF FAILURE
There were, consequently, two reasons why the "New Course" failed.
The first was that it left unresolved, almost by definition, the
question of Soviet leadership.

The clear, uncompromising direction

which so characterized the Stalin era was critically lacking.

The

ability to maneuver· and to respond quickly, except in the most clearcut cases, was lost.

The second reason is attendant upon the first.

There were no clearly defined limits set upon the national variations
of socialism which had been enabled by the "New Course."
this was inevitable.

To an extent

Without defined and recognized leadership, defined

policies are impossible.
The power struggle within the Soviet Communist party, which had
been the source of the principal weaknesses and ambivalence of the
"New Course," was largely resolved with the "resignation" in February,
1955, of Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
From that time, Khrushchev was to emerge as the clearly
figure ·in the Soviet leadership.

do~inant

The conditions tm.der which the power

struggle was resolved and the concrete questions of policy upon which
it turned set the irrnnediate tone for the active concern of the Soviet
Union in

the.a~fairs

of Eastern Europe for the balance of 1955 and

most of 1956.. The resolution of the struggle itself set the foundations
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for the revitalization of the "leading role 11 of the Soviet Union in
the bloc.

In 1953 Malenkov and Khrushchev held similar views regarding economic policy and of the role of the development of heavy industry in
that policy.

However, Malenkov's position shifted in favor of the

development of light or ·consumer goods industry.

A conflict developed

between them in terms of the·" actual priorities in the allocation of
resources to producer and consumer industries. 1134

Khrushchev's position

continued to stress the development of heavy industry.
its way into the.official Soviet press by late 1954.
broke into the open-on December 21, 1954.

His view found
The conflict

Pravda, the Party journal,

supported Khrushchev's position, while Isvestia, considered to be the
government publication, supported Malenkov.

The public broaching of

the issue left the East European leaderships without a clear direction. 36
However, in late 1954 or very early in 1955, Khrushchev gained
the support of the Party's Central Conunittee and the military for his
position regarding the rate and method of heavy industrial development.37
During the course of the debate, Khrushchev "assumed the role of a
Leninist revolutionary" struggling against the bureaucrats by his
support of "new and dynamic schemes of internal reconstruction. "38
At the same time, Malenkov's pro-consumer goods position was charged
with being an "un-Marxist abandonment of heavy industry" and a threat
to Soviet defense capabilities.39

Under such pressure, Malenkov was

forced to resign on February 8, 1955.40
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However, there was

an

equally important issue to that concerning

the relative priority of heavy industry.

It centered on the defense

policies of the Soviet Union, the importance and geopolitical meaning
of nuclear weapons, and military doctrine.
Khrushchev took different sides.

Again, Malenkov and

Stalin had established as Party

doctrine the view that the Soviet system was automatically superior
to any other.

In the immediate post-war period this view, which neces-

sitated the adoption of the correlary doctrine that the Soviet Union
could not be defeated regardless of the specific military circumstances,
had led to stagnation in Soviet military thought and systems
and to an

underesti~tion

of the nuclear potential.

innovatio~

At the Supreme

Soviet session of March, 1954, the Malenkov faction declared that the
Soviet military possessed all that was needed to properly defend the
country.

On

t~e

other hand, the Khrushchev faction called for a further

strengthening of the Soviet military.41

The issue was joined.

The defense debate hinged on the role that nuclear.weapons would
play. in a future war.

i

Through 1953 and 1954, Malenkov' s position was

that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons acted as a deterrent

I

of global war and that such a war would destroy human civilization.

I

1his threat set limits beyond which the nuclear powers could not go in

I

the pursuit of their goals.

However, within those limits the Soviet

Union and the United States were viewed as still being able to maneuver
much as befoTe.42
On

the other side of the debate was Khrushchev's faction and the

main group of top military professionals.

Their position stressed the

possibility of a surprise nuclear attack by the United States and that
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this possibility required a "drastic

reorganizat~on

of military doctrine."

The theory upon which the Malenkov faction relied, the mutual deterrence

of nuclear weapons, was specifically repudiated by Marshall Georgii
Zhukov, the most prestigious Soviet commander of the Second World War.
'Ihe object of the Khrushchev faction was the establishment of a Soviet·
military which was capable of not only "preventing a nuclear war, but
of waging it" also. 43
It seems that Mr. Khrushchev agreed with the Generals
that once a weapon had been invented in th is world of
strife it was the duty of statesmen and their military
advisers not to rely on its deterrent qualities, but
to prepare the country for its use, both defensively
and in the context of a forestalling blow against an
enemy about to strike. 44
Thus Khrushchev's position called for caution and capability,

whil~

Malenkov's called for caution and a very non-concrete trust in the
deterrence of nuclear weapons and in the inherent superiority of the
Soviet system.

THE RESULTS
Following his "resignation, 11 Malenkov retained his position in
the Party Presidium and continued to hold a ministerial position.
,.

j

l

His

posit-ion in the Soviet leadership may have been "down graded" even
before February, 1955.

Malenkov was absent from a delegation headed by

Khrushchev and Bulganin which went to China in September, 1954.45
However, Maienkov was not powerless.•

From his position on the Party

Presidimn, he was later to organize a group which tried unsuccessfully
t~

oust Khrushchev in 1957.
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The resolution of the Party power struggle did not immediately
result in a more clearly defined Soviet East European policy; it only

increased'the ability of the Soviets to form such a policy.

Brzezinski

has characterized the situation faced by the East Europeans, as late as
the sunnner of 1955 as follows:
The internal Soviet ambivalence in policy and the
reduction in international tensions produced the belief
that the People's Democracies could now afford to frame
their policies to fit their domestic requirements.46
Without clear directives from the Soviets and within the context of
reduced international tensions, the East Europeans mistakenly assumed
that the time had come in which _they could formulate and implement
policies more in keeping with their own national interests.

The subse-

quent course of events was to demonstrate that where East European and
Soviet interests were at odds, the East European leaders were wrong.
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CHAPtER VI
THE SOVIET REASSERTION
"There's no single model or mold which fits
all the countries of the world. To think·
that there is is just plain stupid, • • •
Every working class should be able to choose
its own course of development on the basis
of local historical and economic circumstances
--on the one vital condition, of course~ that
the means of production and the banks belong
to the people, and the state is run by the
dictatorship of the proletariat."--Khrushchev.l
THE OBJECTIVES RECAST
It would be convenient to argue that the reassertion of the central~st

position of the Soviet Union and the CPSU neatly began on

February 8, 1955.

That would, however, be wrong.

The real substance

of the Soviet Union's position in Eastern Europe had not been jeopardized by Stalin's death as such.

Indeed, in the long run, Stalin's death

made possible the adjustments and reforms necessary if the Soviet system

.

was not to eventually shatter in a torrential bloodletting.

1.

5, 1953, the treaty systems, the leading role of the Soviet Union and

I

After March

the CPSU, and the economic dominance of the Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe remained in place.

Malenkov's resignation is a turning point

because it marks the new beginning of continuity in Soviet leadership.
There was no return to classic Stalinism; but the unworkable myth· of
"collective leadership" in a situation of intense power struggle was set
aside.

The focus of democratic centralism was restored.

It was
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Nikita S. Khrushchev.

l

The Soviet Union's position in Eastern Europe had, however, been

weakened by the reforms of 1953. and 1954 and by the lack of coherence
generated by the power struggle.

The weakness lay in the failure of the

reforms to clearly and explicitly define the limits to the processes,
planned and unplanned, which had been set in motion by the reforms and
in the greater failure of the reforms to regularize and perform the
necessary restructuring of the Soviet and East European system.

There-

fore, the reassertion of Soviet centralism was a reform of the previous
reforms, the setting of defined limits, the regularization of the fragmented bilateral treaty network, and the formalization, i.e., explicit
codification, of the Soviet and East European system.

I.

a~ter

February 8, 1955, the Soviet government began again to function vigorously with consistency and continuity.
but it was the beginning.

I

In short,

This was not an overnight shift,

The time of mourning and confusion was over.

Khrushchev's policies had three primary objectives:

the avoidance

of ·a.general nuclear war or "peaceful coexistence" as it was phrased,
the economic and political
regulari~ation

~ntegration

of the socialist camp, and the

of the Soviet and East European system.

were generated in support of these goals:

Seven policies

1) the continuation of the

policy of "peaceful coexistence" from the "New Course" period; 2) th_e
limited admission of Western intellectual currents, a necessity for
economic, cultural, and scientific progress; 3) an increase in the rate
of heavy industrial development over the rate in

th~

period of the

"New Course"; 4) an. improved standard of living through an increase
in the production of consumer goods, the continuation of another "New

Course" policy; 5) the limited recognition of a degree of local East
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European autonomy; ·6) an improvement in the general support given to the
East European regimes; and, 7) the establishment or revitalization of
multilateral control mechanisms.2
major areas of Soviet concern:

These policies concentrated upon the

the unity of the Communist

move~nt

within

the system, economic integration, and the Soviet and East European
~

i

.

collective security system.

THE METHODS
As had been the case with the "New Course," the policies of the

Khrushchev era operated within the context of Marxism-Leninism and within
the context of many of the more important goals and policies of postwar
Stalinism such as the commitment to industrialization and the consoiidation of the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe.

In order to reduce the

necessity for constant Soviet involvement in East European affairs and
to contain the pressures of the diversity which Stalinism could only
suppress or paper over, Khrushchev altered the Stalinist system to create
a socialist "commonwealth" based upon economic and institutional processes.
At the same time, Khrushchev reaffirmed the imperative nature of ideolo-

I
,

.

gical unity, defined as adherence to the following basic principles:

the

leading role of the CPSU in the international Communist movement; the
maintenance of the political monopoly held by the bloc Communist parties;

I

and the principle that industrialization and agricultural collectivization

I.

were essential components in the process of socialist transformation.3

I

Nor was the historic maximum goal of Marxism-Leninism and of Stalinism
forgotten.

I~ ~955

the Soviets perceived their opportunities for expan-

sion as being very limited in the Western world.

I
j.

No spectacular situa-
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tions beckoned.

This situation was to change sharply, however, the

following year.

But, especially in 1955, the policy of "peaceful co-

existence" cost the Soviets little. 4 With limited opportunities in the
West, the Soviet Union followed a long-established precedent.
Khrushchev's other grand strategy was the old Russian
one of expanding in Asia (or the less developed nations
in general) to draw strength to fight the West.5
Thus, the continuity of Soviet foreign policy was maintained through a
re-emphasis upon the revolutionary opportunities which existed or which
could be created in the colonial or semi-colonial areas of the world.
Only the inunediate focus and the most extreme method permissible in the
promotion of world·Conununism had changed.

THE REGULARIZATION OF STALINISM
In the most general sense, the regularization of the Stalinist
system took the form of the revitalization of Comecon through the expansion of its functions and the creation of the Warsaw Pact6 which was
a restatement and redefinition of the Soviet and East European collective
security system.

These two institutions, both with solid foundations

in Stalinism, were to form the underpinnings of the multilateral, inter-

I·

sovereignty relations which were to play an increased role in the
Soviet East European system.
Khrushchev's ability to reform Stalinism was limited.
position in the CPSU leadership was not unquestioned.

His own

In 1957

opposi~

tion to Khrushchev was to solidify into a challenge from the "anti-Party"
group.

Also, .reforms which might threaten the political monopoly held
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by the Communist par~ies could not and would not be tried.7

Further-

oore, 'given the still very active factions within the CPSU, a clear

definition of "threaten" was not yet possible.

In any reform program,

Khrushchev could only go so far as his inclinations and the situation
within the CPSU dictated.

With regard to Khrushchev's situation in

1955, it has been asserted that:
Neither then nor in the future was Khrushchev's position
as the leader of his country and of world Connnunism to be
strong enough to enable him to effect really fundamental
changes in the Soviet system or in foreign policy.8
On the other hand, the question must be asked:

Beyond what was necessary

to protect themselves from it, did Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership
ever wish to make really fundamental changes in the system which they
inherited from Joseph Stalin?
ECONOMIC REFORM AND INTEGRATION
Desp~te

Khrushchev's insistence upon the need for ideological

unity, Stalin 1 s death, the turmoil of the "New Course" period, and the

I

I
~

growth of the East European states themselves, made ideological unity
a somewhat tenuous affair •. The Soviet desire for unity had not lessened,
hut the ability of previously successful methods to obtain it was brought

I

generally build

I

and the foundation of the Warsaw Pact.9

I

upon multilateral, formal organizations proceeqed against the background

into serious question.
th~

As

a result the Soviet leadership decided to

unity of the bloc upon the revitalization of Comecon

of a Soviet mandated return to the

I
!

I
I

This shift to a greater reliance

pri~cy

attendant high .economic growth rates.

of heavy industry

and its

Within the context of lessened

international tensions and the new doctrine of "peaceful coexistence,"
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a more classic industrial development program was in fact a test of
the willingness and ability of the bloc leaderships to follow the Soviet
Union.10

Poland and Hungary were to fail that test.

The average growth of industrial output measured as a percentage
of the previous year's output for the bloc as a whole (Bulgaria,
II·

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania) in 1951 was
123.1 percent; in 1952, 119.8 percent; in .1953, 112.8 percent; in 1954,
107.3 percent, and in 1955, 110.3 percent.

From the last full year of

the Stalin period the. rate dropped from 119.8 percent to 107.3 percent
in the full year of the "New Course."

In 1955, the year the "reassertion"

began, the rate rose-to 110.3 percent.11

These figures are, of course,

only indicative and must be treated with a good deal of caution.
theless, they do indicate a certain relaxation.

~one-

In 1952, the rate of

industrial output ranged from a high of 124 percent in Hungary to a
low of 116 percent in East Germany.

In 1954, these rates ranged from

103 percent for Hungary to 111 percent for Poland.

In 1955, these rates

ranged from 108 for East Germany and Hungary to 114 for Rumania.

There-

fore, though the pace of industrial development was resumed, there was
no return to the counteproductive growth rates characteristic of the
~

.

Stalin era.

(See Appendix L.)12

The pace of industrialization slowed in 1.953 and 1954; however,
economic growth continued.

With the resolution of the power struggle

within the CPSU, the emphasis upon heavy industrial development was
restored, though not to the extent characteristic of classic Stalinism.
The g!owth rates fell as part of the "New Course," but that was only
part of the reason.

The pace also slackened in some part due to the

confusion within the Soviet leadership and, therefore, within the
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East European leaderships as well.
Within this situation, the Soviet leadership hoped to promote
Soviet and East European economic integration as a material foundation

i
l

c
~

l

I

i·
~

for bloc unity.

'Tilough Comecon has gone through substantial reorgani-

zation and evolution, the Soviet. leadership's hopes for it as the basis
of economic integration have been somewhat disappointed.13

This has

been largely due to the inability of the Soviet and East European system to shed the basic economic autarky of Stalinism.14
Until the early 1960s, economic reform in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union was limited to bureaucratic and administrative reforms
of the basic Stalinist model.

For

ex~ple,

the degree of economic

liberalization which took place in Poland between 1956 and 1958 was
followed by a return to more Stalinist methods.15

Further, the adminis-

tration of the Soviet economy was reorganized in 1953, 1954, and 1957.
However, though the leadership was willing to try "radical" innovations
in the bureaucratic structures, they remained firm on the maintenance
of "the primacy of state planning, the dominant role of the Communist
Party," and "the continuance of socialized farming. "16

Until 1955 or

1956, Soviet diplomats and advisers in Eastern Europe simply "gave
orders· to local officials on major questions of economic policy."17
Though the fundamental attitudes of economic autarky and the
"connnand" system of economic planning remained in force to a greater
or lesser extent, the importance of foreign trade both within the bloc
and outside of it steadily increased following Stalin's death.18

At

a symposium sponsored by the West German Institute for the Study of
the USSR in April, 1956, J. M. Letiche, who was then an associate

1.

l

I
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professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley,
stated that Soviet trade with .Eastern Europe had "become a means of
coordinating the plans and directing the economic development of the
Soviet and satellite states."19
tives of Soviet foreign trade:
bloc; to help

incre~se

Letiche also identified several objecto limit Western influence within the

the Soviet economic growth rate; to chqrlnel the

controlling proportion of foreign trade of the bloc thrqugh the Soviet
Union; to promote the socialist development of the bloc; and to create
the impression of a market for Western industrial surpluses, while at
the same time creating an "atmosphere of needless defense in Western
Europe. 11 20.
For these reasons, until the middle 1950s the burden of economic
integration ·and the coordination of economic planning in the bloc was
carried by intrabloc trade.

However, the coordination of foreign trade

was augmented by economic loans, credits, and scientific and technical
assistance.21

On the other hand, working against economic integration,

the centrally directed state foreign trading organizations made an effort
to insulate their domestic economies from the fluctuations in the markets
outside their countries.22
The modest move away from economic autarky increased the importance
of intrabloc trade.

At the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev emphasized

the necessity for intrabloc economic specialization to free industrial
capacity and- other resources for the development of agriculture and light.
industry.23

This was necessary if the bloc was to both improve the

general standard of living and at the same time renew the pace of industrial development as called for by Khrushchev's policies.

However, in

tenns of foreign trade as such, political, economic, and military objec-
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tives, as distinct from consumer objectives, were given priority.24
The new emphasis on the division of labor within the bloc was an integral
part of economic integration and further increased the dependence of
the East Europeans upon the Soviet Union.25

However, with regard to

product specialization, the Soviet attitude in 1955 and 1956 was that,
though the East European states were to specialize, the Soviet Union
would reserve the right to produce a full line of products.26

Product

specialization began to make some real headway in 1956, but as the
product of bilateral arrangements, rather than action taken within the
structure of Comecon, though the problem was discussed there.27
The Soviet decision to establish Comecon as the major institution
of economic integration was finalized in May, 1956, with the formation
of the first group of Comecon's various standing commissions.

This

decision was taken in response to several factors, among which were:
the successful, increasing economic integration of Western Europe, the
political need within Eastern Europe for the creation of a more multilateral agency to promote economic integration which at the same time
could be subject to Soviet control, and the objective superiority of
nrultilateral methods of economic integration as opposed to strictly
bilateral ones.

I'

j
l

Since the early middle 1950s, Soviet and East European

economic cooperation had taken the form of a drive toward economic integration through the coordination of investment plans, specialization,
various

joi~t

cooperation.28

undertakings, and financial, scientific, and technical
In 1954, these efforts involved the founding of various

special committees.29

These committees were given a more formalized

status in 19S5~30 and in May, 1956, were established as formal, standing

lQl
commissions.

Kaser has noted:

It was not until some of the eastern European members
had begun seriously to examine the standards by which
integration could be judged that Comecon took on operational form--by the establishment of standing technical
commissions in 1956.31
Needless to say, this could not have been done without active Soviet
support and involvement.

The standing connnissions created gave a new

scope to Comecon's activities,32 and demonstrated the Soviet Union's
commitment to revive Comecon as 'a viable organization.33
These standing commissions were:

agriculture, chemicals, coal,

electric power, engineering, ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, foreign
trade, oil and, gas, 'forestry, timber and cellulose, and geology.

The

latter three were abolished in 1958 when four other commissions were
added:

construction, transport, economic questions, and light and food

industries.34

The connnissions allowed a much broader opportunity for
I

experts and professionals to meet and exchange views than had existed
before 1956.

Additionally, :in 1955 and 1956 the standing connnissions

and their predecessors became genuine mechanisms for negoti~tions.35
On balance, it must be concluded that Comecon was functionally

inactive apart from its role in propaganda until 1956.

Before that

time, economic cooperation had proceeded through other channels,36
such as bilateral inter-Party contacts and interstate contacts.

Comecon

was established as a multilateral institution in fact, but bilateral
economic mechanisms were not set aside nor would they be.

I

I
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THE. FOUNDATIONS OF THE WARSAW PACT
The second post.-Stalin instrument of Soviet and East European integration was the Warsaw Pact.37

With regard to the East European states,

the Warsaw Pact
l·

• • • represented the single most important formal commitment
binding the states to the USSR, officially limiting their
scope of independent action, and legalizing the presence
(and hence the political influence) of the Soviet troops
stationed in some of them.38
The Warsaw Pact was created and evolved as the central, multilateral
institution of the Soviet bloc.
The Pact was created for a number of reasons.

The most immediate

geopolitical reason was the rearmament and admission of West Germany to
NAT0.39

The treaty itself makes this assertion.

The Warsaw Pact was a

response to West German remilitarization and integration into the "north
Atlantic bloc."40

The Soviet position, as stated by Alexandrov, is

that the Warsaw Pact is a "purely defensive organization" directed at
"s cif~guarding" European and global peace.
Signed six years after the formation of NATO, the Warsaw
Treaty is a retaliatory measure of the peace-loving
states against the aggressive activities of NATO and
other imperialist military blocs.41
Ulam has observed that it was only after West German inclusion in NATO
that the Soviets came to consider NATO a "direct menace" and responded
by the formation of the Warsaw Pact.42
argument further.

Remington extends this general

The formation of the Warsaw Pact was a response to

and an attempt to prevent West German participation in NATQ.43

Indeed,

for Remington, ."the Warsaw Treaty Organization was not intended to fight
but to gain another bargaining card in the Cold War. n44

In addition,

103
Remington observes:
From a political point of view the minimal natu~e of
that structure was not particular!~ important to Moscow.

For at that time the Warsaw Treaty was designed to be
primarily a prop of Soviet strategy at the Four Power
Geneva Conference in July.45
Based upon the information publicly available regarding the January,
1956, meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee,46
Remington asserts that two views of the·warsaw Pact operated within
the Soviet leadership.

In line with

~mington's

thesis, the Khrushchev

faction viewed the Warsaw Pact as an organization not intended to"play
a direct military role, but as an asset "in the Cold War."

On the other

hand, Molotov viewed the Pact as "a vehicle for socialist consolidation,
military preparedness, defense."

Becatise Molotov was caught up in a

power struggle in 1957 and "relegated to Outer Mongolia," Remington
considers that his view lost in the debate.47
Though Khrushchev may have viewed the Pact as a new "negotiable"·
asset in the Cold War, it is unlikely that his view of the Pact was so
limited.

A

structur~

beyond "minimal" was not necessary, nor even

desirable, to the Soviets due to the political control they were able ..
in 1955 to exercise and due to the extent to which Soviet personnel
were directly integrated into the East European military.

Khrushchev's

position in the power struggle with Malenkov, his promotion of military
interests, and his alliance with Zhukov indicate that the First
Secretary's view of the new Pact was much closer to Molotov's.
In addition to the "German motive," the Warsaw Pact was created
to replace bilateral, Stalinist methods of control and integration
which would not work effectively iri the post-Stalin era.

The political
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uncertainty of the period created a situation in which a more formal
arrangement governing military and political matters appeared very
desirable to the Soviets.48
Remington's analysis.

This second motive is not ignored in

In 1955, Soviet analyses of the Pact used the

terms '"participants of the Warsaw Pact" and "members of the socialist
camp" interchangeably.

"Within this context Moscow clearly perceived

the substance of the Warsaw Pact as derived not from its stated aims
but from the political system of its member states."49

Brzezinski

has summarized the political aspects of the Pact as follows:
The gradual return of 'content' to the forms of
state independence was in this fashion balanced
by a treaty which provided for joint consultation
on all major issues and Soviet command of all
troops, and which did not provide any procedures
for withdrawal from such treaty arrangement or
for the removal of the Soviet forces.SO
Therefore, though the "German motive" was the most immediate in 1955,
the more profound reason lay in the Soviet desire to counter-balance
the nationalistic forces set in motion by the death of Stalin and the
"N~w

Course."
On the other side of the coin, the Pact also promoted some East

European interests.

Many Pact members deeply feared Germany.51

Well

into the 1960s, the West Germans were a real threat in the minds of
many East Europeans and were used as a pretext by several East European
regimes for close

relatio~s

with the Soviet Union, the only means

·considered available for protection against a remilitarized West
Germany.52

For Poland and Czechoslovakia a territorial question was

also involved.

In the absence of a general European peace treaty,

the Warsaw Pact provided those countries with some assurance of
territorial security.53
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Within this context, the timing of the Warsaw Treaty is

i~portant.

In December, 1954, the Soviet Union announced.that if the Paris agreements regarding German entry into NATO were ratified, the Soviet Union
would take counter-measures.

On May 5, 1955, the Paris agreements were

ratified; and on May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was formed
in Warsaw between the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.

Howeve:r, only the timing .

of the Pact was influenced by the en try of West Germany into NATO. 54
A second influence upon the formation of the Pact was the Austrian
question.

In April, 1955, the Soviets held talks in Moscow with the

Austrian government.SS

Under the terms of the 1947 peace treaties be-

tween the Soviet Union and Hungary and Rumania, Soviet troops were
required to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania upon the completion of
a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Austria. S6

The Austrian

state treaty was signed on May 15, 1955, one day after the formation
of the Warsaw Pact.

The Pact allowed the continued presence of Soviet

troops in Hungary and Rumania.57

Indeed, the Warsaw Pact was used to

legalize the presence of Soviet troops throughout Eastern Europe.58
From the brief analyses given above, it is reasonable to conclude
that the "German motive" was a substantial part of the Soviet decision
to form the Pact, but that the Pact would have been formed regardless
for more fundamental political reasons.

The Gennan threat in the minds

of the East Europeans was used by the Soviets to promote their position
in

~he

bloc and to generate support for a more extensive collective

security organization.

In the face of the realities of nuclear war,

it is hard to credit that the Soviets felt threatened by West Germany
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as such. .Therefore, it must be considered that the Warsaw Pact had its
origins within the dynamics of the bloc and the need for a new basis of
unity.

The formation of the "Warsaw Pact" would have taken place in

any event; only the timing and the specific content of the treaty were
genuinely influenced by the then contemporary geopolitical questions
operating outside the bloc.
The Warsaw Security Pact is a treaty of frien.dship, cooperation,.
and mutual assistance.

The main provisions of the treaty are that the

contracting parties shall:

strive for "effective measures for universal

reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other
weapons of mass destruction"; consult with one another on all important
international issues "affecting their common interests," especially in
the case of the development of a military threat; in the event of an
armed attack upon one or more of the contracting parties, the other
parties shall come to its aid immediately; establish a joint command
for the armed forces; "not participate in any coalitions or alliances
and not • • • conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the
objects" of the Warsaw Pact; "promote economic and cultural relations
between the parties to the Pact."

The treaty also provides that the

Warsaw Pact shall cease to operate upon the conclusion of a "General
European Treaty of Collective Security."59
The operations of the Warsaw Pact are administered by.two bodies.
The Political Consultative Committee coordinates all Pact activity not
of a purely military nature.

It considers questions of foreign policy

and economic and cultural cooperation.

The Unified Conunand of Pact

Armed Forces has authority over those troops assigned to it by the
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member states.

Both bodies are located in Moscow.60

Considered simply as an instrument of control, the Pact has
allowed the Soviet Union to conduct political and military monitoring
and has provided a reminder of common ideology, emphasized formal ties,
and provided a political fortnn subject to Soviet domination, especially
with respect to ideology.

It has also acted to facilitate the solution

of the problems attendant to the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern
Europe and has furthered the integration of the East European military
establishments into an East European defensive perimeter.61
In many ways, the political benefits to the Soviet Union from
the Warsaw Pact have probably been as great or greater than the purely
military ones.62

Apart from air defense issues, for the first ten years

the Pact provided a political and propagandistic answer to the inclusion
of West Germany in NATo63 and provided a focus for bloc unity.

It was

not until the late 1950s that the first steps were taken to elevate the
military importance of East European troops in terms of military

plan~

ning and a truly joint role for Soviet and East European forces.64
Prior to that time, military integration was

~argely

limited.to air

defense and the information exchanges necessary for East European
production of Soviet-type weaponry.65

It was not until 1961 that

annual combined military training exercises were begun.66

Further,

the actual "loyalty" or reliability of East European troops could not
be taken for granted by the Soviets.

During the upheavals of 1956,

Hungarian troops actively fought the Soviets, and in Poland a "decisive
portion" of the Polish army was prepared to resist Soviet military
intervention.67
Over the years, the Warsaw Pact has proven its value to the Soviet
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Union.

It

• • • has proven more effective than any other multilateral institution in holding the bloc together and

still provides the basic treaty obligation binding
the East European states to the Soviet Union.68
The Pact has developed as the central institutional foundation of bloc
tm.ity.
Thus between 1955 and 1956 the foundations were set down for the
two institutions, the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, which would prove
to be the foci and operational constructs of Soviet and East European
economic and military integration, indeed of bloc tm.ity.

Both organi-

zations derived from the advantages to be gained by the Soviets and,
to a much lesser extent, by the East Europeans through the reworking
of previously bilateral economic and military arrangements into more
clearly multilateral forms.

To be sure, the movement was neither total

nor absolute nor exclusive·.

Other organizations and bilateral treaty

systems covering such things as nuclear power and special military
accords also played and still play a vital role in the Soviet and East
European system.

However, the period following the "New Course" saw

the formation of the basic institutions through which and around which
the subsequent unity of the bloc has been maintained and by which the
pressures which have threatened to shatter the position of the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe have been vented.
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CHAPTER VII

.,,

THE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TITO:
THE FIRST ERROR
"After such a long period of hostility,
there was more to restoring relations than
just sitting down at a table and drinking
a glass of wine together." -- Khrushchev.l

,

THE PURPOSES OF RAPPROCHEMENT

Following Stalin's death', two main pressures militated against
the ability of the faltering Soviet leadership to restore the unquestioned, centralist position of the Soviet Union and the CPSU.

These

pressures were "separate roads to socialism," as symbolized and practiced by Yugoslavia after 1948, and the Soviet-sponsored de-Stalinization program.

Both elements rose from the Soviet leadership's ill-

guided efforts to reform and redefine the Stalinist system tn such a
way that the bloc would both endure under Soviet influence and function
at a reasonable level of efficiency.

A policy which allowed "differing

paths to socialism" was hoped by the Soviets to provide a structure
within which the pressures generated and suppressed by Stalinism could
be "harmlessly" vented.

It was hoped that a carefully measured increment

of "nationalism" would provide a safety valve.

In line with these hopes,

the Soviets sought to bring Yugoslavia back into the "camp" under
conditions that would restate the "Yugoslav path" as an acceptable and
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workable "middle ground" between the unworkable extremes of classic
Stalinism and the unacceptable diversity of "Titoism" and remove
Yugoslavia as an example of Soviet failure and alternative mod~l of
Communism.·
The removal of .St:alin as an image and source of Communist unity
and coherence had two besic sources.

Past a certain point, the reforms

·could not proceed without an explicit denunciation of Stalin an.d
Stalinism.

The leadership found in late 1955 that its authority could

not be· maintained without turning the point of the resentment and
hatred released in part by the "New Course" from themselves and the
Soviet Union to Stalin and Stalinism.

Beria could no longer be made

to serve as a proxy for Stalin.

The other basic source is grounded in

Khrushchev's drive toward power.

He used de-Stalinization as a poli-

tical weapon against the factions which were to emerge in 1957 as the
so-called anti-Party group.
However, subsequent events were to prove that the Soviet leadership's hopes were sadly and perhaps even tragically misplaced.

The

attempts to coax Tito back into the "camp" and the denunciation of
Stalin were to prove to be, from the Soviet standpoint, two critical
errors, the results of which still hang threateningly over the Soviet
Union •.2

THE ORIGINAL CONFLICT
The Yugoslav Communist Party gained power after the Second World
War and stayed in power through their own efforts rather than through
"Soviet might. rr3

It is widely held that in 1947 and 1948, only the
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Communist regime headed by· Tito, the principal architect of Yugoslav
Communism and leader of the partisan army during the war,4 had popular

support; the other East European regimes, with the possible exception of
Czechoslovakia, were kept in power either directly or indirectly by the
Soviet army.5

This condition was at the source of the conflict between

Stalin and Tito.

The· proximate cause of the conflict was Tito's quite

understandable unwillingness to place Soviet interests above those of
Yugoslavia. 6
As

early as 1942 Tito and Stalin had had differences of opinion

over operational procedure.7

By 1945 or 1946, the Soviets viewed Tito's

then ultra-loyal brand of Connnunism, in a period ?f professed diversity,
in paternalistic terms, as one would tolerate a "precocious" child. 8
In September, 1947, the Cominform was founded with its headquarters
located in Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia.

Regarding the location

of the organization's headquarters, Phyllis Auty, a British historian
and a biographer of Tito, has made this observation:
It sounded like a compliment to the Yugoslavs but was
actually intended by Stalin as a means of controlling
Tito and gaining more information about what he was
doing.9
By early 1948, the coming split was beginning to materialize.
Tito made a clear distinction b~tween inter-state and inter-Party relations which made Soviet information gathering activities in Yugoslavia
more difficult than elsewhere in the bloc.

The Yugoslavs made an·

absolµte objection to and would not permit Soviet intelligence activities
within Yugoslavia.10
sought in Yugoslavia:

There were several key privileges which Stalin
control of Yugoslav intelligence organizations,

I

1·
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Soviet freedom to recruit agents for the Soviet Union, access to
Yugoslav secret information, and freedom of movement for CPSU perI

!.
~

sonnel.

These privileges, which could have made a satellite of

Yugoslavia, were denied to the Soviets by Tito.11
In a last-ditch effort to control Yugoslavia, Stalin ·insisted
in March, 1948, that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria unite.
refused.12

Yugoslavia

On June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comin-

fonn and charged with a long list of anti-CoIIllllunist actions, among
them that Yugoslavia had taken a position incompatible with MarxismLeninism and that the country had deviated into bourgeois nationalism; 13
a very serious charge in 1948.

On the Yugoslav side, they counter-

charged in 1949, among other things, that Stalin had "reduced the
'creative' substance of the theory [Marxism-Leninism] to a sterile
rationalization for his personal dictatorship. "14

In the final ana-

lysis, it was the Soviet's inability to control Tito that led to the
split.ls
The ensuing campaign against Yugoslavia was long and bitter.

In

the face of the Cold War, the anti-Tito campaign took on the character
of a preventive measure directed against factionalism in the "socialist
camp."16

Any "laxness" toward Tito within the Connnunist movement was

considered "treasonous" by the Soviets.17
economic blockade of Yugoslavia.18

The bloc also undertook an

The conflict reached such propor-

tions that Stalin sent agents into Yugoslavia to try to cause a revolt
and to assassinate Tito.19
RECONCILIATION
Following Stalin's death, the first "peace" overtures from the ·
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Soviet

Unio~

began in the summer of 1953 with a. proposal to exchange

ambassadors.20

In general, be~ween March, 1953, and early 1954 the

Soviets reduced the level of anti-Tito propaganda, proposed the above
::r-

mentioned "resumption of normal diplomatic relations," pressured the
East European regimes to reduce their hostility to Tito, made concessions regarding river traffic on the Danube, "resumed railroad traffic,"
and released Yugoslav prisoners held in the bloc.21
The rapprochement with the Soviet Union had begun as a result of
Soviet initiative.

Khrushchev, in view of the tensions building in

the East European states, "needed Tito's support to consolidate his
position among the Connnunist states of eastern Europe. u22

For this

reason a more public demonstration of the "new relations" between the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was needed.

A visit by the Soviets to

Yugoslavia was announced for May, 1955.

For his part, Tito was cautious

with both the Soviets and the United States, which had extended a substantial amount of aid to Yugoslavia following the 1948 break.

Tito

was careful to ensure that the United States understood that Yugoslavia
was still grateful for the aid received from the West and that no chang_e
in Yugoslav foreign policy was "presaged" by the scheduled Soviet
visit.23

However, at this juncture Tito felt some need of a new under-

standing with orthodox Communism, with the Soviet Union, in

order to

counter the growing restlessness within the Yugoslav Communist Party.24
On May 26, 1955, Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Anastas Mikoyan arrived
in Yugoslavia and awkwardly blamed the past troubles on Beria.25

After

a series of talks, tours, and parties, a joint statement by the Soviet
Union .and Yugoslavia was issued which recognized separate paths to
socialism.

It is important to note that Tito re-enforced his position
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that the talks were between two states and not between two Communist
parties by insisting that Bulganin as the Soviet premier sign the
connnunique.26
relations.

Khrushchev, however, was anxious to re-establish Party

During the next year, Yugoslavia assumed the role of trusted

adviser to the Soviets on East European affairs and to the East European
regimes on de-Stalinization.

However, the new role which Yugoslavia

and Tito were playing in the bloc was having a demoralizing effect upon
many of the still very conservative East European regimes.

Tito had

become a symbol of relaxed control by the Soviet Union over the East
Europec:m states,27 a symbol which strengthened the liberal factions
within the East European parties and weakened the Stalinists.
One result of the pivotal 20th Congress of the CPSU held in
February, 1956, was the formal adoption of the "many roads to socialism'i
theory with the important restriction that the Party remain in political
control.

In line with the newly adopted policy, in April and May many

East European leaderships were reformed and formal apologies made to
Tito for past wrongs and slanders.

In Bulgaria, Vulko Chervenkov, a

hard-line Stalinist, resigned as Bulgarian Prime Minister.

In Poland,

Gomulka, a Polish national Conununist who had run afoul of Stalin in
the late 1940s, and others were rehabilitated.
former "Titoists" were also rehabilitated.

In Czechoslovakia,

In Hu~gary, Mathias Rakosi,

a Stalinist of the old school who had been a member of the Hungarian
National Liberation Committee during the Second World War, admitted his
faults and many "Titoists" were rehabilitated.

Even Albania, where

suspicion of Yugoslav intentions was high due to past border disputes
and proposals for "union," managed an apology to Yugoslavia. 28
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Many of the rehabilitations of former "Titoists" were, of course,
posthumous •

Additionally, in 1955 and 1956 various steps were taken to improve
economic relations between Yugoslavia and the bloc.

And, as a symbol

of the new times, the Cominform was disbanded on April 17, 1956.29

It

should, however, be p.ointed out that the Cominform never did a great
deal beyond publishing a newspaper, For A Lasting Peace, For A People's
Democracy.

The organization had held three meetings:

one in Belgrade,

at which the publication was started, one to expel Yugoslavia, and one
to "combat Titoism. n30

Apart from propaganda purposes, Stalin had had

little use or need for the organization.
THE SECOND DENUNCIATION
During these maneuvers, Tito's attitude remained one of caution.
He insisted that relations proceed on a government to government basis.
Despite Khrushchev's overtures in 1955, it was only after the "secret
speech" that Tito felt able to move towards genuinely closer relations
with the Soviet Union.

To the Yugoslavs, Stalinism had become

identifie~

as the bureaucratization of the state and the transformation o.f socialism
into a form of "state capitalism."

Only after Khrushchev had shown

decided "proof of his desire and capability to deal with" the bureaucracy
were the Yugoslavs able to consider that the "objective" circumstances
had changed.
'!he final proof came only with the Twentieth Congress
and with the destruction of Stalin. From that moment
on Tito considered himself as Khrushchev's first ally
in the crusade against the remnants of Stalinism.31
In JW1e, 1956, Tito went to Mqscow.

He offered his support for

Soviet foreign policy if the Soviet Union would remove the remaining

120
anti-Titoists, allow him a "greater voice in ·Balkan affairs" outside of
Yugoslavia, and recognize "separate paths to socialism" and the "independence of the satellites."

Tito's requests were ."politely" refused. 32

On June 20, 1956, the Soviets and the Yugoslavs issued a communique

which affirmed the communique issued in Yugoslavia by the two states
the previous year.

The collllilunique "stressed the permissibility of each

Communist country seeking its own way to socialism. 11 33

On the other side of the coin, long before the thaw in SovietYugoslav relations, Tito had resolved that Yugoslavia would not and
should not rejoin the bloc.

Therefore, despite the Soviet efforts,

Soviet and Yugoslav relations could come no closer than the re-establishment of limited economic and political ties.

Tito could not be

brought back into the bloc, even at the price of Soviet admissions

.

of error.34

On the Soviet side, the Hungarian revolt in late 1956 strengthened
the position of the Soviet conservatives, such as Molotov, and marked
the end of direct Yugoslav influence on Soviet policies regarding
Eastern Europe.35

From that time on, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were

of an uon again, off again" character.

The limit beyond which the

Yugoslavs would not go in their efforts to better relations with the
Soviet Union

a..~d

the CPSU was established by the Yugoslav refusal to

agree to the declaration issued at the fortieth anniversary celebration
of the Bolshevik revolution.

Finally, the cooling thaw ended in 1958

with Chinese and Soviet denunciations of the "Yugoslav path."36
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THE INFLUENCE OF· YUGOSLAVIA
The influence of the

11

Yu~oslav

path" in 1955 and 1956 upon Soviet

and East European relations was by no means minor.

Khrushchev had

hoped that the Yugoslav example could be made to provide some ground
upon which relations within the bloc could be reformed and the growing
ferment contained. 37

However, Tito's blueprint for reform, "liberali-

zation combined with nationalism," was increasingly

br~ught

into ques-

tion by the Soviets under the influence of the developing Polish and
Hungarian crises.

It became clear that Tito had over-estimated the

popular support which Communism had in Eastern Europe, at least in
Hungary.38
Among the various East European leaderships, in 1955 and 1956
the Soviet rapprochement' with Yugoslavia
• with favor."39

"could not have been viewed

For the East European Communists a great deal

was at stake.
'!he Soviet leaders might undermine their own positions
if their Yugoslav policy failed; the East Europeans
stood to lose their positions as soon as the policy
was implemented.40

I

I

In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, a shift in attitude
in the direction of a more favorable stance regarding Yugoslavia by the
local Communist parties was considered by them to be a serious threat to
their internal solidarity, a solidarity which had been built in large
part through an "anti-Tito" campaign and which had been seriously disrupted by the adoption of the "New Course."

For example, in 1956, after

the Nagy period of 1953 to 1955, when Rakosi was finally able to have the

I

,.

I
I

· 1

I

1·
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"liberal" Nagy expelled from ·the Hungarian Party, Rakosi was only
beginning to cope with the issues and turmoil caused by the shifts in

policy, 41 which were the result of th.e reassertion of the Soviet centralist position and the abandonment of the "New Course."

"The reten-

tion of some forms of Stalinism, and therefore only a partial reconcili-.,
ation with Yugoslavia, was a

sine que

.!!.Q!!.

of most of these regimes'

political stability."42
The events which followed the June 20th communique issued by the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia provided sobering evidence of "Khrushchev's
miscalculation concerning Tito" and the additional miscalculation regarding "the capacity of some of the East European regimes to operate
beyond the Stalinist framework. 11 43

The result of the Soviet-Yugoslav

,

.

rapprochement was that the common core, the source of ideological unity,
was to a limited but

crit~cal

extent threatened by the Yugoslav support

of a "polycentric" view of Connnunism.

In addition, as long as the

~

Soviets supported the rapprochement with Tito the disintegrating
pressures of "Titoism" were more or less free to operate without contradiction.

Despite the growing Soviet awareness that this situation was a

threat to their hegemony, despite their attempts to narrowly limit the
"interpretation" to be placed upon the Yugoslav example,
• • • By September 1956, Soviet ·redefinitions could no
longer contain the developments nurtured by the dissipation
of Stalinism and crystallized by the reconciliation with
Belgrade.44
Instead of containing the pressures, the Yugoslav model had only served
to increase them.
The existence of the Yugoslav model acted as a "spur" to "national
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sentiment"· in Eastern Europe. 45

The power of that model was enhanced by

the Yugoslav support of Gomulka' s return to power as being a "great

victory for socialism. n46

However, except for Poland and Hungary, "the

influence of Titoism in other Eastern European satellites was more
psychological than institutional. "47

Poland adopted a carefully measured

degree of Titoism and was able to withstand the growing crisis.

Hungary

attempted to go beyond "Titoism" and was not able to withstand it.
Thus, the rapprochement' with Tito, the· temporary acceptability
which it placed upon national Communism, or more simply, nationalism,
comprises a major Soviet error in the reform and redefinition of
Stalinism.
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CHAPTER VIII

THE SECRET SPEECH:
THE SECOND ERROR
"For three years we were unable to
break with the past, unable to muster
the courage and the determination to
lift the curtain and see what had been
hidden from us about .the arrests, the
trials, the arbitrary rule, the executions, and everything else that had
happened during Stalin's reign." -- Khrushchev!
One of the central issues facing the Soviet leadership in 1956
was the "proper level" of de-Stalinization.

At such a level past abuses ·

could be exposed and eliminated in such a way that the
political monopoly would not be threatened.2

~ommunist

party

The "secret speech" deli-

vered by Khrushchev to the 20th Party congress on the night of February
24-25, 19563 was a .crucial event in the search for that "proper level 11
as well as in the emergence of Khrushchev as the real head of the
CPSU. 4

According to Khrushchev, the material in the speech was developed
by an inquiry which rose out of the trial of Beria in 1953.

Khrushchev

felt that the Party leadership would have to give an accounting for
Stalin's practices and the remaining aspects of "Stalinism" in the
Soviet system.

One way or another, sooner or later, the camps would

discharge those whom Stalin had imprisoned without cause.

Khrushchev

argued that it would be better if the "truth" were learned from the
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Party leadership rather than from Stalin's returning victims.

In a

real sense, the 20th Party congress was the right time for the leader'
ship to make a "full" disclosure of the abuses of the Stalin era and
hope for the best.

The 21st congress would be too late.

If the Party

leadership did not denounce Stalin and Stalinism, the ferment created
by the.return and rehabilitation of Stalin's innocent victims was
likely to be uncontrollable.

The practice of blami1?-g "it all" on Beria

simply would no longer work.

"After Beria' s trial we had found our-

selves trapped by the version which we'd created in the interests of
protecting Stalin's reputation • .,5
protected.

That reputation could no longer be

As Khrushchev wrote, "Murder will out.

things like that a secret for long. 11 6

You can't keep

So, to protect the Party and

the leadership, the report of the inquiry commission was recast as a
speech and Khrushchev delivered it to the 20th Party congress.7.
Four major reasons for the "secret speech" have been identified:
1) the three-year old de-Stalinization program could not proceed safely
without a

speci~ication

of the root causes of Stalinist abuses; 2) by

performing the expose themselves the leadership hoped to gain credit
with the Party membership and to ideologically reactivate the Party
rank and file; 3) the regime was in a stable position and felt that it
could say in February, 1956, what it could not have said in March,.
1953; and, 4) Khrushchev had not been as visible in the Stalin era as
the other members of the leadership and by making the speech he could
strengthen his position in 'the power struggle by attracting to himself
those who did not wish to see a return to Stalinism.8
The speech itself made four main charges against Stalin:

1)
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Stalin engaged in "wild terror" in which many good Connnunists were
liquidated; 2) Stalin lost his nerve at the beginning of the Second
World War; 3) Stalin ignored the Party and at the same time demanded
personal glorification; and 4) on the eve of his death, Stalin was
plotting another massive purge of the Party. 9
charges were:

Among the secondary

that anyone who opposed Stalin's ideological viewpoint

was in danger of being removed from the leadership·and subject to both
moral and physical annihilation; Stalin had invented, according to
Khrushchev, the concept "enemy of the peep.le" in order to murder his
opponents in the 1935-1938 purges; and that Stalin had become psychol.
!
l

logically unstable.IO

All together, the "secret speech" made some 25

charges against Stalin.11

In addition, Beria was presented as Stalin's

chief henchman and as an agent of foreign

imperialism.~2

It is also important to note those things with which Stalin

w~s

not charged and those aspects of the Soviet system which were not
brought into question:

Leninism was reaffirmed, though it is doubtful

that classic Stalinism could have emerged without its Leninist foundations; 13 Khrushchev was also silent about his own role and the role of
the rest of the leadership with regard to the glorification of Stalin;l4
Stalin was praised for his efforts against the various factions within
the Party, e.g., the Trotskyites, etc.;15 with the exception of SovietYugoslav relations, Stalin's foreign policy was not mentioned in the
speech;l6 and, there was a clear distinction drawn between indiistrialization, so long associated with Stalinism, and Stalinist abuses.17
Generally, the results of the speech were devastating.

The older

Party members had known or had suspected what the nature of the abuses
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had been, but the younger Party members were caught unprepared.
revelations made wer~ a "devastating shock. 11 18

the Soviet Union

~tself

The

Though the results in

were not, on balance, as overhwhelming as many

had feared, the effects of the speech in Eastern Europe were shattering.
The East European

leadership~

knew that they would be expected to follow

the Soviet lead, but they did not have a clear answer to the critical
question:

How far should de-Stalinization be taken?

simple question.

It was not a

Widespread de-Stalinization, it was feared, was very

likely to spark violent protests against the East European regimes and
to ignite the nationalism which Stalinism had only been able to suppress.
The abuses could no longer simply be blamed on the excesses of the various security chiefs.

Another result was that the intra-Party feuds

which the Soviets had held in check now split the various central connnittees and spilled over into the Party rank and file.19
The only source of security left to the East European regimes was
the Soviet troops stationed there under the provisions of the Warsaw Pact.
The situation was such that the allegiance of the East
"could not be taken for granted. u20
important political effects.

Europe~

armies

The "secret speech" had two other

The first was that by destroying the myth

of Stalin it allowed Khrushchev to choose those elements of Stalinism
which he wished to continue and to conveniently discard the rest.21

The

second effect was that the speech, combined with the reconciliation with
Tito and the abandonment of the "New Course," had created a dangerous
"disintegrative process."

This was especially the case in Poland and

Hungary.22
The "secret speech" opened fissures in the Communist world; "people
I

l

I.

I·
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saw no more reason for blind .obedience, and the organs of repression
·seemed to have lost the will to repress. u23

And at the same time, the

central problem remained, and to an extent still remains, the determination of the permissible limits to the process of de-Stalinization.24
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CHAP'l'ER IX

THE OCTOBER-NOVEMBER CRISIS
"The trouble we had had there was far
less serious than the trouble in Hungary.
There hadn't been an armed uprising _in
Poland, and an acceptable Polish leadership had already been formed by Comrades
Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz and by other
- comrades we trusted." -- Khrushchevl
.)

By September, 1956, the disintegrating pressures which the "New
Course," the Soviet reassertion, the reconciliation between Tito

~d

the Soviets, and finally the "secret speech" had generated could no
longer be easily contained.2

However, when the ruptures occurred,

they did not follow a uniform pattern.

The events in Poland and

Hungary were the most radical and the most violent.
ber of reasons for this.

There were a num-

First, the economic crisis of 1956 was not

as acute in the other East European states as it was in Poland and
, I

Hungary.

One result of this was that only in Poland and Hungary were

the intellectuals at the center of the storm supported by the urban
workers.

Second, neither Czechoslovakia nor Bulgaria had the deep

hatred for the Russians which the Hungarians and the Poles had.

Third,

in the German Democratic Republic the failure of 1953 was a very fresh

memory.

Lastly, in Rumania there simply was not a viable political

alternative to the regime.3

Thus, Poland and Hungary became the- focal

points for the political upheavals of October-November, 1956.
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THE POLISH CRISIS

The stage was set for the Polish crisis when in 1948 Gomulka was
expelled from the Polish Communist party for Titoism.

Gomulka' s "crime"

had been his unwavering support for a moderate policy regarding socialist
reconstruction and his advocacy of a Polish way to socialism.4

In

February, 1956, the Soviet denunciation of Stalin's "personality cult".
put the "little Stalin" Boleslaw Bierut, who was in charge of Polish
C.Onununism, "on the spot."
Commun~st

Indeed, the whole leade:rship of the Polish

party, which had followed Stalin's lead in condemning Titoism,

Gomulka, and "separate paths to socialism," were brought into serious
question. ".

The discrediting of Stalinism was a risky operation,

because for most Poles Stalinism and communism [sic] were one and the
same thing. nS

In April, 1956, a conference of Party activists was

assembled to discuss the results of the 20th Party congress.

Edward

Ochab, an old Party functionary who had replaced Bierut as head of the
Party following the latter's death in Moscow in February, 1956, admitted
various mistakes and
Ochab also promised:

a~nounced

the release and rehabilitation of Gomulka.

to democratize the Polish Connnunist party, to

remove "disproportions" in the economy, to restore economic balance
between agriculture and industry, to increase wages for the lowest paid
workers, and to curt~il defense spending.6

And, on April 20, 1956, an

annesty was declared for some 28,000 people, many of whom had been
political prisoners.7
Through the spring of 1956, the ferment continued to grow as
demand and concession fallowed one upon another, each building upon the·
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last.

Things, as far as the

~arty

was concerned, were getting out of

hand.8

Now, the. 'thaw' became really dangerous for the party
because the people began openly asking whether
Stalinism alone was responsible for the soulless
society created in Poland during the last decade.
The party leadership was simply carried away by a
trend which it considered dangerous, yet unable to
stop.9
The innnediate crisis in Poland began in June, 1956, with the
famous Poznan strike.

The issues centered around the worker's living

standards and the working conditions at the Zispo plant.

The strike

became violent, and the Polish army was called upon to restore order.
Estimates of the dead range from 38 to 53; and for the wounded from
270 to 300.

Once order had been restored, the Soviet Union reacted to

the situation with an offer of 25 million dollars worth of consumer
goods to offset the worst of the shortages.
The strike set off a political struggle within the Polish Communist
party which eventually ended with the return of Gomulka to power in
October, 1956.10

The Party was divided into those who felt that the

riots and demonstrations were the direct result of the relaxations and
those who felt that further relaxations were necessary.11
leadership

The Polish

decided in June that it could no longer rely on troops to

maintain order and the regime.

On July 6, 1956, a series of financial

concessions was made to the Polish workers.12

On August 4, 1956, nego-

tiations were begun for Gomulka's return to power.

Gomulka was a

popular figure .•
In the eyes of some people, he had been a martyr for
the cause of Polish independence from Moscow, because
of which they were willing to forgive many of his
past excesses.13
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By October, however, the situation in

~eland

verge of full-scale revolt and civil war.

had deteriorated to the

This growing chaos had not,

of.course, been lost ·upon the Polish leadership.

Finally, on October

19, 1956, Gomulka was installed as First Secretary of the Polish
Communist party.14
The situation in Poland had been allowed to progress to the danger
point by the paralysis of the Soviet leadership.
the Soviets to "speak with one voice." 15

There was no way for.

However, by October 19 the

Soviet leadership had become concerned to the point that a delegation
headed by Khrushchev and including Molotov went to Warsaw to take the
situation in hand.

Soviet troops were alerted for possible action.16

The new Gomulka leadership managed to convince the Soviets that
the Polish leadership was in control· of the situation and that the
Polish Communist party was connnitted to Marxism-Leninism and to close
relations with the Soviet Union.

They also made it clear that it was

unlikely that the Polish army would obey Rokassovsky, the Sovietappointed head of the Polish armed forces.

In short, the Gomulka

leadership convinced the Soviets that everything was under control,
the Party monopoly would be maintained, and that Poland would follow
the Soviet Union in all foreign policy matters.
withdrawal from the.Warsaw Pact.17

There would be no

But all of this was not clear at

the time.
On October 19 there was a real danger of fighting between Soviet

and Polish forces.

The Polish leadership had threatened to give orders

for armed resistance if Soviet forces were to try to enter Warsaw
its·elf.

This threat did not end until October 22 or October 23.18
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Soviet military interventinn in the Polish crisis was prevented by a
Soviet fear that their intervention would spark a real war.

Also, the

repercussions in the West, in China, and in the Soviet Union itself
could not be known.19

On the night of October 19-20, the Soviets went

back. to Moscow without reaching a complete agreement with Gomulka.
Finally, on October 23, 1956, it was announced in Warsaw that Khrushchev
had called Gomulka and had stated that there was nothing to prevent
better relations between ~he·two countri~s.20
Gomulka' s "Polish way to socialism" was based upon five factors:
Gomulka' s recognition of the peculiarities of the Polish nati.on which
made the wholesale

trans~er

of Soviet institutions counterproductive;

widespread hostility to Communism among the Polish people; the specifics
of the agrarian situation in Poland and the independence of the Polish
peasants; the higher level of industrialization in Poland than was the
case at a comparable stage in the ''building of socialism" in the Soviet
Union, which was an additional factor that made the strict translation
of Soviet practice into Poland impractical and which further increased
the attractiveness of a "separate path to socialism"; and finally, the
agreement, which allowed the "solution" to function, that a close
alliance between Poland and the Soviet Union would be maintained in
all extra-bloc foreign affairs with the stipulation that the Poles would
be free to exercise a large degree of local autonomy so long as the
Party remained in power.

Soviet acceptance of the "Polish path" was

aided by the fact that Poland had no ideological ambitions, unlike
the Yugoslavs, either within the bloc or outside of it.21

In an address

to the Polish Central Committee Gomulka criticized the abuses of the

139 .
"personality cult" and promised the democratization of the Party, a
return to legality, and criticized previous economic policy for a lack
of attention to consumer goods and agriculture.

He promised basic

economic reforms, factory self-government, and material work incentives
for the industrial workers, peasants, and artisans.

Economic compulsion

was rejected.22
On November 18, 1956, the Gomulka leadership went to Moscow to
regularize their relations with the Soviets.

The Soviet Union agreed

to cancel 2.4 billion rubles of the Polish debt to the Soviet Union and
to recall Marshal Rokossovsky.

Poland agreed to strictly support Soviet

foreign policy and to allow the continued stationing of Soviet troops
in Poland under certain conditions relating to troop disposition and
movement.23
The agreement between the Soviets and the Poles was to become the
pattern for the 1956 readjustments in the bloc.

Like the agreement

between Czechoslovakia and the Soivet Union in 1943, and the East German
settlement in 1953, the 1956 arrangement with Poland was to serve as the
patt~rn for similar agreements with other people's democra~ies.24

The Polish settlement established the critical limit for which
the Soviets had been searching.

Beyond that limit nationalism and de-

Stalinization would not be allowed.

The events in Hungary were proof

that those limits could not be crossed with impunity.

THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS
The proximate cause of the 1956 Hungarian revolt was the power
struggle between the Nagy and Rakosi factions within the Hungarian
Communist party.25

Imre Nagy was closely associated with the Malenkov
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"New Course."
Muscovites.

Rakosi was a Stalinist hardliner, one of the Hungarian
In early 1955 following the downfall of Malenkov, the

Ra.kosi faction returned to power, Nagy having achieved prominence,
not on his own, but only as part of the "New Course."
Rakosi's policies were unpopular and even went beyond the bounds
set by the Khrushchev leadership.

Rakosi's policies involved a re-

emphasis upon collectivization, the arrest of some kulaks (or rich
peasants), and a Party purge.26

On July 18, 1956, Rakosi was finally

replaced by Erno Gero, a Hungarian Stalinist who lacked Rakosi's
political "talent, 11 amid acknowledgements of bad policies and promises
for

imp~ovements.

However, Gero came to power with no clear policy.

Neither he nor the Soviets had formulated one.

Because of this vacuum,

Gero's regime rested entirely upon the organs of physical power:
secret police, the army, and the Soviet occupation forces.

the

By late

October, Gero's power was based entirely upon the Htmgarian secret
police.

He lacked both Hungarian and Soviet support.27

Apart from the irresolution in the Hungarian government attendant
to the political turmoil, three basic elements contributed to the 1956
revolt.
1956.

The first was the very bad economic situation in Hungary in
The main weaknesses were the incredibly bad harvests that year,

a coal shortage, and the resulting unemployment.

Adding to the already

bad situation were the continue·d deliveries of coal and other goods
to the USSR in payment for previous economic aid.

The second element

was the Soviet underestimation of the gravity of the Hungarian situation.
The last element was the situation in Poland, 28 as symbolized by the
widespread discussion of it in such student-intellectual groups as
the Petofi Clubs. ·
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On October 2.3, a demons-tration was held in support of various
student demands, known as the Sixteen Points.

Among the demands were:

the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections, a new economic policy
for Hungary, freedom of the pre_ss, and new CoIIllilunis t party elections.
The demonstration, which turned out the people of Budapest, was led by
university students and factory workers.29

The demonstration became

violent, and on October 24 Soviet tanks were used to restore order.
As one result of the increasing pressures upon the Gero regime,
Imre Nagy was returned to the Hungarian collective leadership in early
October, 1956.

In late October, a Soviet delegation went to Budapest

and authorized Nagy and Kadar to begin reforms.

The withdrawal of

Soviet forces in the near future was also promised.

Thus, Nagy was

placed in real power by the Soviets on October 25, 1956, in an attempt
to save the Communist regime in Hungary. 30
It appears that contingency plans to use Soviet military force to
~"restore

order" in Hungary had been made by the Soviets as early as

October 23 or ?4.31

Khrushchev indicated that after extensive talks

with the Chinese, Marshal Ivan Konev, cormnander of the Warsaw Pact
troops, was instructed to prepare to restore order in Hungary.
was recognized at this stage as a possible necessity.32

Force

Therefore it

is clear that when the Soviet troops were removed from Budapest following their functional defeat between October 24 and 27, it was only to
regroup and to be ready for a possible return.33
reinforced by Khrushchev.

This view is also

The Soviet decision to pull Soviet troops

out of Budapest was taken independently of Imre Nagy's requests.34
The Nagy government as of October 27 included members who were

l

I
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~

I

non-Communists.

The most notable was ·Bela Kovacs, who had been a leader

of an opposition party prior to 1947 when he had been arrested.

This

created a situation which was "too fluid to be viewed with equanimity"
by the Soviets.35

On October 28, 1956, in a Pravda editorial, the

Soviets set down the limit on what they would allow politically in
Hungary:

a more responsive government in terms of popular aspirations,

but nonetheless, a solidly Communist one.

There was to be no compromise

with regard to the political monopoly of the Hungarian Connnunist party.36
On October 30 the Soviet officials declared (see Appendix N) that
they would re-examine their economic relations with Eastern Europe,
recall their economic and military advisors, conduct all future relations on the basis of the strict observance of national sovereignty,
and that they would renegotiate their military agreements with the
various East European countries within the framework of the Warsaw
Pact.37

However, the Soviet declaration did not lessen the tension

nor did it contain the events.

Instead of heeding the Soviets, the

Hungarians instituted a coalition government, permitted a free-press,
restricted the police, asked the United Nations to exert p·rcssure on
the Soviets to remove Soviet troops, and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact
while at the same time declaring Hungarian neutrality.38
On the Soviet side, at the same time the declaration on "friendship and cooperation" was issued on October 30, Soviet troops were
already moving toward Hungary from the central Ukraine.39

Indeed,

Soviet troops were crossing into Hungary before Nagy announced Hungarian
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.40

On

November 1 heavy Soviet rein-

forcements were moving into Hungary while the Soviets made denials that
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there was any intent on their part to use force.41
The situation got out of hand because the Htm.garians lacked a

coherent plan of action.

Had Nagy remained in control of the situation

and been able or willing to follow a more moderate path, it is likely
that Hungary would still have been occupied, but that the subsequent
events of November 3 would not have occurred.4 2

However, it is possible

that rather than being tm.able to control the course of political events,
Nagy became the leader of the H~ngarian revolt.43
however, more complex.

Nagy's situation was,

He was the leader of a faction which had been

held together by a single issue:

Rakosi.

Once that issue had been

removed, the coalition could not stay together.

The dynamics of Nagy's

group pushed it toward an "openly national Communist policy."44

At

the same time, it was functionally impossible to really form any.sort
of governing policy.
On

For one thing, time was far too short.

November 2 the Soviets decided finally upon a second military

intervention.

In preparation for the intervention, on November 3 a

rival Hungarian government was set up and was to be "led" by Janos Kadar,
who had gone over to the Soviets.

On November. 4 Kadar announced the

formation of the new government and asked for the assistance of the
Soviets to restore order.

The Soviet attack began the same day.

The

Soviet action had the endorsement of all the other East European
regimes.45

At the end of several days, order was restored, with 2900

Hungarians dead and 13,000 wounded!
not k.nown.46

Soviet losses in the action are

Finally, on November 22 Imre Nagy and various members of

his government were arrested as they left the Yugoslav Embassy where
they had sought assylum.

Nagy was later "tried" and executed. 47
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Brzezinski has made the·following observation:

On November 4 Soviet artillery fire signaled the
Soviet determination not to tolerate national
Connnunism within the Soviet fold, while the failure
of Nagy to contain the events demonstrated the
inability of national Connnunism to maintain domestic
stability in the wake of brutal Stalinism.48
There could now be little doubt.
which held the bloc together.

Soviet force was the primary element

In the streets of Budapest· there was

neither Communist ideology nor economic development, only the treaded
' imperative of geopolitics.
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CHAPTER X
THE NEW LENINISM
"Long live the victorious banner of our
Party -- Leninism!" -- Kh rushchevl
COMPARISONS
The Polish and Hungarian revolts had their causes in the postwar
histories of the two states.

Those histories were conditioned by the

development of the Soviet East European .system.

The causes of the two

revolts were deeply embe'dded in nationalism, in the manner in which
Conmnmist control was established, in the economic chaos brought about
by the Soviet economic model, and in the senseless brutality engendered
by Soviet policies.

The hope for political and economic relaxation

brought about by the "New Course" was frustrated by the revitalized
centralism of the Soviet Union after February, 1955.

The roots of the

revolts must also be sought in the poorly-defined character of the
Soviet de-Stalinization program.

This Soviet failure, which arose

from the Soviet Party power struggle, became critical following the
20th Congress of the CPSU.

The warning implicit in the "Polish solu-

tion," the warning in the Pravda editorial of October 28, and the
warning implicit in the declaration of October 30 were not sufficient
to contain the events in Hungary.

For Hungary the definition of limits

to the relaxation had come too late.

In fact, by the summer of 1956,
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the time for the definition of limits had passed.

It was the settlement

of the Polish and Hungarian revolts the following winter which·established the long overdue, explicit definition of Soviet policies in
Eastern Europe.
The success of the "Polish October" was based upon the limited
scope of the Polish "path" as· defined by Gomulka and the Polish leadership in October, 1956.

The Polish "path" was restricted to domestic

affairs and was not a challenge to fundamental Soviet interests.

The

main elements of Gomulka's program, which enabled its success and
acceptance by both Poland and the Soviet Union, were:

Gomulka's past,

which made of his assumption of power on October 19 an assertion of
Polish nationalism; the retention of all political power in the hands
of the Polish Conununist party; and the Polish assertion that the reforms
were domestic in nature and would not involve Poland in any sort of
foreign policy independent from that of the Soviet Union.

Also, it is

equally important to note that the Soviet action in Hungary gave to
Gomulka a meaningful ability to guide the Polish reforms and to retain ·
Conununist power as those reforms were elaborated following October 23.2
In Hungary the situation was quite different.

According to his

memoir, Khrushchev thought of Imre Nagy at the time of the revolt as
the leader of a small "clique" which took power through the exploitation
of Rakosi's errors and proceeded to overthrow the legitimate government
of Hungary.

Supposedly, Nagy spoke only for himself and a small group

of emigrees who had returned to "help the counter-revolution. 11 3

Simi-

larly, the object of the SmTiet military interventions was the preservation of international "fraternal proletarian solidarity" and not
Soviet national. goals.4

Though the pattern of justification is clear,-
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Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership must have been aware of the true
dimensions of the Hungarian revolt •.
The news of Soviet concessions to Polish autonomy served as an
additional pressure upon the Gero and Nagy regimes.

In the

end~

Nagy

placed Hungarian national interests over those of the Soviet Union.5
Polish concessions were not considered, only the Soviet.

Soviet tolera-

tion of the Polish "October" signified a Soviet realization that a "more
profitable" relationship was needed between the Soviet Union and the
East European states.6

It did not signify a Soviet willingness to

allow withdrawal from either international Communism or the bloc.
To dwell on the relationships between the Polish and the Hungarian
revolts is misleading.

Each developed along its own course with a

minimal influence from the other.

The events of November in Hungary

served as a demonstration that the Soviets would, when pressed closely
enough, use troops; but this was already known to the Polish leadership.
The Polish crisis came to a head on October 19 before the Hungarian crisis.
And, the Hungarian economic and political situation was critical enough
that a revolt would have developed from any attempt at reform, regardless of events elsewhere.
The essential difference between the two revolts, the

fundamenta~·

determinant in the decision by the Soviets to use force, was that the
Polish liberalization was led and contained by the Polish Communist
party, while in Hungary the Party lost all semblance of control.7
Therefore, Khrushchev's actions in Poland can be seen roughly as an
effort to cut his own domestic political losses as well as those of
the Soviet Union in the hope of reasserting Soviet dominance at a later

'
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date.

In Hungary the Soviet effort was focused upon the re-establish-

ment of Communist control as such.8

Thus the Soviet use or threatened

use of military power estahlished the permissible limits to de-Stalinization and "national Communism. 11 9

The limits were based. upon the

primacy of the Soviet Union balanced against the domestic needs of the
various Communist leaderships in Eastern Europe.10

From Commtm.ism and

the bloc there ·could be no desertion.
RECONSTRUCTION
Following the events of October and November of 1956, the Soviet
leadership set about the reconstruction

~f

geopolitical stability in

Eastern Europe and the position of the Soviet Union in that stability.
The Soviets had made four principal errors which had led to the severe
crisis out of which they were emerging in the later winter of 1956.
These errors were:

an underestimation of Tito's ambitions; an over-

estimation of the extent to which the "foundations of socialism" had
been built in Eastern Europe, which created a further overestimation
of Conununist strength and an underestimation of East European hostility;·
the failure to comprehend the forces which acted to create a domestic
focus within the various East European leaderships; and, finally, the
Soviet practice of generating foreign policy for the bloc as a whole
on strictly Soviet criteria.11

These errors in judgement led to the

reconciliation with Yugoslavia and to the explicit destruction of the
Stalin myth.

The result was the dissipation of the

ideology and power in Eastern Europe.12

Stalinis~

unity of

The development of this situa-

tion was latent within the Soviet and East European system.
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T~e

Stalinist legacy, in the terminology of the
initiated, was the mounting contradiction between
the imperatives of the political superstructure
and the dictates of the material and social base.13
The Stalinist interstate system was essentially political in

nature.

This was due to the necessity to transform the economic base

of Eastern Europe along Soviet lines and to create the necessary ties
~o

the Soviet Union.14

While the redefined system which the Soviet

leadership and Khrushchev instituted in the course

of

1955 through 1957

certainly did not abandon the political instrument, the political aspect was greatly augmented by an increasing reliance upon the Comecon
and the Warsaw Pact.15

In a very real sense, the redefinition of the

system began with the Soviet declaration of October 30th.16

The end

result of the process was the replacement of the Stalinist, totalitarian
_system with what came to be called the socialist commonwealth:

a group

of allied, totalitarian states containing the seeds of pluralism and,
at the same time, which acknowledged Soviet leadership.17
The formal control mechanisms which emerged as central elements
in the redefined system were:

the Warsaw Pact, the Comeco.n, the Institute

for Nuclear Research and other such technical and scientific research
institutions, bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual trade, bilateral treaties regarding the stationing of Soviet. troops in Eastern
Europe which augmented the provisions of the Warsaw Pact, bilateral
trade treaties which augmented the Comecon and which involved coordinated but not integrated economic planning, and cultural and mass media
co-operation.18

It should be noted that each of these functions had

counterparts in classic Stalinism.
In terms of extrabloc foreign policy, Khrushchev moved away from

153
the position of continual military struggle and confrontation and
adopted the policy of "peaceful co-existence" which had been set in
motion by the "New Course. "19

However, the "basic legitimacy of non-

Communist regimes" was "still not accepted. "20
In terms of intrabloc diplomacy, a great deal of regularization
of basic diplomatic channels and consular conventions took place in
1957 and 1958.

The roles of the Soviet ambassadors to Hungary, Poland,

Rumania, and East Germany as direct superiors for the domestic leaderships of these countries decreased.21
Writing in 1961, Brzezinski identified six major points of contrast
between the Stalinist era and the period that followed.
Stalin era was:

The post-

most evidently, not as politically monolithic and in-

vulnerable to change; better equipped to absorb strain; more vulnerable
to ideological erosion; characterized by growing evidence of the SinoSoviet conflict; the transformation of the national empire of the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe into an international Communist empire; and a
growing reliance on political and economic ties to cement the unity of
the East European bloc.22

Thus, in most respects, the major contrasts

between the Stalinist era and what followed it were a matter of degree:
the end result of the confrontation between the unworkable or counter!

productive policies of classic Stalinism and the geopolitical and
economic realities of the middle and late 1950s.

The major areas.in

which that confrontation and the Soviet and East European redefinitions
were hammered out were political, economic, and military.

In each case,

the Soviet leadership was able, to a greater or lesser degree, to
reassert the central and primary position of the Soviet Union and the·
CPSU.
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The explicit political reconstruction began with the Soviet
declaration of October 30, 1956, and was followed in November with the

Suslov formula.

The main elements of that formula were:

the maintenance

of the political monopoly of the various Communist parties within their
respective states, the strengthening of the ties between the proletariat
and the peasantry, socialist ownership of the means of production, and
the resolute defense of the gains made by the "revolution. u23
The Suslov

formula~as

supplemented and further elaborated by

the Chinese declaration of December 29, 1956, which set forth a program
for the restoration of bloc unity.
program were:

The main elements of the Chinese

political and ideological unity with an allowance made

for local.diversity, the maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the maintenance of proletarian internationalism, and the assertion of the primacy of the Soviet Union.i4
Throughout 1957, East European Conmrqnism and the position of the
Soviet Union in the bloc was repaired largely along the lines of the
Chinese declaration.

The Soviets asserted the primacy of the CPSU and.

the Soviet Union within the structure of proletarian internationalism.
The internal and exte mal struggle against imperialism and the Connnunis t
political monopoly were reaffirmed.

And, .the "either-or" monolithic

unity of the classic Stalinist era was replaced by a degree of diversity
within the bloc.25
From November, 1956, to April, 1957, a series of bilateral meetings
was held between the Soviets and the East European leaderships.
meetings

These

reaffirmed the loyalty of the East Europeans to the Soviet

Union and the CPSU.

The Soviets on their part made adjustments in the
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character o.f their economic and military relations with E8:s.tern Europe.
The supply of raw materials and foodstuffs was increased, various loans
and grants were made, and various debts were canceled.

The status of

Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe was regularized.26
In addition, Khrushchev called a meeting of the East European
parties which took place on January 1, 1957, in Budapest.
was between Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia,
the Soviet Union; Poland did not attend.

Bulga~ia,

The meeting

Albania, and

The conference issued a

connnunique proclaiming the unshakable unity of the Soviet bloc and
affirming the Soviet view of the Hungarian revolt. 27
A further interesting facet of the reconstruction of the Soviet
position in Eastern Europe was the reminders made by the Soviets that
Stalin had not been entirely without merit.

As early as November, 1956,

favorable references to Stalin appeared in various official Soviet
statements.

In January, 1957, while in China, Khrushchev mentioned

that Stalin had known how to deal with the enemies of Communism.28
These statements were in keeping with the position taken by Khrushchev
in the "secret speech."

It had been in the "ideological fight" with

the "Trotskyites, rightists, and bourgeois nationalists" that Stalin
had "played· a positive role. 11 29
The completion of the political reconstruction of the bloc took
place at the November, 1957, celebration in Moscow of the fortieth
anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

At that meeting the "state

ruling" parties reaffirmed the re-instated principles of international
Party discipline.30

The meeting's declaration (see Appendix 0) set out

the parameters for political tmity.

It affirmed the Soviet doctrine
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of peaceful co-existence; set <lawn that both revisionism (defined generally as right-wing. opportunism and a manifestation of bourgeois ideology)

and dogmatism (the refusal to take the objective situation into account
in decision-making) must be overcome; and stated that each Party was to
decide for itself which danger was the greater for it as the situation
arose.31
The declaration made a seven-point definition of revisionism.
Revisionism:

declares that Marxism-Leninism is obsolete as a guide

'for social development; tries to undermine the faith of the workers in
Marxis~;

denies the historical necessity of the proletarian revolution

and the dictatorship of the proletariat; denies the leading role of the
Connnunist parties in that revolution; denies proletarian internationalism; attempts to abandon Leninist norms in Party relations, especially
the principle of democratic centralism; and tries to convert the
Communist party into an organization little better than a debating club.32
The declaration also emphasized the danger of factionalism, while stating
that the forms of the transition to socialism in specific countries may
vary.

It also set down that the revolution could proceed through par-·

liamentary means, provided those means were turned to the purposes of
the revolution.
out.

However, the use of violence was not enti·rely ruled

The declaration also called for "unity of action" on any problems

which might face the bloc.33
The declaration also reaffirmed the maximum Soviet goal.

It stated

that the objective of the Connnunist and Worker's ·parties was the victory
of the revolution "for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism on ~
world scale. "34
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At the celebration, the- Chinese were firmly behind the Soviet
centralist position.

The Polish Party was alone in its opposition to

the Soviet line.35 However, Poland was retained in the bloc due to a
concession made by Gomulka which "implied" a "recognition that there·
were higher considerations than the peculiar requirements of the construction of socialism in Poland. n36

The conference, therefore, d~

fined for Poland and Gomulka the fine line which
the Soviet Union and to Conmumism from treason.37

d~vided

loyalty to

By making that

definition for Poland, the definition was also made for the rest of
the Soviet bloc.

It should be noted in addition that the meeting

established Gomulka's formal subservience to bloc unity.38

Despite

Khrushchev's desires, Yugoslavia chose to remain outside the newly
reformed camp.39

The Yugoslavs did not sign the declaration.40

The re-establishment of bloc unity had been, for the time being,
completed.

It was symptomatic that the campaign against Yugoslavia

was renewed; an independent, uncriticized Yugoslavia could not be
tolerated either by the Soviet Union or by China.

By 1958, out of

fear of the implications of friendly relations with Yugoslavia, the
Chinese resumed the attack upon Yugoslavia.
Soviets.

They were joined by the

The 1948 Cominform anti-Tito declaration was in its own turn

"rehabilitated."

However, there was no return to the extremes of

Stalin's anti-Tito campaign; the 1948 economic blockade was not
repeated. 41
Regarding the declaration of the November, 1957, Moscow celebration, this observation has been made:
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• • • any progress from Stalin's handling of the
satellites was more apparent than real. The crucial
point was that the camp declaration re-established
the priority of the parties over the governments.42

Thus the Soviet Union, despite the events of 1956 and the introduction
of a certain degree of flexibility, was able successfully to reassert
its central position, the leading role of the Soviet Union and of the
CPSU.

I
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CHAPTER XI
INTEGRATION
"The goal of our foreign policy hasn't been
to enrich our own state at the expense of
other states; we have never believed in the
exploitation of man by man, of state by
state. On the contrary, both by our stated
policies and by our deeds we have encouraged
countries to enjoy the fruits of their own
labor." -- Khrushchev.l
ECONOMICS
After 1957, economic integration and the Soviet and East European
collective security system were to carry the principal burden of Soviet
and East European integration and ultimate unity.

The re-establishment

of the Soviet centralist position· had not been so complete as to eliminate the vulnerability of Soviet ideological and political control.
Khrushchev set about the attempt to counter that Vu.lnerability through
increased economic and military integration.2
The immediate problem was the economic situation in Hungary and
Poland.

The Comecon countries acted to provide funds to Hungary and

Poland.

In 1956 and 1957 Hungary received 305.74 million dollars in

credits, including 50 million from China.

The Soviet Union also

canceled the outstanding Hungarian debt from its purchase of the
Soviet shares of the Soviet-Hungarian joint stock companies and put
a moratorium on Hungarian debt service payments to the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia·. 3
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Funds were also channeled to Poland.

In consideration of the

900 million dollars gained by the Soviet Union from the terms of trade

established for Polish coal from 1946 through 1953, 528
of the Polish debt to the Soviet Union was canceled.

millio~

dollars

In addition,

Poland received 113 million dollars in loans from East Germany and
Czechoslovakia.

There was also a relaxation in the growth rate set

forth in the Polish economic plan. 4
In line with Khrushchev's policies, Comecon took up the issue
of economic planning.

The 1956 and 1957 sessions of the Comeco?

council established that planning beyond the normal five-year period
was necessary. 5

In 1957 it was announced that Soviet and East European

eGonomic plans were to be coordinated.6

The June, 1957, session and

the January, 1958, session of Comecon set up specialization commissions
for the specialization and standardization of products and the coordination of economic plans for the coming 15-year period. 7
dination of economic plans did present some difficulties.

The coor-

.I
I

Under

Comecon's founding rules, economic integration based exclusively on
a centralist procedure was precluded.

Further, there were no operative

economic criteria which were independent of the authority of national
leaders and by which national interests could be measured against
extra-national interests.8

However, the main obstacle to economic in-

tegration was, and has continued to be, the inability to harmonize
the various forms of central economic planning operative in the bloc.9
The problem was due to the fact that although prior to 1956 each East
European economic plan was modeled after the Soviet plan,10 since 1956
the members of Comecon had become increasingly autonomous.11
1956, the role of the Soviet Union was decisive in Comecon.12

Until
After

:
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that date, however, the situation began to ch8:1lge.

This is indicated

by the fact that from June, 1954, until 1962, all sessions of the

Comecon council were held in capitals other than Moscow.13
Though by 1957 the role of Comecon had grown, the organization
had not displaced bilateral mechanisms.

Technical aid projects pro-

ceeded on a bilateral basis, as well as the coordination of specific
economic plans between states.14

In 1957, the first bilateral ventures

began between Comecon members exclusive of the Soviet Union.

East

Germany and Poland laid the foundations for "decentralized" technical
and administrative relations between Comecon members.15
In sum, up to 1957, only in the area of transportation was extensive, bloc-wide cooperation.achieved.16

Not until 1960 did economic

integration as a function of Comecon begin to take hold in Eastern
Europe.

It was, after all, only in 1960 that Comecon received an
I

·i

explicit charter.17

I

I
COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Khrushchev considered the Warsaw Pact a valuable instrument of
socialist consolidation.18

'Ille role of the Soviet military presence

in Eastern Europe was, and still is, to facilitate the adoption of
Soviet military organizational forms and field doctrine, to aid the
standardization of weaponry and weapons production, and to guarantee
the existence of a political atmosphere in line with Soviet interests.19.
Brzezinski has sunnnarized the function of the Warsaw Pact within this
framework:
The political importance of the WTO is that (1) it provides
a formal framework binding the various states together,
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(2) supplies the juridical basis for limiting the exercise
of their sovereignty, and (3) serves as a useful forum for
the articulation of unanimity, expressing ritualistically
the bloc's support of Soviet foreign policy initiatives.20
Therefore, the Warsaw Pact developed into the central institution of
the Soviet and East European collective security system.
Even though the Warsaw Pact as such played a very limited role in
the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956,21 it was directly affected by
the Soviet redefinition of intra-bloc relations and the reassertion of
Soviet .Primacy.

I~

the course of the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet

Union established that Soviet troops could be withdrawn from a Warsaw
Treaty state only upon the agreement of all member states and that of
the state in which the troops were stationed.22

The Hungarian crisis

also gave rise to a series of Soviet and East European bilateral treaties which augmented the Pact itself.

Beginning in December, 1956, and

continuing until May, 1957; the Soviet Union and Poland, East Germany,
Rumania, and Hungary completed the series of agreements.
treaty was the first and set the pattern for the rest.
contained four major provisions:

The Polish
This treaty

an agreement that Soviet. troops in

Poland did not impair Polish sovereignty and were not to interfere
with internal Polish affairs; a definition of the number of Soviet
troops to be stationed in Poland; a provision concerning legal aid
with regard to the prosecution of crimes and misdemeanors committed
by Soviet troops stationed in Poland; and an explicit definition of
the conditions for the movement of Soviet men and materiel through
Polish territory.
The crux of the treaty was that it made Polish consent
mandatory for. troop movement, training, and maneuvers outside
the base area. A joint Soviet-Polish commission was set up
in Warsaw to settle any disputes arising under the treaty.23
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As an instrument of military integration, the

Wars~w

Pact grew

in importance with Soviet realization of the gains to be derived from

consistent military integration and developed upon the augmented nature
of the Pact provided by the 1957 status of force agreements and upon
the "comradely bonds" developed through joint military maneuvers.24
The Warsaw Pact became one of the major institutions holding the bloc
together in the face of the necessary Soviet tolerance of East European national interests.25

The Warsaw Pact has also taken on a more

political character as the East European states have become less subject
to detailed Soviet diktat.26

The Pact functions in the interests of

the East European regimes in that it underwrites those regimes and safeguards their frontiers.27

In short, if the Warsaw Pact serves Soviet

interests, it serves East European interests as well.
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CHAPTER XII
THE DYNAMICS OF CONTINUITY
" • • • Allow me to thank you for the
confidence you have shown me."
Stalinl

CONTINUITIES
History is a continuous rather than a discrete phenomenon.

Each

new period builds upon the foundations set down by the choices and
conditions of those which went before it.

The clarity of historical

definition is the product of rigorous historical analysis rather than
of the historical process itself.

In the development of the Soviet

and East European system from the period of its active foundation, which
took place from 19 39 to 1948, until the narrowly defined current period,.
there have been seven crucial events.

The first was the death of Stalin

which allowed the exploration and implementation of vital reforms.

The

second was the realization by the Soviet leadership in 1953 or 1954 that
nuclear war· on a global scale was not a policy option.

The third was

the de-Stalinization speech by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress
which destroyed the continuity of Stalin's image as a symbol of unity
at a time when such a symbol was most necessary.

The fourth was the

crisis of 1956-1957 which resulted in the redefinition of the Soviet
centralist position and established the limits of East European nationalism.

The fifth was the emergence of Yugoslavia and China as compe-

titers with the Soviet Union for leadership of international Communism.
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The sixth was the removal of. Khrushchev from office in 1964 which
demonstrated that there were limits upon the amount of power which could

be concentrated in the hands of a single member of the Soviet leadership.
And finally, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which again demonstrated Soviet willingness to use military force as a last resort in
the maintenance of bloc unity.

In its own way, each of these events

points to fundamental change and to a more fundamental continuity.
The death of Stalin allowed many !eforms to be tried which could
not have been attempted while he was alive.

However, none of the

reforms seriously threatened the foundations of Soviet power in EasterrJ.
Europe.

The fundamental elements of the system which Stalin had set

in place remained there.

The reforms were a matter of degree--an effort:

to prevent the explosion of the system.
The realities of neclear, war may have forced the Soviets to aban- ·..
don global war as a revolutionary instrument, but the ideological
struggle continues, and proxy wars still occur.
Marxism-Leninism has not been abandoned.

The maximum goal of

Only the extreme method has

been redefined.
The de-Stalinization speech at the 20th Party Congress may have
destroyed the continuity of Stalin's image as a symbol of unity within
Communism, but the functions which that

symb~l

perfonned were transferred

to other institutions such as Comecon, the Warsaw Pact, and the CPSU
itself.

Also, in his own slow, cautious turn, Stalin is being rehabi-

litated.

It must also be noted that Khrushchev's use of de-Stalini-

zation as one method to consolidate his own power is very characteristic
I

I

I
I

l

of the system itself.
Trotsky.

In a very general way, Stalin's "Stalin" was
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The crisis of 1956-1957. led to the

neces~ary

regularization and

reform of a system which was in need of an overhaul.

The "New Course"

had failed to provide the necessary redefinitions required for bloc
stability.

The November, 1957, declaration firmly re-established the

unquestionable nature of the Soviet position at the center of the East
European bloc.

The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia further re-

enforced that position.
The removal of Khrushchev from office was a demonstration that
the leadership of the CPSU would no longer allow the over-concentration of power in the hands of a single individual.

Stalin maintained

his power by setting one faction against another.

Following Stalin's

death, Khrushchev rose to power through participation in factions
which won and by building his own faction.

The crucial distinction

is that, generally, Stalin manipulated factions while remaining outside of them, while Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev were, or .
are, very much members of factions.
Yugoslavia has emerged as one competitor with the Soviet Union··
for the leadership of international Communism, particularly in the
underdeveloped and "neutral" areas of the world.

However, that chal-

lenge relative to the Soviet East European bloc was firmly turned
aside in 1957 and 1958.

A second challenge came· from China.

The

Chinese challenge has increased the value of the East European states
and therefore indirectly allowed them more room in which to maneuver
with regard to the Soviet Union.
bloc has

~ot

The influence of China within the

become decisive, but it is quite real.

Indeed, .it could

be argued that the extrabloc challenge from China has made the Soviet
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Union more flexible in its policies in order to maintain bloc unity.
However, the Soviet Union's influence in the bloc remains decisive in

the final analysis.
Though a detailed

~alysis

of these brief examples remains

beyond the scope and competence of this work, two more detailed examples, based upon the above, are in order.
Following the purge of Beria in June, 1953, and the "resignation" .
of Malenkov on

Febr~ary

8, 1955, Khrushchev emerged as the central

figure in the Soviet leadership.

His position was challenged in June,

1957,.by Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Saburov.

However, with

the aid of Marshal Zhukov and at the end of a week of bitter struggle
in the Central Committee, .Khrushchev prevailed.

Malenkov, Molotov,

Kaganovich, and Saburov were dismissed from their posts in the government and the Party. 2
In a resolution of the Central Committee made on June 27, 1957,
titled "On the An ti-Party Group of G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich,
and V. M. Molotov," the anti-Party group was accused of the obstruction
of the Party's work as set out by the 20th Party. Congress.
was si.ngled out for opposition to the

11

Molotoy

virgin lands" program and for

opposition to better relations with Yugoslavia.3
Late in October, 1957, Zhukov was also stripped of his authority,
and on March 27, 1958, Khrushchev replaced Bulganin as Chairman of the
Council of Ministers.

Thus, Khrushchev became both head of the govern-

-ment and head of the Party. 4
That de-Stalinization was one of Khrushchev's political weapons
is further evidenced by the events of the 22nd Party Congress held in
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1961.

At that congress, Khrushchev publicly launched a frontal assault

upon Stalin's image.

However, Khrushchev also moved against Stalin's

"chief" accomplices:

Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Voroshilov-~ 5

Since Khrushchev's removal in 1964, there has been a partial
return to many of th; ch~racteristic practices -~f the Stalin era.6

It

is interesting to note that on December 21, 1969, for the first time
since 1955, Pravda celebrated the anniversary of Stalin's birth.7
Thus de-St'alinization, like Trotskyism, has become a consistent
political weapon.
The second example of continuity is from the area of bloc integration.

Khrushchev's consolidation of power and reassertion of the

Soviet position made it possible for the Soviet Union to "respond with
greater energy to the problems of unity. "8

The Warsaw Pact and the

Comecon became the central instruments of suppressing East European
domesticism9 and hence of promoting bloc unity.

Though the members of

Comecon have become more autonomous since 1956, the role of the Soviet
Union remains decisive.

Given the relative economic strength of the ·

organization's members, the unanimity required for a Comecon decision
is "meaningless. ulO
a mere rubber stamp.

However, this does not mean that the Comecon is
Genuine disputes do develop.11

Though the

Comecon is not a rubber stamp,- the role of the Soviet Union is decisive.12
i
I

I.

In 1961, Brzezinski made the following judgement:

At the present time, CEMA is doubtless the single
most important organ for actively shaping policies
designed to promote the camp's unity.

l

l

The functions of Comecon have-been developed to
• mold a 'world socialist market' as the basis
for the camp's political and ideological unity.13
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M. Lesechko, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and
permanent Soviet representative in Comecon, in an article titled "Stages
of Comecon Economic Integration" published in Kommunist in the latter
half of 1975, outlined in summary fashion the program adopted by the
29th Session of Com.econ held in Budapest in June, 1975, to promote the
economic integration of the Soviet Union and the East European satellite
states.

(The. full text of Lesechko's article is included as Appendix P.)

The memb.ers of Com.econ· agreed to _the joint construction of "large economic projects" in the areas of fuel, raw-'.!JlClterials, and power generation. _Agreements have also been reached in the areas of production
cooperation and joint
ment projects.

scie~tific

and technological research and develop-

Further, the coordination of economic planning for the

period 1976-1980 has been established with a central objective being the ·
elimination of economic universalism as a further spur to integration,
while at the same time securing the independence of the ·bloc in terms
of fuel and raw-materials.

Various capital investment, transportation

and distribution projects have been undertaken to implement these
objectives under the Agreed Plan for Multilateral Integration Measures
for 1976-1980.

This current, agreed plan is seen, of course, as simply

one stage in the implementation of the Comprehensive Program for
Socialist Economic Integration.
Coordination of economic development plans as the main
method for the organization of cooperation and advancement
of international socialist division of labor is becoming
increasingly established as the basis for the agreed development of the economies of the fraternal countries. Plans for
the new five-year period are being dove-tailed to accomplish
the tasks laid down by the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration.14

",
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The salient point regarding the program adopted by the 29th Session
of Comecon is that, though the Comecon presents itself as open to trade

and economic agreements outside of itself, a major objective remains
basic economic self-sufficiency for the bloc as a whole.

This in turn

is a reflection of the classic Stalinist concepts of economic autarky.
and the basic division of the world market now more fully developed and
expanded to apply to the entire bloc.

Thus Comecon.has developed as

the central organ of economic integration.
The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, is the single, most important
interstate organization binding together the bloc.15

The critical

distinction is that Comecon operates within a framework secured through
the operation of the Warsaw Pact.

Comecon is important in terms of the

generation of bloc policy, while the Warsaw Pact is at the core of the
Soviet and East European collective security system and responsible
for the final enforcement of bloc policy.
In October, 1961, the Warsaw Pact held its first well-publicized
joint maneuvers.

Khrushchev in this period increasingly came to view

the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of bloc integration.

Up

~o

1961,

Comecon had largely failed in this regard; the Warsaw Pact was viewed
as capable of generating polit~cal solidarity.16

However, in 1966 it

appeared that the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee had
been unable to generate political unity, or to counter the more nationalistic policies of the East Europeans which had begun to develop in the
early 1960s .17
In 1966 it appeared that the statements of the 23rd Party Congress
held in March, 1966, regarding "equality and independence, non-inter-

..

:
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ference·in each others' internal affairs, mutual support and international solidarity" as· the bases of intrabloc relations were not
"hollow
~ccept

words~"

It appeared that the Soviet Union was prepared to

the increased nationalism and resulting independence of the

bloc states.

By

doing so, the Soviet Union was considered to be

attempting to preserve the unity of the bloc and the military and
political effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact.18
The source of this apparent shift in attitude can be found in
the Sino-Soviet conflict.

That conflict served to increase the Soviet's

need for East European support and, therefore, has increased the maneuverability of the East European governments.19
In earlier periods, the East German uprising and the Hungarian
revolt demonstrated that the Soviet Union would use military power to
enforce its controls in Eastern Europe.20

The invasion of

Czechoslovakia in 1968 was to make this point all over again.

The

conflict with China notwithstanding, there were limits beyond which
the Soviet Union would not allow East European nationalism to go.21
'lbe immediate Soviet motive for the 1968 intervention was the preservation of Communist orthodoxy, as defined by the Soviets, in
Czechoslovakia.·· With regard to Rumania, an outwardly independent
state which seeks its own way while remaining inwardly the most
Stalinist of the European Communist states, the Soviet intervention
served as an unsubtle warning.

Just as there were limits for

Czechoslovakia, there were also limits for the other bloc states,
Rumania not least. of all.

The continued ability of Soviet troops

to hold maneuvers in Rumania and Rumania's continued membership in
Comecon and the Warsaw Pact indicate. that, despite the verbiage by
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both the Soviets and the Rumanians, Rumania remains within the Soviet
sphere, however uncooperatively.22
The invasion of Czechoslovakia had two principal causes.

The

first was the defense of the western-most extension of the Soviet and
East European defense perimeter.

The second was

Sovie~

fear that the

main elements of the "Prague Spring" would spread outside of
Czechoslovakia, perhaps even to the Soviet Union itself.

In the final

analysis, the invasion can be considered to be an exercise of Soviet
imperial prerogatives.23
beyond which the

Sov~et

It was the concrete definition of the limits

Union would not allow domesticism to trespass.

As one result of the example made of Czechoslovakia, the Rumanians

ceased their demands for more political freedom of action for their
state.24
Writing in 1961, Brzezinski asserted that the Soviets have
established the principle that the political practice of one Communist
state is materially relevant to another, "that each Communist state
must continually refer its practice to the general practices of the
camp.25

The-subsequeµt devel~pment of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon

have served to support Brzezinski's contention.

However, like the

Comecon, the Warsaw Pact is not simply a rubber stamp for Soviet policies, though it is a principal instrument of those policies.
The multilateral character of the Warsaw Pact is underscored by
Andrei Gromyko's 1974 statement that an almost causal relationship
exists between the "struggle for peace and socialism" and the coordination of Pact policies.26

This means that the East Europeans are

bol.llld to the Soviet Union and the maximum goals of Marxism-Leninism
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through the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact.
that regardless of the specific

s~cial

It should be noted, however,

system of the Soviet Union and

given the results of the Second World War, 'the security of the East
European states is necessarily bound to the Soviet Union.
moreover, a reciprocal relationship.

This is,

Also, the interests of the Party

elites throughout the bloc are quite par.allel.

And, because their

interests are parallel, their policies are parallel.

Those interests

are not served by the violence typical of past policies.

The •isocial-

ist reconstruction" of Eastern Europe has taken on a more suhtle
character in recent times.27

/

Currently it is not en.tirely clear that the Warsaw Pact and
Comecon are the instruments of absolute political control which they
once were, legitimizing Soviet control ideologically and providing the
necessary support to maintain the East European Communist regimes in
power.

Though this situation is not clearly the case, it is equally

not clearly the case that the Warsaw Pact and Comecon have developed
into organizations which function in accord with the provisions of
their charters and stated purposes.

Though recent developments "may

point in that direction," it remains an open question. 28
A vital distinction must be made between the genuine evolution
of the Soviet system as it operates in Eastern Europe and the.changes
which may have taken place in that complex structure of relationships
under the pressures of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet pblicy of
"detente11 with the West, and the evident need for further economic
.reforms to increase the productive capability of the bloc as a whole.
A clear distinction must be· also drawn, and this is perhaps the most

178
difficult, between a "relaxation" which takes place within the system
and the evolution of the system.

It is vital to note that none of the

central, fundamental mechanisms of Soviet power in Eastern Europe have
been abandoned. · Those mechanisms have evolved in a multilateral direction, but they are still very much in place and quite operative.
DYNAMICS
The death of Stalin, the riots of 1953, the establishment and subsequent abandonment of the "New Course," the power struggle within the
Soviet leadership, the de-Stalinization ·program, the attempted rec.onciliation with Tito, the shift from a predominantly bilateral system to
a more multilateral one; and the events of October-November, 1956,
taken together, constituted a three and a half year crisis for the
Soviet and East European system:

an East European "time of troubles."

The reconstruction of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe took a
full year of in-tense effort and in the end did not achieve the total
re-establishment of the pre-1953 Soviet prerogatives.

Following the

events of 1956, for example, the Soviet extraction of capital from
Eastern Europe at an annual rate of one billion dollars stopped.29
Indeed, after 1956 there could be no question of a return to the extremes of classic Stalinism.

History had moved too far.

For the

Soviets, the "task after 1956 was to establish some commonly-held
ideological criteria and to forge new bonds of unity to prevent the
diversity from becoming political disunity. 11 30

The problem was the

reassertion of Soviet political and economic hegemony in such a manner
that the position of the Soviet Union was beyond serious question and,

i

.I
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.at the same time, there would be no resurgence of the highly counterproductive features of Stalinism.

A balance was necessary between the

centralist position of the Soviet Union and the pressures generated by
East European nationalism.
That necessary equilibrium was established between late 1956 and
.the end of 195 7·.

It was given

c~ncrete

expression in the less exploi-

tative economic policies of the Soviet Union, such as the cancellation
of various East European financial debts and the extension of economic
grants and other aid; the negotiation of the 1957 status of force agreements; and in the declaration
celebration.

issue~

at the November, 1957, Moscow

The equilibrium was based upon the primacy of the Soviet

Union and the CPSU within the bloc and in extrabloc foreign affairs on
the one hand and the domestic rights of the various East European states
which operated within that context of Soviet primacy on the other.31
It was, like so many other things in Soviet and East European affairs,
a matter of degree, a more productive balance between the imperat·ives
of Soviet power and the realities of Eastern Europe.
A final question, however, remains to be answered.
the Soviet Union to re-establish its centralist position?

What enabled
However,

given the geopolitical realities, the power relationships operative in
Eastern Europe in 1956 and 1957, was the question ever seriously in
·doubt?
weaker,

Yes, it was.

In all

like~ihood,

had the Soviet position been

had the Soviets not had some support from the rest of the bloc

and, in a guarded yet fllllctional way, from Yugoslavia,32 the military
operation in Hungary could well have proved to be counterproductive,
forcing the Soviets to accept the neutrality

of Hungary.

This is not

i

!.
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idle speculation,

~or

if there had not been basic support for Soviet

policies in the other bloc Parties, had they not been in control domestically and in support of the Soviet position, the Hungarian revolt
may well have been replicated throughout the bloc.

Also, if their

support had riot been forthcoming, the Poles may well have been able
firmly to establish their individualist position at the Moscow celebration and follow a Polish version. of the "Yugoslav path."

The Poles,

like the Yugoslavs in 1948, were united and prepared to resist.

True,

the Soviets could have imposed a "Carthagenian" solution to the entire
question of "national Communism," but it is probable that such a policy
would have cost more than it would have gained pnd certainly more than
'\..,~ .. '"the course eventually adopted. On the other hand, given the history of
Western attitudes toward Eastern Europe as demonstrated in 1938, the
period 1945 to 1948, and most starkly in 1956, there was little chance
that the East Europeans had any tangible support outside the bloc such
as Yugoslavia had had in 1948.
If this argument does not clearly demonstrate that the unity of
the bloc was seriously at issue, neither can it be said that it was not.
It is perfectly possible to construct an argument in favor of the position that the "national Communism" of Poland in late 1956 and early

1957, as expressed for example in Poland's refusal to attend the
January, 1957, conference in Budapest, could have taken root in other
bloc Parties.

Under that condition, the reassertion of the Soviet

centralist position would have been impossible for the time being.
Therefore, it is necessary to conclude, at the very least, that the
Soviet centralist position in the bloc, and in a very real way the
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ultimate unity of the bloc as a whole, were indeed at issue in 1956 and
1957.

Certainly the role of the Soviet military in the re-establishment
of the Soviet position cannot be discounted.

Through 1957 Hungary was

a fresh, grim.example of Soviet willingness to employ ultimate sanctions
~

when Soviet interests were seriously endangered.

And, predictably,

there was a. renewed emphasis upon Soviet military might in the first
months of 1957,33 an emphasis which was not lost upon the East Europeans.
But the Soviets' ability to rebuild the system upon a nakedly . military
basis simply did not exist.

If that had.been the case, there would have

been no necessity for the Soviets to negotiate the status of force
agreements, hold the January, 1957, meeting in Budapest, negotiate the
declaration of November, 1957, cultivate the Chinese and the Yugoslavs,
or, for that matter,- to issue the October 30, 1956, declaration.
was clearly a limit to what an

exclusiv~ly

There

military solution could have

achieved given the political and economic price the Soviets· were willing
or able to pay at that particular time.
In the redefinition of the Soviet centralist position, the Soviets
drew upon the inherent strength of the system.

That

streng~h

was the

direct and the indirect result of the operation of several factors.

The

most fundamental of these was the CoIIllllunist commitment to industrialization, the ability of the Party to industrialize and to maintain an
acceptable rate of economic development.

Milovan Djilas' analysis of

this point bears review.
No society or nation allows production to lag to such
an extent that its existence is threateneq. To lag
means to die. People never die willingly·; they are
ready to undergo any sacrifice to overcome the
difficulties which stand ·in the way 'of their economic

182
production and their existence.34
To repeat, it is not the absolute level of industrialization but the

relative rate of industrialization which is crucial.

Stalinism and

its excesses were tolerated, in general, by East European Communists
because they were "accepted as expedients and sacrifices that had to
be made" in the course of industrialization within the Communist framework.35

Within the Party, this issue was also vital.

With regard to

intra-Party power struggles, Djilas has asserted that it was that
faction which was "the most consistent and determined" in its ·support
of "industrialization along Communist principles" that would win.36
The example of the Khrushchev-Malenkov contest is a case in point.

The

commitment to industrialization and to "socialist reconstruction" was
vital.

Industrialization was vital to the nation as a whole; the

"socialist reconstruction" of society was vital to the Party.

Radislaw

Selucky has summarized this condition:
The formal and declared goal of the economy is to
satisfy social needs and to foster growth of the
population's living standard. The informal and primary goal of the economy is to strengthen socialist
production relations and the existing political system.
The formal economic goal expresses the interests of the
population; the informal economic goal expresses the
interests of the P?Wer elite.37
Regardless of the specific goal involved, industrialization and further
development were primary for political power.
Following Leninist and Stalinist principles, economics became ·a
· subordinant function of politics.

A political and economic system was

formed in which the "economic facts" were "far less impor:tant than the
ideological considerations. 11 38

Economic policy developed as an instru-

ment of political control wit.bin the

co~text

of the ideological unity

'~

I

1
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I

of the bloc.

The Soviet Party was the guarantor of functional ideolo-

I

gical unity.

"Without such central power • • • the unity rooted in

I

ideology could disintegrate under the impact of time, change, specific

II

interests, and differing conditions. •139

I·

Any loss of ideological unity

threatened the political unity of the bloc and, by extension, the control

I
j

of each East European Party.

!

the ideological primacy of the Soviet Union was essential.

I

Yugoslav Party and the Chinese Party, the·East European Parties had not

I

If the Parties were to remain in power,
Unlike the

come to power in their own right, but had been placed in power as a
result of Soviet actions and were t;herefore dependent upon the Soviet
Union.

Individually they were not strong enough to retain power without

Soviet backing.

This is· why Nagy was unable to control the Hungarian

!

a

upheaval, and why Gomulka finally accepted the centralist position of

I
I
I

the Soviet Union and the CPSU in November, 1957.

I

i
I

I
I
I
I
I

In the system which was developed after 1948, any .economic decision
was a political one, 40 and Party elites. "were reluctant to change the
command system" which formed

11

the basis of their absolute power. 11 41

Indeed, as Djilas has observed, "Without industry the new class cannot
consolidate its position or authority. 1142

But, because of the fundamen-

tals of their legitimization, the Party elites must also produce sustained
economic growth.
It was not until the early 1960s

th~t

it became clear that the

continued subordination of economics to purely ideological consideratio?S
could not produce the needed results.43

Through the 1950s, the Stalinist:

economic model worked well as long as there was labor which could be
transferred and capital was available for reinvestment.44

During the
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1950s,.capital grew more rapidly than the labor force; the growth in
put exceeded the growth of the capital stock.

out~

But, in the 1960s, the

growth of output dropped, while ·capital investment continued to grow;
capital investment had reached a point of diminishing returns under the

I

conditions of the operative, ideologically based economic model.45

I

I

But, in 1957, the Stalinist economic mode, with relatively mino.r

I

reforms,46 was still able to produce the economic growth necessitated by

!
I

ideology, political control, and the most fundamental stated purposes
of Communism.

Thus, at least as far as the Party apparats were concerned,

the primacy of the Soviet
own domestic control.

.~n

was_. essential

,.for~

:the retention of their ·

The economic threat to their control inherent in

the rigid or semi-rigid subordination of economics to ideology and the
subordination of that ideology to the dictates of Soviet power imperaj

I

I

tives had not yet become clear.
The second source of strength upon which the Soviets drew in the

I

reconstruction of their authority in the bloc was the ability of multi-

Ii

lateral organizations such as the Warsaw Pact and Comecon to act as

I

"shock absorbers" between the East Europeans and the Soviets. 47

I

progressive development of multilateral organizations as instruments

The

of bloc integration began in 1955 with the revitalization of Comecon
and foundation of the Warsaw Pact.

Though both of these organizations

were surrounded by bilateral treaties and agreements which augmented
their decisions, they provided a formal structure which, to an extent,
stood between the East European states and the Soviet Union.

How

meaningful this intermediate structure was in the middle 1950s is hard
to evaluate.

Those organizations did not function in controvention
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of basic Soviet interests, but the purely exploitative character of those

I

structures began to taper off after 1956.

If Comecon and the WTO opera-

I

ted in support of Soviet interests, they also began to operate more

I
I
I

by the fact that these bodies took on the character of organizations

I

with;i..n which genuine negotiations take place.

clearly in the interests of the other member states.

This is indicated

The development of these institutions ·and the growth of the Soviet
commitment to them in the course of the early and middle 1950s suggest
that even though the Soviet Union retained its dominant position, that
position was expressed "through a more formal institutionalized set of
arrangements. 11 48

Those arrangements provided not only a buffer between

the Soviet Union and the East

Eu~opean

states, but also provided a

greater flexibility and a broadened scope for maneuver on the part of
both the Soviet Union and the East European states.
The third element was, curiously enough, the still largely operative rapprochement'with Yugoslavia and, .less curiously, the active support
of the Chinese.

The reconciliation with Tito did not actually founder

until the November, 1957, Moscow celebration, by

~hich

time the support

of Yugoslavia was no longer necessary or, as it developed, even desirable.
During the course of the post-1956 reconstruction, both the Soviets and
the East Europeans could point to the example of .Yugoslavia and draw
support for their separate positions.

The Yugoslav example was used

in a highly qualified form as a central element in the opening stages
of the reconstruction as a quasi-model for bloc relationships.

With the

progressive re-establishment df .Soviet centralism, that "inodel" became
less and less relevant until it became an actual threat ·to bloc unity,

I
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I

I
I

at which time it was again condemned.

l

At the time of the Moscow celebration the Chinese were firmly

I

I

behind the Soviets. · Unlike Yugoslavia, China signed the November, 1957,

II
I

I
I

declaration.

led the renewed attack upon the Yugoslavs in 1958.
did not

i

Further evidence is provided by the fact that the Chinese

b~gin

Sino-Soviet relations

seriously to deteriorate until the late 1950s.

Economic

relations between the two states started to go bad only in late 1957.49

I

As

for relations in general, several dates for the beginning of the rift

have been advanced.

The Chinese set the date for the beginning of the

deterioration at 1956; the Soviets ~ite both 1958 and 196i.50

In any

event, the Sino-Soviet rift did not come into the open until the early
1960s,51 by which time the Soviets had reconstructed their position in

I

I
I
I

I

Eastern Europe.
The po.int is that at the critical moment, through the course of
the reconstruction and particularly at the Moscow celebration, there
was neither an ideological nor a geopolitical alternative for the East
European Parties.

The Yugoslav position was not strong enough to counter

the Soviets except by a Yugoslav withdrawal from the conference; the
Chinese supported the Soviets.

Without a viable alternative, there was

no choice for the East European Parties.
The fourth element of Soviet strength was the continued ability of
the Soviet Union and the CPSU to act independently within the bloc.
Though the treniors of 1953 and the upheavals of 1956 necessitated various
policy changes and procedural reforms, none of these actions seriously
compromised the Soviet's ability to maneuver,. to institute and abandon
policies as circumstances dictated.

The most serious threat in this

\

\

I
II

of the internal power struggles between the Malenkov and Khrushchev

I

factions.

\

the bloc, finally served to strengthen the ultimate Soviet position.
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regard ·came from within the Soviet Party itself as a necessary consequence

I

Indeed, the various reforms, by reducing the tensions within

I

I
!

CONCLUSIONS
It is necessary to conclude, therefore, that the resolution of the
1953-1956 crisis set in place a redefined Soviet and East European system
which in its continuities with the pre-1953 system is more striking and
important than in its divergencies ... Though, from an East European 'Viewpoint, the most blatant and objectionable aspects of Soviet primacy had
been cancelled, having been realized as counter-productive to the bloc

I

as a whole and finally

I
I
I
I
I

firmly in Soviet control.

I

t~

purely Soviet interests, in 1957 the bloc was

In that redefined system, the central elements of the pre-1953
system, which were the sources of its strength, re-emerged in new forms.
The previous bilateral institutions and methods, though hardly abandoned,
had been reconstructed in a multilateral mode.

For example, the bila-

teral collective security network was restated ·in a multilateral form-the Warsaw Pact, which was augmented by bilateral treaties.

And, the

pre-1953 multilateral institutions were either abandoned where they
proved no longer practical or were revitalized and given a real function.
Many of those factors which allowed the Soviet Union and the CPSU
to resolve the crisis more nearly in line with their desires had formed
part of the basis for the pre-1953 system.

Those factors.were:

a

functional Western indifference toward Eastern Europe, or the inability

I

I
\

I

II
II
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of the West to act decisively on behalf of the strictly East European
states; the Communist connnitment to industrialization and economic growth;

I

the economic and ideolQgical dependence of the East European states upon

I

the Soviet

Un~on;

and, finally, the ability of the Soviet Union both to

I

resolve its own internal power struggle and to retain through the course

I

of the crisis its flexibility of maneuver with regard to its East Euro-

I

pean political and economic policies.
There can be no doubt that the 1953-1956 crisis was real.

The

sources of that crisis can be found in the weaknesses of the pre-1953
Soviet and East European system;

bu~·

the .resolution of that crisis had

its sources in the strengths of that same system.

I

I

I
I

I

I
I
I

\
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APPENDIX A
AGREEMENT BETWEEN POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION, 30 JULY 19411
"The Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the present
Agreement and decided as follows:
"l.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist

R~publics

recognizes .that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity.

The Government·

of the Republic of Poland declares that Poland is not bound by any
Agreement with any third State directed against the U.S.S.R."
"2.

Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two Govern-

ments upon the signature of this Agreement and an exchange of Ambassado rs will fallow immediately."
"3.

The two Governments mutually undertake to render one another

aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite
Germany. "
"4.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

expresses its consent to the formation on the territory o·f the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics of a Polish army under a commander appointed by the Government of the Republic of Poland, in agreement with the

lGreat Britain, Foreign Office, British Foreign ·and State Papers,
"Agreement Beb<teen Poland and The Soviet Union, 30 July 1941," vol. 144,
pp. 869 ff., in J. A. S. Grenville, The Major International Treaties
1914-1973 (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), pp. 214-215.
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Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Polish army

on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be
subordinated in operational matters to the Supreme Command of the
U.S.S.R. on which there will be a representative of the Polish army.
All details ·as to command, organization and employment of this force
will be settled in a subsequent agreement."
"5.

This Agreement will come into force immediately upon its

.

signature and without ratification.

.

The present Agreement is drawn up

in two copies, each of them in the Russian and Polish languages.

Both

texts have equal force."
"Secret.Protocol"
"L

Various claims both of public and private nature will be

dealt with in the course of further negotiations between the two
Governments. 1·1
"2.

This Protocol enters into force simultaneously with the

Agreement· of the 30th of July, 1941."
"Protocol"
"l.

As soon as diplomatic relations· are re-established the

Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will grant amnesty
to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on
the territory of the U.S.S.R. either as prisoners of war or on other
adequate grounds."
"2.

The present Protocol comes into force simultaneously with

the Agreement of July 30, 1941."

1
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APPENDIX B

..

AGREEMENT REGARDING FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND

l

POST-WAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE POLISH REPUBLIC, MOSCOW, 21 APRIL 19451
"The President of the National Council o·f the Homeland and the Presidium
of the Supreme Council of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics moved
by an unshaken determination to bring, in a common effort, the war with
the German aggressors to a complete and final victory;
"Wishing to consolidate the fundamental change in the history of
the Polish-Soviet relations in the direction of friendly cooperation,
which has taken

pla~e

in course of a connnon fight against the German

imperialism;
"Trusting that a further consolidation of good neighbourly relations and friendship between Poland and her direct neighbour - the
U.S.S.R. - is vital to the interests of the Polish and Soviet peoples;
"Confident that friendship and close cooperation between the
Polish people and the Soviet people will serve the ·cause of successful
economic development of both countries during the war as well as after
the war;
11

Wishing to support after the war by all possible means the cause

of peace and security of peoples;
1United Nations, Treaty Series. Treaties and International
Agreements Registered or Filed and Reported with the Secretariat
of the United Nations, vol. 12, "Agreement Regarding Friendship,
Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation Between the Soviet Union
and The Polish Republic, Moscow, 21 April 1945, 11 pp. 391ff., in
Grenville, pp. 361-362.
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"Have resolved to conclude this agreement and have

appointed

as their plenipotentiaries:
"The President of the National Council of the Homeland - Edward
Osobka-Morawski, the President of the Council of Ministers and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic,"
"The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics - Joseph Vissarionovitch Stalin, Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;
"Who, after exchange of full powers which were recognized as being
in order and drawn up in due form, . have· agreed as follows:
"Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties jointly with all United· Nations

will .continue the fight ·against Germany until final victory.

In that

fight· the High Contracting Parties undertake to give one another mutual
military and other assistance using all the means at their disposal."
"Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties, in a firm belief that in the

interest· of security and successful development of the Polish and Soviet
peoples it is necessary to preserve and to strengthen lasting and unshaken friendship during the war as well as. after the war, will strengthen
the friendly cooperation between the two countries in accordance with the
principles of mutual

~espect

for their independence and sovereignty and

non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Government."
"Article 3.

The High Contracting Parties further undertake that even

after the end of the present war they will jointly use all the means
at their disposal in order to eliminate every possible menace of a new
aggression on the part of Germany or on the part of any other Govern-

•"
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ment·whatsoever which would be directly or in any other manner allied
with Germany."
"For this purpose the High Contracting Parties will, in a spirit of
most sincere collaboration, take part in all international activities
aiming at ensuring peace and security of peoples and will contribute
their full share to the cause of realization of these high ideals."
"The High Contracting Parties will execute this Agreement in
compliance with the international principles in the establishment of
which both Contracting Parties took part."
I

"Article 4.

If one of the High Co~tracting Parties during the post-war

period should become involved in war operations against Germany· in case
she should resume aggressive policy or against any other Government
whatsoever which would be allied with Germany directly or in any other·
form in such a war the other High Contracting Party will immediately
extend to the other Contracting Party which is involved in military
operations military and other support with all the means at its disposal."
"Article 5.

The High Contracting Parties undertake not to. sign without·

mutual consent an armistice or a peace treaty with the Hitlerite Government or any other authority in Germany which menaces or may menace the
independence, territorial integrity or security of either of the two
High Contracting Parties."
"Article 6.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undert.akes not to

enter into any alliance or to take part in any coalition directed against
the other High Contracting P.arty."

l
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"Article 7.

The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in a spirit of

friendship also after the end of the present war. for the purpose of
developing and strengthening the economic and cultural relations between
the two countries and will give mutual assistance in the economic reconstruction of the two countries."
"Article 8.

This Agreement comes into force from the moment of signing

and is liable to ratification within the shortest possible period.

Ex-.

change of ratifying documents will take place in Warsaw as soon as
possible."
"This Agreement will remain in force for twenty years after the·
moment o·f signing. "
"If one of the High Contracting Parties does not make a statement
twelve months before the expiration of the twenty years period to the
effect that it wishes to give notice, this Agreement will remain in
force for a further period of five years and so on until one of the High
Contracting Parties makes a statement in writing twelve months before
the expiration of a successive five years period to the effect that it
intends to give notice of the Agreement."
"In witness whereof the mandatories have signed this Agreement
and have apposed their seals thereto."
"Drawn up in Moscow on April 21, 1945, in duplicate, each copy
in Polish and in Russian, both texts being equally binding."

\
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"By authority of the President of the National Council of the
Homeland."

Osobka-Morawski
"By authority of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the

u.s.s.R."
J. Stalin.

"After consideration this Agreement has been recognized equitable in its
-#

~

-~

....

~/

...

whole as well as in individual provisions contained therein; it is,
therefore, announced that it has been accepted, ratified and approved
and will be strictly complied with."
"In witness whereof this Act has been issued with the seal of the
Polish Republic duly apposed thereto."
WARSAW, September 19, 1945
President of the National Council of the Homeland
Boleslaw Bierut
President of the Council of Ministers
Edward Osobka-Morawski
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
P. P. Z. Modzelewski"

APPENDIX C
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE A11D POST-WAR
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
MOSCOW, 12 DECEMBER 19431
"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of ·the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the President of· the Czechoslovakian Republic, desiring to
modify and supplement the Treaty of Mutual Assistance existing between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovakian Republic
and signed in Prague on May 16, 1935, and to confirm the terms of the
Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic conceming
joint action in the war against Germany, signed July 18, 1941, in London;
desiring to cooperate after the war to maintain peace and to prevent further aggression on the part of Germany and to assure permanent friendship
and peaceful post-war cooperation between them, have resolved to conclude
for this purpose a Treaty and • • • have agreed to the following:
"Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties, having agreed mutually

to join in a policy of permanent friendship and friendly post-war
cooperation, as well as of mutual assistance, engage to extend to each·
other military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the
present war against Germany and against all those States which are
associated with it in acts of aggression in Europe."

lcreat Britain, Foreign Office, British Foreign and State Papers,
· "Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation .
Between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, 12 December 1943,"
vol~ 143, pp. 238ff., in Grenville, pp. 215-216.
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"Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties engage not to enter

during the period of the present war into any negotiations with the
Hitler Government or with any other Government in Germany which does
not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to carry on
negotiations and not to conclude without mutual agreement any armistice
or other treaty of peace with Germany or with any other State associated
with it in acts of aggression in Europe."
"Article 3.

Affirming their pre-war policy of peace and mutual

assistance, expressed in the treaty signed at Prague on May 16,

193~,

the High Contracting Parties, in c;.ase one of them in the period after
.the war should become involved in military action with Germany, which
might resume its policy· of 'Drang nach Osten,' or with any other State
which might join with Germany directly or in any other form in such a
war, engage to extend immediately to the other Contracting Party thus
involved in military action all manner of military and other support
and assistance at its disposal."
"Article 4.

The High Contract·ing Parties, having regard to the

security interests of each of them, agree to close and friendly cooperation in the period after the restoration of peace and agree to
act in accordance with the principles of mutual! respect for their
independence and sovereignty, as well as of non-interference in the
internal affairs of the other State.

They agree to develop their

economic relations to the fullest possible extent and to extend to
each other all possible economic assistance after the war."
11

Article· 5.

Each of the High Contracting Parties engages not

to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed
against the other High Contracting Party."
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"Article 6.

The present Treaty shall come into force immediately

after signature and shall be ratified within the shortest possible time;
the exchange of ratifications· will take place in Moscow as soon as
possible. 11
"The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty
years from the date of

sign~ture,

and if one of the High Contracting .

Parties at the end of this period of twenty years does not give notice
of its desire to terminate the· Treaty twelve months before its expiration, it will continue to remain in force for the following five years ..
and for each ensuing five-year pertod unless one of the High Contracting
Parties gives notice in writing twelve months before the expiration of
the current five-year period of its intention to terminate it."
"Protocol"
"On the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance
and Post-War Cooperation between the Union of Soviet

Socialis~

Republics

and the Czechoslovakian Republic the High Contracting Parties undertake
that, in the event that any third country bordering on the U.S.S.R. or
the Czechoslovakian Republic and constituting in this war an object of
German aggression desires to subscribe to this Treaty, it will be given
the opportunity, upon the joint agreement of the Governments of the
U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovakian Republic, to adhere to this Treaty,
which will thus acquire the character of ·a tripartite agreement."
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"By authority of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the
~

j.

U.S. S. R.

V. Molotov
"By authority of the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic
Z. Fierlinger"

APPENDIX D
INDICES OF MAJOR CROP PRODUCTION
IN THE BLOC, 1948-19551
(19 34-19 38 = 100; "b" :

All grains totaled under bread grains)
COARSE GRAINS

BREAD GRAIN

Czechoslovakia
Poland
Hungary
Rumania
Bulgaria
Yugoslavia

1948

1953

.1955

1948

1953

1955

81. 8
89.8
80.8
90.4
99.0
104.2

83.0
76.0
94.1
75. 7b
132.3
105.6

81.1
108.8
92.4
151. 4b
112.0
101.1

97.8
75. 3
97 .1
104
81.5
87.7

107. 9
79.0
105.3
- b
105. 9
85.4

112.0
82.9
115.9
- b
151.9
84.1

POTATOES

Czechoslovakia
Poland
Hungary
Rumania
Bulgaria
Yugoslavia

SUGAR-BEETS

1948

1953

1955

1948

1953

1955

55.2
70.3
103.2
87.8
89.2
100.0

71. 7
114.5
93.8
185.3

?

98.6
98.6

74.5
70.8
123.0
203.5
178.1
294.8

94.7
162.8
265.0
326.6
344.1
298.0

172.0
220.0
502.5
349. 3

lspulber, p. 349.

?

?
?

140.9

153.9

?

271. 7
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APPENDIX E

PERCENT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND IN THE SOCIALIST SECTORl

("-":

unavailable)

1952

1953

1954

1956

1957

1958

Poland

13

17

19

24

14

15

Czechoslovakia

.24

48

44

45

70

77

I

Rumania

19

21'

26

35

50

51

Hungary

25

37

32

33

22.

23

Bulgaria

50

62

60

62

90

92

East Germany

5

8

30

33

40

Yugoslavia

-

24

-

9

!Brzezinski, p. ·99.
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APPENDIX F

I

BLOC STATES' FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE USSR AND OTHER BLOC

1

I
I
I
1·

STATES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOREIGN TRADEl
1937

1948

1949

1950

1951

Bulgaria

12

74

. 82

88

92

Hungary

13

34

46

61

67

34

43

59

58

i

Poland

7

Rumania

18

71.

82

83

79

Czechoslovakia

11

30

45

52

60

lrbid., p. 127.-
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NETWORK OF LONG-TERM TRADE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED
BETWEEN COMECON MEMBERS IN 1950-19.Sll

ALBANIA
BULGARIA

l

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I

GDR

I

HUNGARY
POLAND

'

RUMAN IA

I

SOVIET UNION

I

I

lKaser, p. 61.

Albania

*
*
*
*
*
*

Bulgaria

*

*
*

Czechoslovakia

*
*
*
*

GDR

*
*
*

Hungary

*
*

Poland

*
*

Rumania

*

Soviet Union

l
\
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APPENDIX H

\

I
I

COMECON'S FOUNDING COMMUNIQUE:

'

JANUARY 22, 19491
"In January of this year an economic conference was held in Mos cow
attended by delegates. from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the USSR,
and Czechoslovakia.

The conference noted considerable successes in the

development of the economic relations annng the countries concerned and
above all the great rise in the turnover of trade.

As

a result of the

above-mentioned economic relations and the implementation of economic
co-operation between the countries of people's democracy and the USSR,
conditions have been created to accelerate the restoration and development of their national economies.

The conference further observed that

the Governments of the United States of America, of Great Britain, and
of certain western European states had boycotted trade relations with the
countries of people's democracy and the USSR because these countries did
not consider it appropriate that they should submit themselves to the
dictatorship of the Marshall Plan, which would have violated their
sovereignty and the interests of their national economies.

In the light

of these circumstances, the meeting studied the question of the possibility of organizing wider economic co-operation between the countries
of people's democracy and the USSR.

To establish this· wider economic·

co--operation between the countries of
1Michael Kaser, Comecon (London:

pp. 11-12.

people~

s democracy and the USSR,

Oxford University Press, 19.65),

l
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the conference considered it necessary to create the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance between the countries represented--on the basis of
equal represeritation and with the task of exchanging economic experience,
extending technical aid to one another and rendering mutual assistance
with respect.to raw materials, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, etc.
The meeting decided that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
would be an organization open to other countries of Europe sharing the·
principles of the Council for Mutual Assistance and desirous of participating in the widening of economic co-operation with the above-mentioned
countries.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance would take a deci-

sion only with the agreement of the interested countrr.

The Council

shall meet periodically ·in the capital of each of the signatory countries
in turn under the chairmanship of the representative of the country in
whose capital the session takes place."

I
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APPENDIX H (continued)
THE OOME CON CHARTERl
"At its 12th session in December 1959, the Conncil drafted a
Cllarter, which was signed on Dec. 14, 1959, and came into force on
April 13, 1960."
"A sunnnary of the Charter is given below:
In the preamble the signatories state their determination
'to continue developing all-round economic co-operation
on the basis of the consistent implementation of the inter~
national socialist division of labor in the interests of
building Socialism and Communism in their countries and
ensuring a lasting peace throughout the world.' They also
state their 'readiness to develop economic relations with.
all countries, irrespective of their social and State systems.'
Art. 1. The purpose of the CMEA is to facilitate, by
tmiting and co-ordinating the efforts of the Council's
melnber countries, the planned development of the national
economy, acceleration of economic and technical progress
in these countries, a rise in the level of industrialization
in countries with less developed industries, uninterrupted
growth of labor productivity, and a steady advance of the
welfare of the peoples in the Council's member-countries.
Art. 2 deals with membership of the CMEA. Membership
is open to any European country sharing the Council's
aims and principles. Any member-country may leave the
Council with six months' notice. This article was amended
at the 16th session of the Council, when admission to membership was extended to non-European countries.
Art. 3 states the functions of the CMEA to be to:
(a) 'organize all-round economic, scientific and technical
co.-operation of all the Council's member-countries in the

l"The COMECON Charter," Treaties and Alliances of the World,

An Inten1ational Survey Covering Treaties in Force and Communities
of States (New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons; 1974), pp. 129-132.
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most rational use of their natural resources and acceleration
of the development of their productive forces'; and
(b) 'assist the Council's member-countries in elaborating
and carrying out joint measures for:
(i) the development of the industry and agriculture of
the Council's member-countries: (ii) the development of
transport • • • ; (iii) the most efficient use of principal
capital investments allocated by the Council's membercountries for the development of the mining and manufacturing industries and for the construction of major
projects which are of interest to two countries or more;
(iv) the development of trade and exchange of services
between the Council's member-countries and between
them and other countries; (v) the exchange of scientific
and technical achievements and advanced production experience.'
Art. 4 states that 'recommendations shall be made on
questions of economic, scientific, and technical co-operation' and on 'decisions on or'ganizational and procedural
matters.' Reconrrnendations and decisions apply only to
those members who have declared an interest in the ques-.
tion from which they arise.
·
Art. 5 names the constituent organs of the Council as
the Session of the Council; the Conference of Members'
Representatives (since replaced by the Executive Committee); the Standing Commissions; and the Secretariat.
Arts. 6, 7, 8 and 9 give details of the composition and
functions of the organs of the Council.
The remaining articles deal with the Council's international relations and financial arrangements, and with such
matters as the ratification and amending of the Charter.
"ORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL"

"Summit Conferences"
"Since June 1962 the first secretaries of the Central Committees
of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the Heads of Government of
the·member-countries of Comecon have met in conference from time to time
to discuss the expansion and consolidation of economic .co-operation
among Comecon countries.

At these smnmit conferences the general lines

of Comecon's work are laid down."

I
I
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"Session of the Council"
"The supreme permanent organ of Comecon is the Session of the
Council, which meets at least once a year in the capital of each membercountry in turn, the host-country providing the chairman for each Sessien.
The program of work discussed at the summit conferences is here determined in greater detail..

Recommendations, which must be passed unanimous-

ly, are put into effect by inter-governmental agreements."
"Executive Committee"
"The Executive Connnittee was set up at the 16th Session of the
Cotmcil on July 7, 1962.

It consists of Deputy Prime Ministers of the

Comecon member-countries, their deputies, and advisers.

Meetings are held

at least every two months, the function of the Committee being to co-ordinate national economic development plans and to supervise collaboration
in scientific and technical research.

A branch of the Executive Committee

is the Bureau for Common Questions of Economic Planning, in which each
Comecon country is represented by the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning
Organization."
"Secretariat"
The Secretariat consists, at present, of the Secretary of the
Council and six De.puty Secretaries.

It is responsible for preparation

of material for the Council, the Committee, and the Permanent Commissions,.
and for the drafting of reports and the compiling of statistics."
"Permanent Commissions"
"Twenty-three Permanent Commissions wer¢ set up at various times
to study different aspects of. Comecon's work.

All the Comecon member-

l
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countries are represented on each of the committees and sub-committees
of the Permanent Commissions." ·
"The Connnissions are listed below, together with their date· of foundation and present headquarters.
Agriculture
Forestry
Power
Coal Industry
Machine Building
Oil and Gas
Ferrous Metals
Non-ferrous Metals
Chemical Industry
Wood, Cellulose, Paper
Transport
·
Construction
Light Industry
Food Industry
Economic Questions
Foreign Trade
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
Standardization
Co-ordination of Scientific.
and Technical Research
Statistics
Finance and Currency
Radio and Electronics Industries
Geology

(May 1956; Sofia)
(May 1956; Bucharest)
(May 1956; Moscow)
(May 1956; Warsaw)
(May 1956; Prague)
(May 1956; Bucharest)
(May 1956; Moscow)
(May 1956; Budapest)
(May 1956; Berlin)
(May 1956; Budapest)
(June 1958; Warsaw)·
(June 1958; Berlin)
Created as a
(July 1963; Prague)) single connnis(July 1963; Sofia) ) sion in December,
(1958; Moscow)
1958.
(May 1959; Moscow)
(Sept. 1960; Moscow)
(June 1962; Berlin)
(June
(June
(Dec.
(July
(July

1962;
1962;
1962;
1963;
1963;

Moscow)
Moscow)
Moscow)
Budapest)
Ulan-Bator)"

"The creation of a Permanent Commission for Posts and Teleconnnunications was decided upon by the Council at its 25th Session held in
Bucharest, July 27-29, 1971." ·
"The Permanent Connnission for the Co-ordination of Scientific and
Technical Research was at the same time replaced by a Committee for
Scientific and Technical Co-operation, and a Committee for Co-operation
in the Sphere of Planning was also set up."

I
I
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"INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK"

."An International Investment Bank, with

~ts

seat in Moscow, was

set up on July 10, 1970, by 7 countries as founder-members (Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland,
and the Soviet Union).

Romania became a member of the bank on Jan. 12,

1971. II
"Starting operations on Jan. 1, 1971, with initial capital subscriptions totaling 175,000,000 rubles (to be increased by another
175,000,000 rubles in 1972 and a

to~al

of· 650,000,000 in later years),

the bank was to concentrate resources for capital construction and for
co-ordinated expenditure through the granting of long- and medium-term
credits.

Membership subscriptions were based on the volume of members'

exports in mutual trade turnover, with the Soviet Union providing nearly
40 percent and Eastern Germany about 17. 6 percent of the capital.

The

bank was also authorized to use loans and investments from third countries. 11

"INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION" .
"An International Bank for Economic Co-operation, formed by Comecon' s

eight member-countries with an initial capital of 60,000,000 rubles (to
be increased to 300,000,000 rubles within five years), came into being on
Jan. 1, 1964."

"OTHER INSTITUTIONS"
"Other permanent bodies created by the Council are a Working Party

1

I
l·
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l

for the Co-ordination and Delivery of Finished Articles (founded probably

I

in 1959) and a Central Dispatcher Administration (founded in 1962)."

I
I

"A Standardization Institute was established in 1964, its function
being the creation of a progressive standardization of industrial products
among the Comecon member-countries."

I

"The creation of an International Institute of Economic Problems of
the World Socialist System was approved by Comecon's Executive Committee
on July 24, 1970."
"Division of Labor"
/

"The work of Comecon is largely based on the principle of the
division of labor.

In Sessions of the Council from 1956 to 1961 a number

of plans were approved for specialization, in various industries, among
the Comecon countrie·s.

At the Session of the Council from Dec. 12-15,

1961, the draft of the 'Fundamental Principles of International Socialist
Division of Labor' was adopted.
on June 17, 1962.

The details of the document were published

Described as 'a planned and consciously molded proces.s,

which takes into consideration the objectively operating economic laws of
Socialism,' the Principles are contrasted with the competitive system of
capitalist international division.

All later resolutions of Comecon in

the field of the division of labor are based on this document."
n

COMPLEX PROGRAM"

"The Council published on Aug. 7, 1971, a 'Complex Pr.ogram for th.e.
Further Deepening and Improvement of Co-operation and Development of the

.i·

Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA Member-Countr;i.es.·"'

1

I
I
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I

I
I

The purpose of the program was stated to be 'the promotion of
the growth of the economic power of the Socialist world system
and the strengthening of the economic system of each country.'
Socialist economic integration, however, was to take place on
the basis of 'complete voluntariness' and would not be linked

with the creation of supra-national organs.

There would be

intensified co-operation in planning, with joint forecasts
for energy, petrochemicals, and automative systems in the
period 1971-75, and also in joint research projects in science
and technology.
The program further provided for a new form of trading, i.e.,
trade in non-quota goods which would not need to be balanced
bilaterally but would, for clearing purposes, be counted in
the total trade of the respective countries.
The 'transferable rouble' (the collective currency used for
accounting in the internal Comecon clearing accounts but not
transferable otherwise) was to be strengthened so as to attain
'real transferability' and be used in clearings with non-Comecon
countries, and new parities would be established between the
currencies of the member-States: and in relation to the 'transferable ruble.'
The proposed increased co-operation was to include the c~eation
of a network of express trains and of long-distance roads, joint
shipping enterprises, and the introduction of standardized
container transport systems.
"The negotiations on the 'Complex Program' during the Council's
25th session in Bucharest, July 27-29, 1971, revealed 'serious controversy on

qu~stions

of integration,' and, in partic.ular, strong reserva-

tions on any surrender of a country's sovereignty to Comecon were
expressed by Romania.
"Scientific Co-operation"
"The Eastern Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna (U.S.S.R.)"
"A preliminary agreement on the establishment of an Eastern Joint
Institute for Nuclear Research, made on March 26, 1956, was implemented
on July 12, 1956.

The· members of the joint Institute are Albania,

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, North
Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union,
and the Democratic Republic

of

Vietnam •. The People's Republic of China,

I
I

I
I
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formerly a member, withdrew its scientists in July 1966."
"On its inception the Joint Institute comprised the former Institute

of Nuclear Problems and Electro-physical Laboratory of the Soviet Academy

1

of Sciences.

Its equipment included one synchrotron generating 10,000,

I

000,000 electron volts and another generating 680,000,000 electron volts.

I

Other sections of the Institute, which have come into operation since its

I

establishment, are the Laboratory of High Energies, which began operating

I

in 1957; the Laboratory of Neutron Physics, equipped with an experimental
fast neutron pulse reactor (in operation since 1960); and a Laboratory of
Nuclear Reactions equipped with a crclotron for accelerating multi-·
charged ions (also coming into operation in 1960).

The Joint Institute

also has a Computing Center and a Radiochemical Laboratory."
I
11

The supreme authority of the Joint Institute is the Committee of

Government Plenipotentiaries, the members of which are the heads of the
atomic energy authorities of the member-countries.
responsible for policy and finance.

Th~

The Committee is

program of work is the respon-

sibility of a Scientific Council, while the practical administration is
carried out by a Management consisting of a Director, two Vice-Directors
I

and an Administrative Manager."
"Other Scientific Centers"
"Agreements signed in Moscow on April 28, 1971, provided for the
establishment of seven new scientific centers to study such matters as
new chemical compounds, prevention of pollution, control of weeds and
agricultural pests, automated systems for medical institu.tions, anticorrosion measures, research in biological physics; and uses of timber."
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"ADMISSION OF CUBA"

I

I
1

I
I
I
I

"At the Council's 26th session, held in Moscow July 10-12, 1972,
Cuba was unanimously admitted as a full member of Comecon."
"In the·communique·issued at the end of the session, it was stated
that.from 1970 to 1971 the Comecon member-countries had increased their
national income by 6.3 percent; their industrial output by 7.8 percent;
their transactions in 'transferable rubles' by 11 percent; and their
foreign trade by 8 •.3

percent, that with the rest of the worlq having

risen by 8.5 percent."
"INCREASING PARTICIPATION BY YUGOSLAVIA"
"At the same time the Yugoslav Federal Prime Minister signed a
protocol on the undertaking of joint projects between Comecon membercountries and Yugoslavia."

\

l
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APPENDIX I

\.
Bi,oc TRADE WITH THE U.S.A. AND WESTERN ERUOPE AND

I
I
I

EUROPEAN NEUTRAL STATESl
(Figures cited are in unadjusted then current millions of U. S. dollars.)

1

spulber,

1947

908.l

1948

1347.6

1949

1281. 8

1950

1039. 3

1951

1243.l

1952

1120.2

1953

1005.2

1954

1183.7

p. 463.

1

I
I
l

I

I

I

I.

APPENDIX J

I

GENERAL BLOC TRADING PATTERNS, 1937-19521

I

(Figures cited are in percentages of a given state's total foreign trade.)
- WITH THE SOVIET UNION 1937

1948.

1952

Czechoslovakia

1

16

35

Poland

1

22

32

11

29

25

58

54

57

10

14

36

6

12

35

Hungary

13

23

42

Rumania

17

46

27

Bulgaria

12

20

32

Hungary
Rumania

1

Bulgaria
- WITH OTHER BLOC STATES Czechoslovakia
Poland

lspulber, p.

lo.·

~,

1

I
I

I
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APPENDIX J (continued)

l·

l
I

- WITH.THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER BLOC STATES -·-

1937

1948

1952

· 11

30

71

7

34

67

Hungary

13

34

71

Rumania

18

71

85

Bulgaria

12

74

89

1937

1948

1952

Czechoslovakia

89

70

29

Poland

93

66

33

Hungary

87

66

29

Rumania

82

29

15

Bulgaria

88

26

11

I
Czechoslovakia
Poland

- WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD -

APPENDIX K

I
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COLLABORATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN

\
\

THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC· .AND THE SOVIET UNION,

\
\

MOSCOW, 4 FEBRUARY 19481

\

lA

treaty in similar terms was concluded between Bulgaria and the Soviet

Union, 18 March 1948; and .between Hungary and the Soviet Union, 18

\

February 1948.1

\
\
\

\

"The Praesidium of the Rumanian Popular Republic and the Praesidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
"Desirous of consolidating friendly relations between Rumania and
the Soviet Union;
"Desirous of keeping-up close collaboration, with a view to consolidating peace and general security, in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Organization;
"Convinced that the keeping up of friendship and good neighbour\

liness between Rumania and the Soviet Union is in accordance with the
vital interests of the peoples of both States, and will bring the best
possible contribution to their economic development;
"Have decided to conclude this Treaty, and have to that end full
powers:
"Articl~

1.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to take jointly all

1United Nations, Treaty Series, Treaties and International.Agreements Registered or Filed and Reported with the·secretariat·of .the
United Nations, vol. 48, "Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual
Assistance Between the Rumanian.People's Republic and the Soviet Union,
Moxcow, 4 February 1948," pp. 189ff., in Grenville, p. 364. Enclosed
in brackets are Grenville's annotations.

I
I

I
I
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measures in their power to remove any threat of repeated aggression

on

the part of Germany, or of any State ally_ing itself with Germany directly
or in any other way."

\

I
I

I

"The High Contracting Parties state that it is their intention to
participate .with full sincerity in any international action aimed at
ensuring the peace and security of nations, and that they will fully
contribute to the carrying out of these great tasks."

I
"Article 2.

I

Should one of the High Contracting Parties be involved in

armed conflict with Germany, attempting to renew her policy of aggression, or with any other State allying itself with Germany, directly or
in any other way, in her aggressive policy, the·other High Contracting
Party will lose no time in giving the High Contracting Party involved
in a conflict military or other aid with all the means at its disposal."
"This Treaty will be applied in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter."
11

Article 3.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to conclude

no alliance and to participate in no coalition, action or measures
directed against the other High Contracting Party."
"Article 4.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with regard to

all important international issues concerning the interests of the two
countries."
"Article 5.

The High Contracting Parties state that they will act in a

spirit of friendship and collaboration, with a view to further developing and strengthening economic and cultural relations between the two
States, with due regard for.the principles of mutual respect for their

I
I

I
I
1-

229·

independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in the internal
affairs of the other State."

1

l

HArticle 6.

I

the date·of its signing.

I

years, none of the High Contracting Parties expresses the wish to cancel

This Treaty will remain in force for twenty years, as from
If, one year before the expiry of the twenty

I

the Treaty, it will remain in force another five years, and so on, until·

I

one of the High Contracting Parties, one year before the expiry of the

l

current five-year period, announces in writing its intention to put an
end to the validity of the Treaty •

ti

l

I
I
I

I
1

APPENDIX L

I

PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, 1951-19551

---

I

(Previous year's output= 100.)

I

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

Bulgaria

119

118

112

109

110

Czechoslovakia

115

ll8

110

104

111

East Germany

122

116

112

110

108

. 130

124

111

103

108

Poland

124

120

118

111

111

Rumania

129

123

114

117

114

I

I

Hungary

1

Brzezinski, p. 170.

I
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APPENDIX M
TREATY·OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

\

I
I
I
I
I

BETWEEN ALBANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUB~IC,

POLAND, RUMANIA, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

lwARSAW PACT), WARSAW, 14 MAY 19551
11

The Contracting Parties,"
"Reaffirming their desire to create a system of collective security

in Europe based on the participation of all European States, irrespective
of their social and political structure, whereby the said States may be
enabled to combine their efforts in the interests of ensuring peace in
Europe;"
"Taking into consideration, at the same time, the situation that has
come about in Europe as a result of the ratification of the Paris Agree~

ments, which provide for the constitution of a new military group in the
form of a 'West European Union,' with the participation of a remilitarized
West Germany and its inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, thereby increasing the danger of a new war and creating a threat to the national security
of peace-loving States;"
"Being convinced that in these circumstances the peace-loving States
of Europe must take the necessary steps to safeguard their security and
to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe;"
"Being guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
1United Nations, Treaty Series, Treaties artd Interna.tional·Agreements
Registered or Filed and.Reported with the Secretatiat·of"the United.Nations,
vol. 219, "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between
Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, The German Democratic Republic, Poland, Rumania,
The Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia [War-saw Pact] Warsaw, 14 May 1955," .
pp. 3ff., in Grenville, pp. 365-367. Enclosed in brackets are Grenville's
annotations.

j
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United Nations; 11
"In the interests of the further strengthening and development of

. friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the
principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of States and
of non-intervention in their domestic affairs;u

I
I

"Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship,
Cooper~tion

and Mutual Assistance and have appointed as their pleni-

pot en tiaries • • • who have agreed as follows:"

I
I
l

"Article 1.

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the

Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force and to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and

se~urity

"Article 2.

are not endangered."
The Contracting Parties declare that they are prepared to

participate, in a spirit of sincere cooperation, in all international
action for ensuring international peace and security and will devote
their full efforts to the realization of these aims."
"In this connection, the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to
secure, in agreement with other States desiring to cooperate in this
matter, the adoption of effective measures for the general reduction of
armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of
mass destruction."
"Article 3.

The Contracting Parties shall consult

toget~er

on all im-

'

portant international questions involving their common interests, with a
view to strengthening international peace and security.u

233

I

I

"Whenever any one of the Contracting Parties considers that a

\

I

threat of armed attack on one or more of the States parties to the

l

Treaty has arisen, they shall consult together immediately with a view

I

to providing for their joint defence and maintaining peace and security."

I

"Article 4.

I

the States parties to the Treaty by any State or group of States, each

I

State party to the Treaty shall, in the

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of

vidual or collective

self-defen~e,

~xercise

of the right of indi-·

in accordance with Article 51 of the

United Nations Charter, afford the State or States so attacked immediate
assistance, individually and in agreement with the other States

par~ies

to the Treaty, by all the means it considers necessary, including the
use of arIIEd force.

The States parties to the Treaty shall consult

together immediately concerning the joint measures necessary to restore
and maintain international peace and security."
"Measures taken under this Article shall be reported to the Security
Cotmcil in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
These measures shall be discontinued as soon as the

Securi~y

Council takes

the necessary action to restore and maintain international peace and
security."
"Article 5.

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Unified

· Command, to which certain elements of their armed forces shall be allocated by agreement between the parties, and which shall act in accordance
with jointly established principles.

The parties shall likewise take such

other concerted action as may be necessary to reinforce their defensive
strength, in order to defend the peaceful labour of 'their peoples,

l

I
!
I
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guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and afford

j

l
I

protection against
"Article 6.

possibl~

aggression."

For the purpose of carrying out the consultations provided

I

for in the

I

the consideration of matters arising in connection with the application

I

of the present Treaty, a Political Consultative Connnittee shall be estab-

pr~sent

Treaty between the States parties thereto, and for

lished, in which each State party to the.Treaty shall be represented by
1

a member of the Government or by some other specially appointed represen-

I

tat:i,ve."
;

"The Committee may establish such auxiliary organs as may prove to
be necessary."
"Article 7.

'Ihe Contracting Parties tmdertake not to participate in any ·

coalitions or alliances, and not to conclude any agreements, the purposes
of which are incompatible with the purposes of the present Treaty."
"The Contracting Parties declare that their obligations under international treaties at present in force are not incompatible with the provisions of the present Treaty."
"Article 8.

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a

spirit of friendship and cooperation to promote the further development
and strengthening of the economic and cultural ties among them, in
accordance with the principles of respect for.each other's independence
and sovereignty and of non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs."
"Article 9.

The present Treaty shall be open for accession by other

States, irrespective of their social and political structure, which

I
I

I

I
I

I
I
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express their readiness by participating in the present Treaty, to help
in combining the efforts of the peace-loving States to ensure the peace
and security of the peoples.

Such accessions shall cone into effect with

the consent of the States parties to the Treaty after the instruments of
accession have been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's
Republic."

I

"Article 10.

I

the instruments of

I
I

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification, and
ratificatio~

shall be deposited with the Government of

the Polish People's Republic."
"The Treaty shall come into force on the date of deposit of tI:ie last
instrument of ratification.

The Government of the Polish People's Repub-

lie shall inform the other States parties to the Treaty of the deposit
of each instrUillent of ratification."
"Article 11.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years.

For Contracting Parties which do not, one year before the expiration of
that term, give notice of termination of the Treaty to the Government of
the Polish People's Republic, the Treaty shall remain in force for a
further ten years."
"In the event of the establishnent of a system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European
Treaty concerning collective security, a goal which the Contracting
Parties shall steadfastly strive to achieve, the present· Treaty shall
cease to have effect as from the date on which the General European
Treaty comes into force."

I
I

I

I
I
I
I
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"Done at Warsaw, this fourteenth day of May 1955, in one copy,
in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all the texts
being equally authentic.

Certified copies of the present Treaty shall

be transmitted by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to
all the other parties to the Treaty. "

I

I
I
I
I
I
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APPENDIX N
\

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR ON THE PRINCIPLES

\

I

OF DEVELOPMENT AND FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST

\

\

I

STATES, OCTOBER 30, 19561
"A POLICE OF PEACEFUL

coexisten~e,

friendship, and cooperation among all

states has been and continues to be the firm foundation of the foreign
relations of the Union of Soviet Soc'ialist Republics."
"This policy finds its deepest and most consistent expression in
the mutual relations among the socialist countries.

United by the common

ideals of building a socialist society and by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their mutual relations only on the principles of
complete equality, of respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and of noninterference in one another's internal
affairs.

Not only does this not exclude close fraternal cooperation and

mutual aid among the countries of the socialist commonwealth in the
economic, political, and cultural spheres; on the contrary, it presupposes
these things."
111 Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the Principles of

Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation
Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States, October 30, 1956,"
Pravda, October 31, 1956, in Paul E. Zinner, ed., National .Communism and
Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press,
1956), pp. 485-489.

I
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"The system of people's democracies took shape, grew strong and
showed its great vital power in many countries of Europe and Asia on

1·

this foundation after the Second World War and the rout of fascism."
"In the process of the rise of the new system and the deep revolutionary changes in social relations, there have been many difficulties,

I

unresolved problems, and downright mistakes, including mistakes in the
mutual relations among the socialist countries--violations and errors

\

which demeaned the principle of equality in relations among the socialist

I

states."
"The 20th Congress of the Communist Party.of the Soviet Union quite

'

I

resolutely condemned these violations and mistakes, and set the task of
consistent application by the Soviet Union of Leninist principles of
equality of peoples in its relations with the other socialist countries.
It proclaimed the need for taking full account of the historical past
and peculiarities of each cotmtry that has taken the path of building a
.new life."
"The Soviet Government is consistently carrying out these historic
decisions of the 20th ·Congress, which create conditions for further
strengthening friendship and cooperation among the

socialis~

countries

on the firm foundation of obseryance of the full sovereignty of each
socialist state."
"As recent events have demonstrated, it has become necessary to

make this declaration of the Soviet Union's stand on the mutual relations
i·'

l

of the USSR with other socialist countries, particularly in the economic

i

and nqlitary spheres. 11

;·

"The Soviet government is prepared to discuss together with the

i

I
I
j

I
I

I
I
I
I
I

I
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governments of other socialist states measures ensuring further development and strengthening of economic ties among the socialist countries in
order to remove any possibility of violation of the principles of national
sovereignty, mutual benefit, and equality in economic relations."
"This principle must also be extended to advisers.

in the first period of the formation of the new social system, the Soviet
Union, at the request of the governments of the people's democracies, sent
these countries a certain number of its specialists--engineers, agronomists,
scientists, military advisers.
· has repeatedly raised before· the

I

It is known that,

In the recent period the Soviet· Government
soc~alist

countries the question of· re-

calling its advisers."
"In view of the fact that by this time the people's democracies
have formed their own qualified national cadres in all spheres of economic and military affairs, the Soviet Government considers it urgent to
review, together with the other socialist states, the question of the
expediency of the further presence of USSR advisers in these countries."
"In the military domain an important basis of the mutual relations
between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies is the Warsaw Treaty,
under which its members adopted respective political and military obliga-.
tions, including the obligation to take 'concerted measures necessary for
strengthening their defense capacity in order to protect the peaceful labor
of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their borders and
territory, and to ensure defense against possible aggression.' 11
"It is known that Soviet units are in the Htmgarian and Rumanian
republics in accord with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental

agree~nts.

Soviet units are in the Polish republic on the' basis af the Potsdam

I
I

I
I
I
I

I
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four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty.

Soviet military units are not

in the other people's democracies."
"For the purpose of assuring mutual security. of the socialist countries, the Soviet Government is prepared to review with the other socialist countries which are members of the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet

I

troops stationed on the territory of the above-mentioned countries.

In so

doing the Soviet Government proceeds from the general principle that stationing the troops of one or another state which is a member of the Warsaw
Treaty on the territory of another state which
is a member of the treaty
r
is done by agreement among all its membe-rs and only with the consent of
the state on the territory of which and at the request of which these
troops are stationed or it is planned to station them."
"The Soviet Government considers it necessary to make a statement in
connection with the events in Hungary.

The course of events has shown

that the working people of Hungary, who have attained great progress on
the basis of the people's democratic system, are rightfully raising the
question of the need to eliminate serious defects in the sphere of

econo~

mic construction, the question of further improving the living standards
of the population, the question of conmating bureaucratic
the state machinery.

d~stortions

in

However, this legitimate and progressive movement

of the working people was soon joined by the forces of black reactionand counterrevolution, which are trying to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of a part of the working people in order to undermine the
foundations of the people's

democra~ic

system in Hungary and to restore

the old landcrwner-capitalist ways in that country."
"The Soviet Government, like the whole Soviet ·people, deeply
regrets that the development ·of events in Hungary has led to bloodshed. 11

I
1

I
I
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"At the request of the Hungarian people's government, ·the Soviet
Government has granted consent to the entry into Budapest of Soviet mili-

1

tary units to help the Hungarian people's army and the Hungarian agencies
of government to bring order to the city. u
"Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units
in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet Government has given its military connnand instructions
to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon
as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian Government."·
"At the same time, the Soviet.,. Government is prepared to enter into
the appropriate negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People·' s
Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the
presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary."
"To guard the socialist achievements of people's democratic Hungary
is the chief and sacred duty of the workers, peasants, intelligentsia, of
all the Hungarian,working people at the present moment."
"The Soviet Government expresses confidence that the peoples of
the socialist countries will not permit foreign and domestic reactionary
forces to shake the foundations of the people's democratic system, a
system established and strengthened by the self-sacrificing struggle
and labor of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia of each country.
They will continue all efforts to remove all obstacles in the path of
further strengthening the democratic foundations, independence, and
sovereignty of their countries; to develop further the socialist fot.mdations of each country, its economy and its culture, for the sake of
an uninterrupted rise in the living standards and cultural level of all
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the working people; they will strengthen the fraternal unity and mutual
aid of the socialist countries to buttress the great cause of peace
and socialism.

I
I
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APPENDIX 0
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THE REAFFIRMATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST SOLIDARITYl
In November, 1957, a world-wide conference of Connnunist parties
(excepting only Yugoslavia) was held in Moscow to repair the
damage done to Communist discipline by de-Stalinization and the
Polish and Hungarian revolutions. While some flexibility of
tactics was admitted, the aim of Communist dictatorship was
made clear, and unyielding doctrinal orthodoxy was demanded.
"The Communist and Workers' Parties taking part in this conference
declare that the Leninist principle bf peaceful coexistence of the

~o

systems, which has been further developed in contemporary circumstances
in the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, is the firm foundation of
the foreign policy of the socialist countries and the reliable foundation
of peace and friendship among the peoples.

The five principles advanced

jointly by the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India and
the program adopted by the Bandung conference of African and Asian countries correspond to the interests of peaceful coexistence •. The struggle
for peace and peaceful coexistence have now become the demands of the
broadest masses in all countries of the world."
"The Connnunist Parties regard the struggle for peace as their
foremost task.

Together with all peace-loving forces, they will do all

in their power to

prevent~war."

l"Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Connnunist
and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, Moscow, November, 1957,"
in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 9 (January 1958): 4-7, in
Robert V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of° Communism, vol. 2,
pp. 270-273.
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"The conference considers that strengthening of the unity and
fraternal cooperation of the socialist states and of the Communist and
Workers' Parties of all countries and clos:ing of the ranks of the international working class, national-liberation and democratic movements take
on special importance in the present situation.

"

"Intensification of the struggle against opportunist trends in
the workers' and Communist movement is of.great importance at the present
stage.

The conference stresses the necessity of resolutely overcoming

revisionism and dogmatism in the ranks of the Communist and Workers'
Parties.

Revisionism and dogmatism 1n the workers' and Communist move-

ment are today, as they have been in the past, of an international. nature.
Dogmatism and sectarianism hinder the development of Marxist-Leninist
theory and its creative application in specific changing conditions,
replace study of the specific situation with quotations and pedantry,
and lead to the Party's isolation from the masses.

A party that has

locked itself up in sectarianism and that has lost contact with the broad
masses can by no means bring victory to the cause of the wo.rking class."
"In condemning dogmatism, the Communist Parties consider the main
danger in present-day conditions to be revisionism

or, in other words,

right-wing opportunism, as a manifestation of bourgeois ideology that
paralyzes the revolutionary energy of the working class and demands the
preservation or restoration of capitalism •. However, dogmatism and
sectarianism can also be the main danger at different stages of development of one party or another.

Each Con:n:nunist Party determines what

danger is the main danger to it at a given time. •

"

"Present-day revisionism seeks to defame the great teaching of

I

I
245

I

I

Marxism-Leninism, declares that it is 'obsolete' and that it has allegedly

I

lost its importance for social development.

I

The revisionists are trying

to destroy the revolutionary soul of Marxism, to undermine the faith
of the working class and the working people in socialism.

I
I

They deny the

historical necessity of a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of ,·
the proletariat during the period of transition .from capitalism to· socialism, deny the leading role of the Marxis·t-Leninist party, deny the
principles of proletarian internationalism, demand abandonment of the
Leninist principles of Party organization and, above all, of democratic
centralism and demand that the

Comm~nist

Party be transformed from a

militant revolutionary organization into a kind of debating club."
"The entire experience of the international Communist movement
teaches that resolute defense by the Communist and Workers' Parties of
the Marxist-Leninist ·unity of their ranks and the banning of factions
and groups that undermine its unity are a necessary guarantee of the
successful accomplishment of the tasks of the socialist revolution and
the building of socialism and communism. • • • "
"The forms of the transition of different countries from capitalism
to socialism may vary.

The working class and its

vanguard-~the

Marxist-

Leninist party--seek to bring about socialist revolution by peaceful
means.

Realization of this possibility would accord with the interests

of the working class and of all the people and with the over-all national
interests of the country."
"In present-day conditions in a number of capitalist countries the
working class, headed by the vanguard, has the possibility--on the basis
of a workers' and people's front or of other possible. forms of agreement

1

I
I
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and political cooperation among the different parties and public organi-

l

zations--to unite the majority of the people, win state power without civil

I
I

war and ensure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands

I

l

of the people.

Relying on the majority of the people and decisively re-

buffing the opportunist elements incapable of relinquishing a policy of
compromise with the capitalists -and landlords, the working class can
defeat the reactionary, antipopular forces, win a firm majority in parliament, transform the parliament from an instrument serving the class
interests of the bourge'oisie into an instrument serving the working
people, develop a broad mass strug&le

outside~the

parliament, break the

resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions
for bringing about the socialist revolution peacefully.

All this will be

possible only by extensive, steady development of the class struggle of
l

the workers, peasant masses and middle urban strata against big monopoly
capital, against reaction, for profound social reforms, for peace.and
socialism."
"In conditions in which the exploiting classes resort to violence
against the people, it is necessary to bear in mind another possibility-nonpeaceful transition to socialism.

Leninism teaches and history con-·

firms that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily.

In

these conditions. the severity and forms of the class struggle will depend
not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance of the reactionary
circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the
use of force by these circles at one or another stage of the struggle for
socialism."
"In each country the real possibility o"f one or another means of
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transition to socialism depends on the specific historical conditions."
11

The Communist Parties stand for the establishment of cooperation

with socialist parties both in the struggle for improving the working
people's living conditions, for extending and preserving their democratic

I

rights, for winning and defending national independence and for peace

I

among peoples and in the struggle for winning power and building social-.
ism.

Although the right-wing leaders of the socialist parties are trying

in every way to impede this cooperation, there are increasing opportunities
for cooperation between the Communists and the socialists on many questions.

The ideological differences. . between the Communist and socialist

parties should not keep them from establishing unity of action on the
many current problems that today confront the workers' movement • • • • ''
"The participants in the conference unanimously express their firm
confidence that, by rallying their ranks and thereby rallying the working
class and the peoples of all countries, the Communist and Workers' Parties
will undoubtedly surmount all obstacles on the path of progress and hasten
great new victories for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism on a
world scale."

1

I
I
j

I
l

APPENDIX P

I

STAGES OF COMECON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION!

l

I
I

"In keeping with the objective process of internationalization of
production, the Parties and Governments of the fraternal socialist coun-

i
·I

tries are advancing along planned lines of socialist economic integration
which represents the highest form of this process at the current stage.
The interim results of the work already

d~ne

in this direction were,. as

we know, sunnned up by the 29th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (COMECON) held in Budapest in June 1975.

The Session was

attended by the Heads of Government of ·the member countries."
"The period between the 28th and 29th COMECON Sessions was marked
by new successes in the member countries' internal and foreign policy
and in further strengthening their friendship, unity and cohesion.
Making optimal use of the advantages of socialist production and steadily
expanding their economic, scientific and technological cooperation, these
countries have secured considerable results in the fields of the economy,
science and technology, and also in ?ecuring higher living standards for
their working people.

COMECON members are implementing the Comprehensive

Program for Socialist Economic Integration; the countries concerned have
signed agreements on the joint construction of large· economic projects

lM. Lesechko, "Stages of COMECON Economic Integration," Kommunist
No. 16 (1975), in Reprints from the Soviet Press 22 (January 1976): 45-55.
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in the fuel, raw-materials and power-generating industries, on specialization and cooperation in production and collective work on a number of
scientific and technological problems."
"In summing up preliminary results in the coordination of their
economic development plans for 1976-80, the Session took note of the
tremendous work accomplished by the COMECON member countries and the
bodies of the Council in this undertaking.

They have now determined

the main lines of economic, scientific and technical cooperation for
the forthcoming five-year perio.d and have reached agreement o~ the concrete measures necessary for their realization in the different sectors ·
of the national economy.

They have paved the way for the steady· and

dynamic growth of their combined production and for expansion of the
economic potential of each separate country and of the entire community."
"Coordination -of economic development plans as the main method for
the organization of cooperation and advancement of international socialist division of labor is becoming increasingly established as the basis
for the agreed development pf the economies of the fraternal countries.
Plans for the new five-year period are being dove-tailed to accomplish
the tasks laid down by the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic
Integration."
"A distinguishing feature of the COMECON coordination today is ·that
it has achieved a qualitatively higher level.

In the past, it dealt

mainly with the sphere of foreign (export-import) trade, determining
the mutual deliveries of commodities.

As a result, matters bearing on

the advancement of production, specialization and cooperation, research,.
development and design, all of which logically precede and determine the
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delivery of goods, remained in the background.

But now marked progress

has been made in this respect."
"Coordination of the economic development plans for 1976-80 helped

I

establish the necessary interconnections in cooperation in the spheres of·
production, science, technology, and economic planning.

Businesslike

contacts between the national planning agencies, broad participation in
various forms of cooperation on the part of branch ministries and departments, of scientific research, design and other organizations, and of
whole industries of the COMECON member countries have acquired. special
importance.

Hundreds, even thousan4s of organizations and enterprises,

and tens of thousands of various specialists are now directly participating in this extensive.process."
"In coordinating their plans, the parties concerned paid special
attention to the extension of international specialization and cooperation in the field of machine-building;("' This has chiefly affected the
production of tractors and other farm machinery, 1llachines for
:industry and the food industry, motor vehicles, and material
equipment.

~ight
handl~ng

The proposed specialization will make it possible to build

separate industries of optimal size, cut dovin on small-quantity producti-0n
and eliminate universalism.

All this will improve economic performance.

The accord reached has been consolidated by long-tenn bilateral and
multilateral agreements, thus already forming the basis for considerable
growth in reciprocal deliveries of plant and machinery."
"For instance, according to preliminary estimates, the overall
volume of such deliveries between the USSR, on the one hand, and the
other COMECON members and Yugoslavia, on the-other, will in the 1976-80
period show a rise of nearly·75 percent·over the level reached in the
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I

Ninth Five-Year Plan period.

I

its export of power-generating equipment, motor vehicles (cars and trucks),

I

I

The Soviet Union is to expand considerably

tractors, other farm machinery, construction and road-building machines,
mining equipment and other machinery.

This will help the fraternal coun-

tries solve more successfully the serious problems confronting them in
the field of power generation, metallurgy, chemical engineering and
petrochemistry, radioelectronics, transport, farming and other sectors
of their national economies."
"The COMECON countries will in turn considerably increase ·their
deliveries of machinery and other

e~uipment

to the USSR on the basis of

cooperation and specialization in production.

These deliveries will be

of increasingly comprehensive character, with a view to accelerating the
development of the Soviet oil refining, petrochemical and chemical industries, light industry and the food industry.

They will also meet the

demand of the USSR in vessels and rolling stock."
"In coordinating their plans, the members of the socialist community
looked thoroughly into the problem of providing themselves with fuel and
raw materials.

This is to be solved by the joint efforts of all the

COMECON member countries, and is conditioned by the tremendous scope and.
high rate ·of their economic growth, as well as by their steadily rising
demand for fuel and raw materials.

A qualitatively new feature here has

been the agreement reached on joint expansion of the output of their vital
fuel and raw-materials industries in accordance with the Comprehensive
Program." ·
"Such factors as strict adherence to the principles of international-·
ism and mutual assistance are helping the COMECON member countries provide·
their rapidly expanding economies with vital raw materials and fuels.

l
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As

in the past, the Soviet Union will make a sizable contribution to this

I

undertaking.

I

next five-year period its deliveries of oil and gas, iron ores, rolled

It has already undertaken to considerably expand in the

'

I

steel and other colillOOdities to the socialist countries to meet a large
share of their demands."
"Proceeding from the preliminary results, it is now possible to
conclude that in the forthcoming five-year period commodity exchange in
trade between the COMECON countries will grow at high rates."
"Long-Term Capital Investments"
"Experience has shown that with the national economies of the
socialist countries having grown to their present proportions, it will
not be possible to solve all of the more complicated problems of production and economic growth in the course of a single five-year period.
Implementation of many of the undertakings promoting the growth

of

material production calls for large capital investments and considerable
time.

That is why it is going to be necessary to extend joint work in

planning for a longer period."
"Take the problem of fuel and energy supplies to the
countries.

~OMECON

This is a problem facing the whole world economy.

member

The social-

ist connnunity has for some time now been solving it far more successfully
than the capitalist world.

In recent years the latter has been afflicted

with another recurring crisis of overproduction, aggravated, moreover,
not only by a monetary and credit crisis, but also by an unprecedented
energy crisis."
"The COMECON countries have created a vast fuel and energy complex{
and their demands are being met in the main out of their own production

I

I
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facilities..

llere. the

Sovi~t"

Union plays. a leadip.$ role.

It has be.en

!

making every effort to increase deliveries· and. to create for its buyers

I

favorable economic terms, despite the unsteady conditions of the world

I

market.

In 1975 the COMECON members will have received from the USSR

close to 130.million tons of conditional fuel.

In the next five years,

it has been decided to boost these deliveries to about

80~

million tons

I

of conditional fuel.

This will mark an increase of 43 percent over the

level of deliveries in the 1971-75 period.

About half of these deli-

veries will be oil and oil products."
"Forecasts show that the demand for energy after 1980 will skyrocket.

Here it should be mentioned that the fuel resources in the

socialist community are distributed unevenly.

Moreover, the conditions

for prospecting and extraction of minerals are becoming more and more
difficult.

Unless timely measures are taken, the production of raw

materials will lag behind the demand.

In particular, though on the

whole the VSSR has adequate fuel and raw-material resources, they are
either scarce or altogether lacking in the European part of the country.
Studies have shown that in the 1976-90 period the USSR will develop its
fuel and to a great extent its raw-material industries

mai~ly

on the

basis of the resources located in the eastern regions of the country.
It should be noted that these territories are characterized by extremely
harsh climatic and geographical conditions.

As a result, the distance

from the source of supply of raw materials to the consumers will increase
by several thousand kilometers.

This gives rise, among other things, to .

the problem of transportation, which now has acquired primary importance .."
"The above circumstances plus a steadily rising demand prompt the

i

I
I
I

countries concerned to work. out joint measures· in advance in order to

I

provide themselves in the future with fuel and raw materials.

I
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The COMECDN

bodies have been instructed to formulate concepts of long-term development

I

of the fuel, energy and raw-materials base.
together with the national organizations.

They are to work on this
Taking into account that to

develop these industries much capital and time will be required, the
29th Session made provisions for the drawing up of comprehensive longterm, special-purpose programs of cooperation to fill the rational needs
of the COMECON countries in the main types of energy as well .as fuel and
raw-materials resources.

Moreover,. it is important to find ways to

secure considerable savings in energy resources and to limit the expansion of energy-consuming industries in regions lacking adequate sources
of such energy.

All this still remains an important scientific and

technological problem.

It will be necessary.to pay special attention

to the introduction of new equipment and advanced production processes
and to the.improvement of power-generating facilities."
11

It will be essential for each country in the COMECON alliance

intensively to increase its own production of mineral fuels.
above all to anthracite, brown coal, lignite and shale.

This refers

There is reason

to hope that it will be possible to increase the extraction of oil and
gas from the continental shelf, i.e., from the seabed.

There are still

considerable untapped ·possibilities fo·r more complete utilization of
water power resources."
"In the-field of power engineering, proper utilization of nuclear
energy offers considerable promise. ·By the end of the 1970s it is proposed to build several large atomic power stations 'in the COMECON

1
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I

countries.

I

Union.

This will be done with the technical assistance of the Soviet

In the subsequent period, many more atomic power stations will be

built in these countries.

The 29th Session instructed the COMECON bodies

to draw up a broad program for the development of atomic technology on
the basis of large-scale cooperation and specialization in production.
The international economic association Interatomenergo is to play an
important role in this.

The countries which have founded it have good

reason to expect vigorous activity from it" and quick realization of the
possibilities of socialist international division of

labor.~·

"The 29th Session of COMECON also decided that a project for a
General Grid for a United Electric Power System should be drawn up for
those European COMECON members who are interested.

When completed, this

system will be a large-scale international undertaking and a new step
in the advancement of socialist economic integration.

The economic

efficiency of the construction of electric power stations and transmission lines, as well as generation and consumption of electricity will
increase.

This in turn will improve the indicators characterizing the

consumption of fuel and energy resources.

The first element of the sys-

tern will be a large 750-kilovolt power transmission line.

~lanned

to go

into operation in 1978, this line will be built on a multilateral basis."
"The reequipment of certain sectors of the national economy on the
basis of the latest achievements in science and technology is a problem
of equal importance and complexity.

Obviously it will be impossible to

solve it within a single five-year period."
"The 29th COMECON Session decided that a long-term ·comprehensive
program for the development of machine-building on the basis of the
most far-reaching specialization and cooperation in production should

l
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I

be drawn up.

This program will enable the COMECON countries successfully

I

to coordinate their efforts in meeting their needs in advanced equipment
1

and reequipping the leading sectors of their national economies."

(

I

'~Agreed

Plan for Multilateral

Integ.ration Measures for 1976-80"
"The 29th Session paid special attention to the discussion of the
Agreed Plan for Multilateral Integration.Measures for 1976-80, which is
a vital outcome

o~

the effort t'o coordinate the national

fleets a qualitatively new stage in·the
economic cooperation.

~dvancement

plan~.

It re-

and improvement of

In actual fact this is the first collective docu-

ment by sovereign socialist states to appear in the history of international relations, one which expresses their common will and combines
their efforts in the solution of specific economic problems."
"The Agreed Plan covers measures for the construction of projects
and additional capacities in the fuel and raw-.materials industries, with
investments to be made by the countries concerned.

Among these are:

the 2800-kilometer Orenburg-Western Frontier (of the USSR)' main gas
pipeline; the 860-kilometer 750-kilovolt Vinnitsa, West Ukraine (USSR)l I

Albertirsa (Hungary) power transmission line; one of the world's largest
pulp mills (in Ust-Ilim) with an annual production capacity of a halfmillion tons of high-quality pulp, and the Kiyembayevski asbestos mining
plant."
"The joint efforts of the fraternal countries in the building of
additional capacities for the production of nickel in the Republic of
Cuba and the broad assistance rendered to Mongolia in the accelerated
development of her nationai economy, in·keeping with the Agreed Plan,

I

I
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are indicative of the genuinely internationalist character of cooperation
between the COMECON nember countries.

I

I

An International Geological

Expedition has been organized to assist Mongolia in the development of
her natural wealth.

It is intended to carry out a comprehensive geolo-

gical prospecting program for numerous minerals·.

The COMEOON countries

will provide financial backing for this effort on a gratis basis."
"The Agreed Plan has covered measures for specialization and
cooperation in the manufacture of electronic computing equipment,
machinery and other equipment for the oil and gas industries, .material
handling equipment, equipment and other facilities for the container
transportation system, equipment for atomic power stations, etc.

In

the field of specialization and cooperation in production, special
attention has been paid to item, unit and element manufacture as the
most efficient form of division of labor with the most promising future.
The Session also determined concrete ways to achieve specialization and
cooperation.in the

p~oduction

of many vital types of products turned out

by the chemical engineering industry."
"The section dealing with scientific and technological problems forms
a component part of the Agreed Plan of Multilateral Measures for Integration.

It covers a range of vital economic problems, such as deter-

mining the most rational utilization of fuel and energy resources,
combining efforts to solve problems in atomic power engineering, finding
new methods for the production of proteins, raising the nutritive value
of existing foodstuffs and developing new high-quality foods, developing
methods for the comprehensive utilization of timber, meas.ures for the
inhibition of corrosion, and others.

The pooling of scientific effort
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in the solution of these problems will help raise the general scientific
and technical potential and the efficiency of research, and accelerate
the assimilation of the latest scientific and technological achievements
in production."
"It is obvious from the content, the character and principles governing the structure of the Agreed Plan that it is an important political and
economic document of the COMECON member countries.

It marks a new stage

in their joint activity, which is characterized by a desire to take the
fullest possible account of their mutual interests.
the Plan will further strengthen

th.~

The realization of

national economies of the fraternal

countries along principles of socialist internationalism.

At the same

time it will considerably further the practical realization of the
Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration."
"Economic Potential of Socialist Community
Steadily Rising as Result of Cooperation"
j

i.

!
!

!

"The advances already made in the promotion of socialist economic
integration convincingly testify to the vitality of the Marxist-Leninist ·
policy pursued by the ruling Communist and Workers' Parties in the COMECON
countries.

Thanks to their efforts, which are guided by the principles

of proletarian socialist internationalism and directed toward the steady
extension of cooperation and. coordination of the activities of COMECON
members, both in the sphere of foreign policy and in the field of the
economy, the economic potential of each socialist country and of the
entire. community is steadily growing.

At the same time the new community

of countries united in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is

I

I
I
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becoming ever more attractive (as a trading partner) to the rest of the
world. 11
"In the period from 1950 to 1974, the overall national income of

I

the COME.CON member countries increased 520 percent, as compared to a
growth of 190.percent in the countries of the European Economic Community
and 180 percent in all the economically developed capitalist countries.
During the same period, the industrial output of the COMECON countries
increased by 820 percent, as compared to 240 percent in the economically
developed capitalist countries."
"Those COMECON countries which were less developed in the past have
now built up modern industries, including the most advanced industrial
sectors.

The economic levels of the countries belonging to the socialist

community are being constantly raised.

Their growing national incomes

form the basis for the steadily rising living and cultural standards of
their peoples.

Production of consumer goods is being increased, with

quality beipg improved and the choice widened.

Housing construction is

being conducted on a vast scale." .
"The economic achievements and adherence to democratic principles
in relations between the fraternal countries have also enhanced the
international prestige of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
The Council has been granted the status of observer in the United Nations.
The agreement on cooperation between COMECON and Finland is being put
into practice.
and Mexico.

Not so long ago similar agreements were signed with Iraq

Other countries and organizations have been showing serious

interest in contacts with COMECON.
not only

no~

The COMECON member countries have

set themselves the goal of isolating themselves from the

rest of the world, they have ·been constantly working to establish

1

I

I
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equitable relations and to promote trade with third countries on the
basis of mutual advantage., regardless of social and state systems.

The

fruitful results of the Conference on·Security and Cooperation in Europe
will, beyond doubt, open new, highly favorable prospects in this respect."
"The 29th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
adopted important decisions which determine the patterns for the further
advancement and extension of socialist economic integration.

The results

of the Session have been approved by the Central Committees of the
Conmunist and Workers' Parties and by the Governments of the COMECON
member countries."
"In their decision on the work of the 29th COMECON Session, the
Politbureau of the Central Connnittee of the CPSU and the USSR Council
of Ministers have expressed confidence in the fact that implementation
of the measures it outlined would help to utilize additional possibilities for the solution of economic problems confronting the socialist
countries, and to advance cooperation and socialist economic integration
both in the forthcoming five-year period and in the longer term."

